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INTRODUCTION
The International Law Commission ("ILC" or the "Commission"),
the treaty-drafting division of the United Nations,1 has been wrestling, in
one form or another, with the legal ramifications of transboundary pollu-
tion since the early 1970's.2 Two Special Rapporteurs have supervised the
Commission's work in this area, which has been carried out under the
ponderous title "International Liability for Injurious Consequences Aris-
ing Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law."
The first Special Rapporteur was the scholar and diplomat, Mr. Rob-
ert Q. Quentin-Baxter of New Zealand. The second Special Rapporteur is
Ambassador Julio Barboza, an Argentine diplomat. When Ambassador
Barboza assumed office upon the death of Mr. Quentin-Baxter, Ambassa-
dor Barboza stated and "reiterated" that he did not intend to reopen a
general debate on the basic concepts developed by Mr. Quentin-Baxter. s
With his Fifth Report on the topic, 4 submitted the year of his death, Mr.
1. Article 13 of the United Nations Charter, G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 105
(1947), authorizes the General Assembly to "initiate studies and make recommendations
• . . for the purpose of encouraging the progressive development of interntional law and its
codification." Acting on this Charter mandate, the General Assembly created the Interna-
tional Law Commission in 1947 to carry out the twin efforts of codification and development
of international law. See arts. 15-24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission,
reprinted in United Nations, The Work of the International Law Commission (4th ed.
1988). Professor Sinclair has noted that the distinction between codification and develop-
ment has not been maintained: "[tihe Commission has never, since its very early days,
sought to characterize the fruits of its labours on any specific topic as falling squarely within
one or the other of the two categories." SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 46-
47 (1987) [hereinafter SINCLAIR]. See also H. Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of
International Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L. L. 16 (1955) and RAMCHARAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION: ITS APPROACH TO THE CODIFICATION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1977). As a rule, the Commission meets in early summer in Geneva and the
General Assembly's Sixth Committee (Legal) reviews the report of the Commission during
the Assembly's meeting in New York in the fall.
2. See notes 187-212 and accompanying text, infra.
3. Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, by Mr. Julio Barboza, Special Rap-
porteur 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/394, reprinted in [1985] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1985 (Part 1) [hereinafter Preliminary Report]. Ambassador Barboza also
stated that "[a] first comparison of the earlier reports ... with the materials setting out the
practice of States seems to indicate that certain trends and general lines exist independently
of any personal conceptions, and that many of the courses proposed by the previous Special
Rapporteur have already been marked out in State Practice." Id. at 12. In the same re-
port, Ambassador Barboza stated that the "whole topic [would] be entirely reviewed, with a
view not to making changes, but to seeking the certainty which alone gives inner convic-
tion." Id. at 16(f).
4. Fifth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rap-
porteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/383 and Add. 1, reprinted in [1984] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1984 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report].
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Quentin-Baxter had proposed five draft articles, which had evolved from
the schematic outline of the topic included in his Third Report in 1982.'
By the second year of his tenure, Ambassador Barboza was announcing
that he intended to focus on the schematic outline rather than the Quen-
tin-Baxter draft articles, and was questioning the "unity of the topic,"6
expressing concern about the continuum Quentin-Baxter had worked out
to accommodate the prevention and reparation aspects of the topic. In his
view, "the concept of 'injury' in the sense of material harm constituted
the cement of that 'continuum': injury in that sense, whether as injury
which had already occurred or as potential injury, which was the
equivalent of risk, was the focus of the entire topic."'
Special Rapporteur Barboza's Fourth Report, presented in April,
1988, also contained draft articles, ten in all. A comparison of the first of
the articles he proposed there with the first of the articles proposed by
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter indicates that Ambassador Barboza,
rather than focusing on liability for injury or harm, would have liability
follow the creation of "an appreciable risk of. . . transboundary harm."
Indeed, the Special Rapporteur's 1988 proposals, at least on their face,
eliminated any liability for actual injuries, establishing creation of risk as
the sole possible source of liability.'
5. Third Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rap-
porteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360 (incorporating A/CN.4/360/Corr. 1), reprinted in [19821 II
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1982 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter
Third Report]. Professor Magraw has stated that Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's
"schematic outline received what may be described as tentative tacit approval in the Sixth
Committee." Magraw, Transboundry Harm: The International Law Commission's Study of
International Liability, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305, 308 (1986) [hereinafter Magraw I.
6. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-eighth Ses-
sion, T 193, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986), reprinted in [1986] II Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1986 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1986 ILC Report]. Specifically, Ambassador
Barboza said that
he intended to give detailed consideration to such questions as causality,
shared expectations, the incomplete obligations of prevention envisaged in the
schematic outline, the duty to make reparations and the role of international
organizations, which had all been commented on during the discussions, and to
leave open the question of the final scope of the topic. He had also indicated
that [he] intended to re-examine the five draft articles submitted by the previ-
ous Special Rapporteur.
Summary Records of the Meetings of the Thirty-eighth Session, 29, reprinted in [1986] I
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1986 (Part 1). See also First Report on
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law, by Mr. Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/402,
reprinted in [1986] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1986 (Part 1) [here-
inafter First Report].
7. Id.
8. Mr. Quentin-Baxter's proposed Article 1 states:
Article 1. Scope of the present Articles: The present articles apply with respect
to activities and situations which are within the territory or control of a State,
and which give rise or may give rise to a physical consequence affecting the use
1990
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Commentary in the Commission's 1988 session and in the debates of
the Sixth Committee that year made it clear that, rather than the ap-
proval that had previously been accorded the broad, general outlines of
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's work, this topic had become quite
controversial:9
The debate [at the ILC's 1988 Session] highlighted the fact that,
while the Commission has been working on this topic since 1980, the
project is still at an embryonic stage of development. There remains
no clear understanding within the Commission of the kinds of activi-
ties to which the draft would apply, nor is there agreement on the
fundamental question whether the applicable standard of liability is
strict (objective) or based on fault. There is even disagreement within
the Commission over whether the purpose of the draft is to provide
for prevention or compensation. 0
Virtually all the representatives who participated in the 1988 Sixth
Committee debate on this topic expressed difficulties with the risk con-
cept as set forth and defined in the draft Article 1 Ambassador Barboza
proposed in his Fourth Report.1 Even those who seemed to view Special
or enjoyment of areas within the territory or control of any other State.
Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report, supra note 2, at 1 1.
The first draft article proposed in Special Rapporteur Barboza's 1988 Report reads thusly:
Article 1. Scope of the present Articles: The present articles shall apply with
respect to activities carried out under the jurisdiction of a State as vested in it
by international law, or, in the absence of such jurisdiction, under the effective
control of the State, when such activities create an appreciable risk of causing
transboundary injury.
Fourth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts
Not Prohibited by International Law by Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur, 17, U.N.
Doc.A/CN.4/413, to be reprinted in [1988] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER. A/1988 (Part 2) [hereinafter Fourth Report].
9. One member of the Commission, Mr. Stephen J. McCaffrey, who is also Special Rap-
porteur for the International Watercourses topic (see notes 47-67 and accompanying text,
infra), has summarized the shift effected by Ambassador Barboza by stating that:
During the Commission's discussion of the fourth report, a basic division
emerged between those members who believed that the topic should be con-
fined to activities that create a risk of transboundary harm and those who
thought it should cover the entire field of international liability for trans-
boundary harm. While the former would base the topic upon risk, the latter
focused upon harm and believed that risk should not play such a predominant
role. The distinction has important implications for the extent to which the
draft emphasizes prevention over reparation, anticipatory procedures of notice
and consultation over post hoc obligations of compensation.
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 153, 170 (1989).
10. 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 144, 150-51 (1988).
11. See generally Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Fortieth Session (1988): Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly during its Forty-third Session, Rerort by the Secretariat 11-63,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.431, 18 January 1989.
The representative of Brazil, Carlos Calero Rodrigues, stated that he "believed that
'harm' should constitute an essential criterion in the question of remedy whereas 'risk'
should remain the basis for the rule of prevention." Forty-third General Assembly, Sixth
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Committee, 25th Meeting, 31 October 1988, 2, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2570 [hereinafter 31 October
1988 Press Release]. He did not favor working with only "harm" as a criterion, thus cover-
ing only reparation and limiting the topic to its current title, believing instead that the
articles "should also deal with prevention." Summary Record of the 25th Meeting, Sixth
Committee 18, U.N. Doc. 1/C.6/43/SR.25 [hereinafter Summary Record]. In his view:
If the articles were to cover both prevention and reparation, then both the
concept of "harm" and that of "risk" might have a place in them. However,
"risk" should not become the predominant concept. If that approach prevailed,
reparation for harm actually caused would be conditional on the determination
that the activity causing the harm involved risk, i.e., in the words of article 2,
that it was an activity "highly likely" to cause harm. If harm had been pro-
duced, it was immaterial to try to ascertain whether the activity created risk. It
might even be said that in every case in which harm occurred, there was a risk
of it occurring. The demonstration was made by the very fact that harm was
produced. However, that amounted to admitting that the basis for reparation
was "harm", not "risk". The introduction of the concept of "risk" was unneces-
sary and might be a source of confusion. If an action was not considered highly
likely, or even simply likely, to cause harm and harm was caused, should the
victim then be left to bear his loss or injury? That would contravene one of the
principles . . . on which there had been general agreement in the Commission.
Id.
Another of Mr. Calero Rodrigues' comments indicated that he did not believe it was
proper to turn the topic around so that its primary emphasis was on risk: "The principle of
reparations was the very essence of responsibility; he hoped to see included in the formula-
tion for implementing this matter, all damages, whatever they might be." 31 October 1988
Press Release, supra at 3.
Mr. Calero Rodrigues also endorsed the idea that liability should not result from a find-
ing of wrongfulness, and indicated approval for a flexible liability regime but one that never-
theless provides compensation for all appreciable harm: "There had been examples in the
past of compensation being given ex gratia for harm caused by lawful activities. That had
been done on the basis of a sort of moral obligation; it was now a matter of making that
obligation, in such cases, a legal obligation." Summary Record, supra at 18-19.
The representative of Sierra Leone, Abdul Koroma, also indicated that he was uncom-
fortable with a risk-based analysis. He reported to the Committee that:
While in favour of the proposed topic, he had reservations on the question of
liability. He insisted on the need for observing the rule that: a State which
caused harm to another State, incurred liability to the injured State which was
entitled to compensation by the source State. Liability ensued from the very
existence of an injurous act.
31 October 1988 Press Release, supra at 3.
In his view liability had to be linked with harm:
Liability was not a consequence of the risky nature of the enterprise, but
flowed from the fact that harm had been caused to the injured State. That was
a more solid foundation and should be the basis of the topic. Risk was a matter
of fact and not of law and, therefore, could not be the main criterion for
liability.
Summary Record, supra at 22.
The representative of Ireland, Francis Mahon Hayes, was equally critical of the risk-
based regime, stating that although risk "should serve as a rational basis for the notion of
prevention . ..and while it was an essential element of liability, it was unacceptably re-
strictive, providing for a regime of liability that would be rendered inoperable in many
cases." Forty-third General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 27th Meeting, 2 November, 1988,
1, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2572 [hereinafter 2 November 1988 Press Release]. The representative of
the German Democratic Republic agreed: "the term 'appreciable risk' was too vague to serve
as a criterion in actual situations, especially since it limited the range of liability to mea-
1990
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Rapporteur Barboza's approach with some favor had criticisms. 2 Only
two nations - the United Kingdom and Japan - expressed whole-
hearted approval of the risk-based approach."
Ambassador Barboza responded to these many criticisms in his Fifth
Report " and presented substantially revised versions of his proposed ar-
ticles, which now total twelve. Ambassador Barboza labeled the ILC and
the Sixth Committee debates of the proposals of his Fourth Report "ex-
tremely fruitful," 5 and then went on to spend a large portion of his re-
port explaining and, to a certain extent, altering the concept of risk he
had propounded the previous year. He stated that his emphasis on risk
was designed to avoid introducing the "dreaded" concept of strict or ab-
sures for prevention." Id. at 2.
Andreas Jacovides, the representative of Cyrpus, noted that "[ulsing the notion of ap-
preciable risk as the sole basis of liability would limit the scope of the topic," and in com-
menting on the Watercourses topic endorsed the "concept of 'appreciable harm'" as provid-
ing "as factual and objective a standard as possible." 2 November 1988 Press Release,
supra, at 3.
Robert B. Rosenstock, the representative of the United States, seemed to agree that
harm rather than risk should be the preferred approach: "It was better to consider the ac-
tual injury rather than the risk, and to deal within a strict framework of objective liability in
which the causal relationship between a legal act and an injury suffered by third parties was
the condition for the implementation of the liability process." 2 November 1988 Press Re-
lease, supra, at 7.
12. Harmut Hillgenberg, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, while
expressing satisfaction that " 'appreciable risk' had been retained as the main criterion of
liability," also stressed that "the Commission should have a clear idea of the criteria of
liability." In his view, the "basis for defining the concept of liability" requires considerations
of 'appreciable risk' along with considerations of 'transboundary injury.' 2 November 1988
Press Release, supra note 11, at 2-3. The Chinese representative, Xu Guanjian, while stating
that "[hle supported the notion of 'appreciable risk' as a criterion for liability," nevertheless
argued that "other criteria ... should be retained because risk, as a single criterion, would
exclude certain activities from the scope of the future instrument." Id. at 5. Helmut Tuerk,
the representative of Austria, stated that liability in transboundary pollution situations had
"two functions": covering the risk of the accident and covering significant harm caused in
the territory of other States. Id. at 4. Francisco Villagran-Kramer, the representative of
Guatemala, while acknowledging the validity of consideration of risk, stated that "there was
an equation between risk and injury: 'risk' allowed for the delimitation of liability; apprecia-
ble injury was an essential component." Id. at 7.
13. Arthur Watts, the representative of the United Kingdom, stated that "[hie sup-
ported including the notion of appreciable risk, which, even if it allowed the exclusion of
certain lawful actions, still allowed this innovative regime to be reconciled with the demands
of technological evolution and scientific research." 2 November 1988 Press Release, supra
note 11, at 6. Sumio Tarui, the representative of Japan, stated that "[t]he proposed instru-
ment should only aim at activities which created an 'appreciable risk,' as in draft article 1."
He, too, though, expressed the opinion that "[t]he notion of appreciable risk should be bet-
ter defined." Id. at 7.
14. Fifth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law by Julio Barboza, Special Rapporteur, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/423 and Corr. 1 and Corr. 2, to be reprinted in [1989] II Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1989 (Part 2) [hereinafter Fifth Report].
15. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at V 1.
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solute liability,"6 and to establish workable limits on the topic." Ambas-
sador Barboza did, however, note that "[t]he Commission and the Sixth
Committee were . reluctant to accept the concept of 'risk' in the form
in which it was used in the fourth report."" He went on to state that he
could not "disregard the important body of opinion in the Commission
which prefers not to use the concept of 'risk' as a limiting factor," and
expressed confidence that "such thinking" could be incorporated in the
draft articles, implying that only minor alterations need be made." Then,
without any further acknowledgment that he was introducing a change,
Ambassador Barboza included liability for actual harm along with liabil-
ity for creation of the risk of harm in his new first article.2 He rather off-
handedly, after his explanation about limiting the topic, stated that "[a]
legal text can . ..mix two different types of liability ... ""
This change, however, did not completely satisfy those who had ex-
pressed problems with the "risk" theory, and many still objected to the
Special Rapporteur's continuing focus on risk. While some commentators
expressed their appreciation for the changes introduced by Ambassador
Barboza,2 2 many still expressed concern about any dependence whatso-
16. Id. at T 7, 11 and 14.
17. Id. at 1 4. In Ambassador Barboza's view, there are three possible instances of
harm: the first involves "an injury that has occurred," which must be compensated for by
the "one who is to blame, in the broadest sense"; the second involves situations where "no
one is to blame for the specific act which caused the injury," in which case, "the person who
undertook the activity of which that act forms a part must pay compensation normally be-
cause it is he who benefits from the results of that activity" or because he created the dan-
ger; the third involves situations where, as he put it, "the distinction between the two [for-
mer] kinds of fault cannot be made, as would be the case with injury caused not by an
activity but by an isolated act beyond the control of the perpetrator or by a thing which is
not normally dangerous." See id. at 77 5-6. According to Ambassador Barboza, only the first
two instances are covered by his risk theory, and the third represents the anathema absolute
of strict liability he designed the risk theory to avoid. The third instance, he stated, is one
where there is no link of the harmful act to an activity. Ambassador Barboza has long in-
sisted on using the word "activities" rather than the "acts" of the formal title of his topic,
arguing that it is more appropriate. He emphasizes that, according to his risk theory,
"[Iliability is linked to the nature of the activity," and for that reason the isolated "acts" of
the third instance are not "included in the scope of [this] topic." Fifth Report, supra note
14, at 1 14.
18. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 11.
19. Id., supra note 14, at 1 12.
20. The new proposed Article 1 ("Scope of the present articles") reads as follows:
The present articles shall apply with respect to activities carried out in the
territory of a State or in other places under its jurisdiction as recognized by
international law or, in the absence of such jurisdiction, under its control,
when the physical consequences of such activities cause, or create an apprecia-
ble risk of causing transboundary harm throughout the process.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 16. See also note 8 supra, for comparison of Quentin
Baxter Proposed article 1 and the first version of Barboza's Proposed article 1.
21. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 3.
22. The representative of Ireland, Francis Mahon Hayes, noted that his country "par-
ticularly welcomed an amendment to article 1 so as to give "harm" and "risk" an equal role.
Forty-fourth General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 32nd Meeting, 3 November, 1989, 7,
1990
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ever on a risk-based theory.23 By far, the largest number of comments in
the Sixth Committee emphasized the importance of the topic, 2 4 and the
need for more innovative approaches to deal with the increasingly serious
environmental problems that face the international community.25 Many
U.N. Doc. GA/L/2628 [hereinafter 3 November 1989 Press Release]. Ghassan M. Hussain,
the representative of Iraq, expressed the opinion that his country "welcomed the extension
of the scope of the topic to include not only activities creating an appreciable risk of causing
transboundary harm, but also caused harm." Forty-fourth General Assembly, Sixth Com-
mittee, 33rd Meeting, 6 November, 1989, 7, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2629 [hereinafter 6 November
1989 Press Release]. The representative of Bahrain, Husain M. Al-Baharna, stated that
"[h]is delegation was pleased that redrafting articles on international liability seemed a step
towards dealing with that controversial area." Id. at 3.
23. Carlos Calero Rodriques, the representative of Brazil, asserted that "his delegation
had consistently maintained that harm should be the basis for . . . compensation and that
risk should have its place in provisions related to prevention." Forty-fourth General Assem-
bly, Sixth Committee, 31st Meeting, 2 November, 1989, 2, U.N. Doc. GA/L/2627 [hereinaf-
ter 2 November 1989 Press Release]. The representative of Canada, Edward G. Lee, stated
that "the two concepts of risk and harm should be dealt with separately," and that his
country's position was that "liability should attach in the case of 'appreciable harm,'" while
the "concept risk" had a "important role" to play in stimulating preventive measures, and
even, perhaps, identifying the standard of care to be applied." Id. at 3. The representative
of Bahrain agreed with the latter part of this approach, stating that "his delegation pro-
posed that the Commission adopt a dual approach to the question of risk and liability. One
would establish the criterion of harm or injury for liablity; the other would determine the
risk criterion from preventive measures." 6 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at
3.
The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Hillgenberg, deplored
the fact that "after 11 years of work" on the topic, "'clear contours' could not yet be dis-
cerned," id. at 4, while the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Wolfgang
Hampe, questioned the risk-based theory, suggesting that further work on the topic "should
concentrate on particularly hazardous activities." 3 November 1989 Press Release, supra
note 22, at 4.
24. See comments of Hans Correll, representative of Sweden, 2 November 1989 Press
Release, supra note 23, at 5 (Sweden seeks "high priority for the proposed convention");
Gerhard Hafner, representative of Austria, 6 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22,
at 2 (the subject has "increasing importance ... because of growing threats to the environ-
ment"); Husain M. Al-Baharna, id. at 3 ("recent catastrophes emphasized the urgent need
for international rules regarding the grave risks stemming from transboundary pollution");
and James Crawford, representative of Australia, id. at 4 ("Australia welcome[s] the new
draft articles . . . because of the increased importance of environmental issues").
25. See comments of Mr. Lee, 2 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 23, at 3
("The time ha[s] come to go beyond the precedents of the Trail Smelter, Lac Lanoux and
Corfu Channel Cases and the Stockholm Principle 21, as well as the results of law-making
conferences"); Mr. Correll, id. at 5 ("the Committee [is] developing progressive law where
classical concepts might not apply, since the required approach was to protect the victim's
interest without identifying a culprit. Political and other considerations had resulted in an
overly vague draft, and some means to put it into effect should be included in a new text");
Tullio Treves, the representative of Italy, 3 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at
6 ("The obligation of reparation at the State of origin for damages caused by activities not
prohibited by international law should be residuary in character . . . it would be advisable
for the Commission to consider in detail the provisions relating to the obligations of co-
operation and prevention... "); S.A. Ordzhonikidze, representative of the Soviet Union, 6
November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at 3 ("The instrument should be of a univer-
sal character and be acceptable in cases covering all forms of harmful activities. Due account
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of those who commented in the Sixth Committee expressed support for
the inclusion of provisions designed to protect the "commons," or the
general world environment.2 6 It is particularly ironic that the members of
the United Nations are thus themselves increasingly sensitive to the in-
tensification of world opinion on environmental matters and are support-
ing, at least rhetorically, new approaches to defining and new proposals
for solving the environmental problems that affect all the inhabitants of
this globe, whatever their nationality, 7 even while agreement on the most
fundamental matters continues to elude those charged with codification
of international law in this area.
This article examines the risk vs. harm distinction introduced in the
Fourth Report (1988) of Ambassador Barboza, the alterations he made to
this approach in his Fifth Report (1989) and the effect the issue of strict
liability may have on the success of attempts to codify international law
on liability for transboundary harm. It argues that even though Special
Rapporteur Barboza claims that he is working assiduously to avoid the
"dreaded" concept of strict or absolute liability his approach is one that,
rather than avoiding the issue, inevitably emphasizes the need to resolve
it before there can be any meaningful progress on this important topic.
This article also argues that, while the issue of strict liability is one
that should be considered seriously and that a form of strict liability
should be adopted on the international plane in order to provide relief for
those harmed physically by transboundary events, especially in pollution-
related situations, Special Rapportuer Barboza's approach to the question
of strict liability has, because it has been contradictory, not been condu-
cive to progress. Special Rapporteur Barboza shifted the focus of the
topic itself to "risk" from the "harm" emphasized by Special Rapporteur
Quentin-Baxter, and then reinserted liability for actual harm in the scope
of his topic.2" His Fourth Report can be interpreted as an attempt, by
means of his liability-for-risk standard, to introduce a disguised strict lia-
bility standard, but in his Fifth Report he specifically denounces the
should be taken of the fact that existing conventions on the subject were limited and prece-
dents were consequently hard to come by."); Mr. Al-Baharna, id. ("There [is] a definite
need for an 'umbrella' convention in the area of international law."); and Mr. Rosenstock,
id. at 5 (the Commission's work is "a search for ways to respond to relatively new needs and
concerns, a search for 'law for politicians,' rather than codifying even moderately well-estab-
lished State practice").
26. See comments of Mr. Lee, 2 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 23, at 3
("the global commons should be addressed in the future within the context of the draft");
Mr. Treves, 3 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at 6 ("The Commission would
be missing an opportunity if it were to leave outside the scope of its articles the concept of
global commons, whose importance was increasing in parallel with the general shrinking of
the world"); and Mr. Crawford, 6 November 1989 Press Release, supra note 22, at 4 ("his
country particularly supported the need for articles to deal with situations threatening harm
to areas beyond national jurisdiction-the 'global commons' ").
27. See discussion of Declaration of the Hague at notes 109-12 and accompanying text,
infra.
28. See Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 16.
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"dreaded" concept of strict liability.29 What has been lost in this process
is a chance for the international community to debate strict liability.
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's "soft-law" formulations of the
prevention duties of States with respect to transboundary harm also
seemed to be another victim of Ambassador Barboza's approach: in the
past, Special Rapporteur Barboza indicated that his risk-based approach
to the topic was intended to completely abrogate the "soft-law" approach.
With his Fifth Report, however, Ambassador Barboza, without acknowl-
edging what he is doing, seems to be embracing at least some elements of
the Quentin-Baxter approach: he strengthened the prevention obligations
of states and proposed new articles on "Notification, Information and
Warning by the Affected States."
This article concludes that strict liability for transboundary injury is
a concept that the international community needs to adopt in order to
face up to its obligation to compensate for, and deter, activities that cause
such harm. However, that same standard is unworkable for the duties of
States that bear on the prevention of such harm. For these reasons the
scheme developed by Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter to promote co-
operation of States for prevention of environmental damage, while not
perfect, is certainly the best alternative possible.
I. BACKGROUND
A. International Liability: The Origins and Bases of the Work of the
International Law Commission on Transboundary Pollution
The World Commission on Environmental and Development (the
"World Commission"), an independent body established by the General
Assembly in 1983, published a 1987 Report that began with the following
assessment:
In the middle of the twentieth century, we saw our planet from space
for the first time. Historians may eventually find that this vision had a
greater impact on thought than did the Copernican revolution of the
16th century, which upset the human self-image by revealing that the
Earth is not the centre of the universe. From space, we see a small
and fragile ball dominated not by human activity and edifice but by a
pattern of clouds, oceans, greenery and soils. Humanity's inability to
fit its doings into that pattern is changing planetary systems, funda-
mentally. Many such changes are accompanied by life-threatening
hazards. This new reality from which there is no escape, must be rec-
ognized - and managed. 30
The threat is perceived as immediate. The Governing Council of the
United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP") has stated that
29. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, too, worked to avoid controversy related to the
application of strict liability. See notes 189-98 and accompanying text, infra.
30. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future 1
(1987).
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"[e]nvironmental degradation, in its various forms, has assumed such
proportions as can cause irreversible changes in ecosystems which
threaten to undermine human well being."3'
But the solution will not be an easy one. There are legal as well as
scientific issues to be managed in this area. The General Assembly and
the Commission recognized these issues early on and moved deliberately
toward dealing with them in the Commission. Presently at the ILC, how-
ever, notwithstanding broad-based concern about protecting the environ-
ment, the most elementary legal propositions remain quite controversial.
Early on, this did not seem to be the case. In 1970, when the Commission
adopted a plan for future work on the topic of state responsibility, it set
aside for separate treatment "questions relating to responsibility arising
out of the performance of certain lawful activities'- such as spatial and
nuclear activities" . . . [because, "oJwing to the entirely different basis of
the so-called responsibility for risk, the different nature of the rules gov-
erning it, its content and the forms it may assume, a simultaneous exami-
nation of the two subjects could only make both of them more difficult to
grasp. '3 2 The Commission also stated that "[f]rom the outset of its work
on the topic of State responsibility, [it] agreed that topic should deal only
with the consequence of internationally wrongful acts. . . .That conclu-
sion met with broad acceptance in the discussion of the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session, in 1970."I 8
31. United Nations Environment Programme, Environmental Perspective to the Year
2000 and Beyond, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/26 [hereinafter UNEP Report]. This Report was
adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 42/186 on December 11, 1987 "as a broad
framework to guide national action and international co-operation on policies and program-
mes aimed at achieving environmentally sound development." See also McCaffrey Fourth
Report, infra note 52, at §33.
32. Second Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. Roberto Ago, Special Rapporteur
6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/233, reprinted in [1970] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER. A/1970. The Commission has been quite consistent in this view, stating nine years
later that it
fully recognizes the importance not only of questions of responsibility for inter-
nationally wrongful acts, but also of questions concerning the obligation to
make good any injurious consequences arising out of certain activities not pro-
hibited by international law (especially those which, because of their nature,
present certain risks). The Commission takes the view, however, that the latter
category of questions cannot be treated jointly with the former. A joint exami-
nation of the two subjects could only make both of them more difficult to
grasp. To be obliged to bear any injurious consequences of an activity which is
itself lawful, and to be obligated to face the consequences (not necessarily lim-
ited to compensation) of the breach of a legal obligation, are not comparable
situations. It is only because the relative poverty of legal language that the
same term is used to designate both.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-first Session 1 60,
U.N. Doc. A/34/10/1979, reprinted in [1979] II Y.B. INT'L COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.
A/1979 (Part 2).
33. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirtieth Session
172, U.N. Doc A/33/10/1978, reprinted in [1978] II Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER. A/1978 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1978 ILC Report].
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In 1973, there was again acknowledgment in the Commission that, in
the framework of the state responsibility topic, "it was becoming increas-
ingly difficult to make a clear distinction between responsibility deriving
from a wrongful act and responsibility deriving from a lawful act."'34 That
same year the General Assembly endorsed the general proposition that
the Commission begin studying the international liability topic "at an ap-
propriate time." In 1974 and 1975, the General Assembly suggested that
the Commission begin work on the topic "as soon as appropriate," and,
by 1976, had employed the phrase "at the earliest possible time,"35 and in
1977 "invited" the Commission to begin work.36 In 1978, the Commission
established a Working Group to consider future work on the topic. The
group consisted of Mr. Quentin-Baxter (Chair), Mr. Robert Ago (the Spe-
cial Rapporteur for the State Responsibility topic), Mr. Jorge Castaneda
and Mr. Frank X.J.C. Njenga3 On the basis of the report of the Working
Group, the Commission decided to appoint a Special Rapporteur, choos-
ing Mr. Quentin-Baxter for the job." At the beginning of his task, Mr.
Quentin-Baxter expressed confidence in the Commission's commitment to
the topic and in his mandate from the Commission for work that met the
development as well as the codification functions of the ILC.39 When the
Commission discussed Mr. Quentin-Baxter's Preliminary Report, "[tihere
was . . . broad agreement that the existing title of the topic, although
abstract and rather unwieldy, was . . . an extremely valuable guide-
line. . . . [because it] enumerated each of the four key elements of the
topic, and was in itself a directive endorsed by the General Assembly as
well as the Commission."4 Moreover, "[a] majority of the speakers took
34. Summary Records of the Twenty-fifth Session of the International Law Commis-
sion, reprinted in [1973] I Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1973.
35. 1978 ILC Report, supra note 33, at 1 174.
36. Id. at 175. Professor Magraw has characterized this as "prodding from the General
Assembly," Magraw I, supra note 5, at 307.
37. 1978 1LC Report, supra note 33, at 9. The language the Commission employed in
describing the topic as it stood when the Working Group was formed is instructive:
In past years, the new topic has been described in varying terms; for example,
"responsibility for risk arising out of the performance of certain lawful activi-
ties, such as spatial and nuclear activities," "this other form of responsibility,
which is in reality a safeguard against the risks of certain lawful activities,"
and "a study of that other form of responsibility, which is the protection
against the hazards associated with certain activities that are not prohibited by
international law." In the Sixth Committee similar expressions have been used,
although during one discussion some representatives said they believed that
there might be "a third category of acts ... which, because of their dangerous
nature, fell halfway between lawful and unlawful acts." The simple distinction
between lawful and unlawful acts has prevailed however, and by 1974 the title
of the new topic had assumed its present wording.
1978 ILC Report, supra note 33, at T 176 (footnotes omitted).
38. Id. at 1 177.
39. See discussion of the work of the ILC at note 1 and accompanying text, supra.
40. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second
Session, U.N. Doc. A/35/10, reprinted in [1980] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1980 (Part 2).
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the view that the topic was adequately founded in existing legal doctrine
and that the Commission's task was to develop this doctrine to meet the
unprecedented needs of the present day.'
41
In his Preliminary Report, 2 Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter fo-
cused on the injury the title of his topic commended to his attention and
noted that "the elaboration of rules relating to liability for injurious con-
sequences in respect of acts not prohibited by international law revolves
around the variable concept of 'harm.' "4' He emphasized the good faith
element essential to effectively govern relations between States in the
event of such injury and the necessary subsequent negotiations and agree-
ment on reparation/compensation. He also noted again that his topic
dealt with injuries caused by lawful acts
if such an injury. . . is not caused by a breach of a specific interna-
tional obligation, a State suffering such an injury or danger is not jus-
tified in demanding any limitation of the freedom of action of another
State in relation to matters arising within that State's jurisdiction, ex-
cept the minimum needed to ensure the redress and abatement of the
injury or danger, taking into account any beneficial, though competing
interests.4
Mr. Quentin-Baxter acknowledged that the basic fact of the topic - that
the injuries or harm involved do not result from breaches of international
law - was balanced by the obligation of States to nevertheless make
good the harm.' With his topic so neatly outlined, with an acknowledg-
41. Id. at 139.
42. Preliminary Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Spe-
cial Rapporteur, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/334 and Add. 1 and 2, reprinted in [19801 II Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter, Prelimi-
nary Report].
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id.
45. As one publicist has put it:
In the view of the Commission, the very title of the topic is an affirmation of
the broad principle that States, even when undertaking acts that international
law does not prohibit, have a duty to consider the interests of other States
which may be affected. The topic is thus concerned with situations in which
liability does not depend on "wrongfulness" - a term used to characterize an
act that is the breach of an obligation imposed by law through prohibition -
but rather with a liability arising directly from a primary rule of obligation
generally expressed in the maxim "sic utere tuo et alienum non laedas" ("so
use your own property as not to injure another's"). It deals essentially with
dangers that arise from activities within the jurisdiction of one State and cause
harmful effects beyond the limits of that jurisdiction. The object and purpose
of elaborating rules should be to minimize the possibility of injurious conse-
quences, and to provide adequate redress in any case in which such conse-
quences do occur, with the least possible recourse to measures that prohibit or
hamper such activities.
Pinto, Reflections on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of
Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, XVI NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 17, 34 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter Pinto].
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ment of the importance of the topic and an expression of optimism about
the ability to develop international law in this area, Special Rapporteur
Quentin-Baxter began his work."
B. International Watercourses: A Parallel Effort by the International
Law Commission
The International Law Commission is working on another topic, the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, that shares many
characteristics with the International Liability topic. The aim of this
topic's codifiers is prescription of "equitable and reasonable" "use, devel-
opment and protection" of international watercourses."7 The principles
being proposed in this topic embody "a specific application of the princi-
ple of the harmless use of territory, expressed in the maximum sic utere
tuo et alienum non laedas, itself a reflection of the sovereign equality of
states."" In its specifics, the International Watercourses topic also re-
flects many of the concerns of those working on the International Liabil-
ity topic, and the general obligation-to-co-operate procedural obligations
imposed by Articles 9 through 21"' mirror the continuum of obligations
set forth in Mr. Quentin-Baxter's Fourth Report 0 of prevention, provid-
ing information, entering negotiations and providing reparations. 1 In ad-
dition to the general obligation to "co-operate on the basis of sovereign
equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit to attain optimum utili-
zation and adequate protection of an international watercourse" imposed
by art. 9 of the Watercourses draft, there are obligations of: regular ex-
change of data and information (arts. 10 and 20); exchange of information
Another has acknowledged the difficulties involved in the focus on liability, but reaf-
firmed its primacy: "it is the question of liability proper that alone poses a profound theo-
retical challenge and has prompted the launching of the study in the first place." Handl,
Liability as An Obligation Established By A Primary Rule of International Law - Some
Basic Reflections on the International Law Commission's Work, XVI NETH. Y.B.INT'L L.
49, 51 (1985) [hereinafter Handl II].
46. Professor Magraw has characterized Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's efforts
thusly: "Quentin-Baxter had a rather fine line in attempting to accommodate various con-
flicting views about some of [the topic's] fundamental aspects and in assisting the Commis-
sion in refining its understanding of this challenging subject." Magraw I, supra note 5, at
309.
47. Draft art. 6, reprinted in 82 AM. J. INT'L L. No. 1, 144, 149 (1988) [hereinafter
Watercourses Draft].
48. McCaffrey, The Fortieth Session of the International Law Commission, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L., No. 1, 153, 164 (1989) [hereinafter 83 AJIL]. See also discussion of the sic utere
principle in the context of the International Liability topic at notes 71-74 and accompanying
text, infra.
49. See Watercourses Draft, supra note 47, at 161-64.
50. Fourth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, by Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special Rap-
porteur, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373 (incorporating Docs. A/CN.4/373/Corr. 1 and 2), re-
printed in [1983] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1983 (Part 1) [herein-
after Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report].
51. Magraw I, supra note 5, at 311-13.
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on possible effects of planned measures (arts. 11, 19 and 20); notification
of planned measures with possible adverse effects on other watercourse
States (arts. 12-14); reply to such notification (arts. 15-16); and consulta-
tions and negotiations on such planned measures (art. 17), as well as pro-
cedures established for situations in which the requisite notification is not
given (art. 19). In discussing the "large number of international agree-
ments, declarations and resolutions," etc., that "contain general provi-
sions concerning, or recognize the need for, the regular collection and ex-
change of a broad range of data and information relating to international
watercourses,"52 Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, in addition to referring
to materials relevant to that particular field, pointed to several examples
of more relevance to the International Liability topic, including the 1975
Agreement Between the United States and Canada Relating to Exchange
of Information on Weather Modification Activities,5 3 the 1978 Treaty for
Amazonian Co-operation,54 the 1979 Convention on Long Range Trans-
boundary Air Pollution,55 the 1983 United Nations Convention on the
52. Fourth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-
courses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur 1 16, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/412, to
be reprinted in [1988] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1988 (Part 1)
[hereinafter McCaffrey Fourth Report]. Special Rapporteur McCaffrey's 1989 Fifth Report,
which focused on water-related hazards and dangers, also emphasized the requirements of
cooperation, notification and information sharing in international agreements concerning
such hazards. Fifth Report on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-
courses, by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/421 and
Corr. 1, to be reprinted in [1989] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989
(Part 1) [hereinafter McCaffrey Fifth Report]. Examples of these duties as set forth in vari-
ous international agreements are given with respect to floods (IT 18-29), ice (71 32-34),
drainage ( 11 36-40), flow obstruction (IT 42-43), siltation (1 48) and erosion (TI 51-53).
53. Agreement between the United States of America and Canada Relating to the Ex-
change of Information on Weather Modification Activities, March 26, 1975, 26 U.S.T. 540,
T.I.A.S. 8056. Art. II provides that "[i]nformation relating to weather modification activities
of mutual interest . . . shall be transmitted as soon as practicable to the . . . other Party."
Art. IV requires each Party to "notify and fully inform the other concerning any weather
modification activities" in advance of such activities. Art. V provides for consultations. This
agreement, however, has no provision on settlement of disputes, and specifically reserves the
question of liability. Art. VII provides that "[niothing herein relates to or shall be construed
to affect the question of responsibility or liability for weather modification activities, or to
imply the existence of any generally applicable rule of international law."
54. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, reprinted in SELECTED MULTILAT-
ERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT 496 (Kiss, ed. 1983, U.N. Environment
Programme).
55. See note 147, infra. Art. 3 provides that "by means of exchanges of information,
consultation, research and monitoring," the Parties will work together to develop "policies
and strategies to combat air pollution." Art. 4 requires the Parties to "exchange information
on and review their policies, scientific activities and technical measures" to combat air pol-
lution. Art. 8, captioned "Exchange of Information," lists seven types of information the
Parties are pledged to exchange, and, in art. 9 the Parties agree that exchanges are desirable
and necessary. The settlement of disputes article provides no compulsory mechanism,
merely stating that disputes on the interpretation or application of the convention should be
sought "by negotiation or by any other method of dispute settlement acceptable to the par-
ties to the dispute." There is no provision for liability, which is not surprising in light of the
language of article 2 (see note 149, infra).
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Law of the Sea,56 and the 1983 Agreement Between the United States and
Mexico on Co-operation for the Protection and Improvement of the Envi-
ronment in the Border Area."'
The World Commission 58 has also recognized the importance of the
exchange of data and information: "The duty to provide information may
in principle pertain to many of the factors .. .which may have to be
taken into account in order to arrive at a reasonable and equitable use of
a transboundary natural resource."' 9 The General Assembly, too, has rec-
ognized the importance of co-operation and information-sharing between
States, at least with respect to natural resource exploitation:
In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more coun-
tries, each State must co-operate on the basis of a system of informa-
tion and prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such
resources without causing damage to the legitimate interest of
others.6
What seems to distinguish the International Watercourses topic from
the International Liability topic is the apparent progress that has been
achieved. Like the International Liability topic, International Water-
courses was included on the Commission's general program of work in
1970, and in 1974 the ILC set up a Sub-Committee on the topic and ap-
pointed a Special Rapporteur who was succeeded by a second Special
Rapporteur in 1977, a third in 1982 and a fourth in 1985." Despite these
many changes in Special Rapporteurs, the Commission provisionally
adopted six articles in 1987 at its Thirty-ninth Session (Arts. 2-7), and
another fourteen at its Fortieth Session in 1988 (Arts. 8-21).11 As we have
seen, the International Liability topic, which also first received Commis-
56. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Pub. No. E.83.V.5 (1983),
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122.
57. Agreement between the United States and Mexico on Co-operation for the Protec-
tion and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Zone, August 14, 1983, T.I.A.S.
10827.
58. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra.
59. World Commission on Environment and Development, Experts Group on Environ-
ment Law Report, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, Legal Princi-
ples and Recommendations 95 (1986) [hereinafter Brundtland Report]. The Brundtland
Report, in its statement of General Principles and Recommendations, set forth a general
obligation to co-operate (art. 8), as well as obligations of information exchange (art. 15),
notice (art. 16) and consultation (art. 17).
60. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 3, General Assembly Resolu-
tion 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974.
61. Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-
courses by Mr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/399, re-
printed in [1986] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1986 (Part 1).
62. 83 AJIL, supra note 48, at 160-61. This means that the draft articles have already
passed muster with the Commission's Drafting Committee, McCaffrey, The Work of the
International Law Commission Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 189, 190
(1983). See also SINCLAIR, supra note 1, at 34-35. Five articles, including the controversial
art. 1, were previously adopted in 1980.
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sion attention in 1970, has, after ten years of formal work, not progressed
much, if at all, beyond its initial formulations.
But the Commission and the international legal community should
perhaps not be too quick to praise those working on the Watercourses
topic for having made progress beyond that of their colleagues working on
the International Liability topic. It, too, might still founder on the rocks
of strict liability. Article 8 of the draft Watercourses convention provides
that "Watercourse States shall utilize an international watercourse [sys-
tem] in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse
States." Professor McCaffrey, the Special Rapporteur for the Water-
courses topic, has described Article 8 as "a specific application of the
principle of the harmless use of territory, expressed in the maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, itself a reflection of the sovereign equal-
ity of states." '63 He has reported that this Article, as drafted, has raised
the issue of "whether states would be strictly liable for its violation, or
liable only on the basis of fault."'6 4 He indicated that the majority seemed
of the opinion that violation of Article 8 would "engage the international
responsibility of the state in question - i.e., that such a violation would
constitute an 'internationally wrongful act,' "65 but that there was also
considerable opinion that violation of Article 8 would lead to strict liabil-
ity for the violating State. Professor McCaffrey also revealed that he in-
tended to resolve this issue, for his purposes, by leaving it to others, most
particularly Ambassador Barboza:
The Commission's commentary is silent on this point, chiefly because
of what seemed to be tacit agreement that problems relating to the
standard of liability should be resolved in connection with the Com-
mission's work on other topics, notably state responsibility and, in
particular, international liability for injurious consequences of non-
prohibited acts. This same issue may well arise in relation to a later
article on the obligation of watercourse states not to cause appreciable
pollution harm. 6
Moreover, the Watercourses Special Rapporteur has made no pro-
gress beyond that of the International Liability topic on the question of
the consequences of violation of the duties to cooperate set forth in draft
Articles 9 through 21. The question of settlement of disputes has yet to
be addressed, and the Special Rapporteur has stated that he will not sub-
mit material to the Commission on that question until this year.67
63. 83 AJIL, supra note 48, at 164.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 164-65.
67. McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at $ 8, and McCaffrey Fifth Report, supra
note 52, at 1.
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS
A. Basic Principles
The most elementary principle in the field of international environ-
mental law is one that expresses the concept of sovereignty, the tradi-
tional bedrock of international law. 8 The Stockholm Declaration 9 gives
sovereignty the primacy it enjoys in international law in general by in-
cluding it in the first of its Principles on transboundary pollution: "States
have . . . the sovereign right to exploit their own resources," is stated
first; the principle that they also have the "responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national ju-
risdiction"70 is only a modification of the basic principle, which remains
paramount. Many assert that the sic utere principle7 1 "reflects customary
international law,"'72 but whether or not that is the case, the sic utere
68. As Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter put it:
In order to understand better the hesitancy of Governments to commit them-
selves to specific formulations of rules as to liability in new or changing areas
of the law, it is necessary to have regard to history. Until the twentieth cen-
tury, there were relatively few contexts in which conflict was likely between a
State's freedom of action within its own borders and its duty towards other
States. In the field of sovereign immunities, as State activity extended to areas
of trade and commerce, there were some ingredients for a reassessment of legal
policy. The law of the sea was still preponderantly concerned with ensuring
freedom of navigation, and the right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea did not yet give rise to any active question about the balance of the flag
State's and coastal State's interest. Similarly, though the law relating to the
treatment of aliens at all times gave rise to hard cases, it did not yet present an
aspect that might be seen to restrict unduly the freedom of a sovereign State
to govern its own affairs. The pressures of the twentieth century have brought
these matters to the fore.
Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at 32.
Indeed, it was not so long ago that the United States advocated a rule of absolute terri-
torial sovereignty during a dispute with Mexico over the Rio Grande:
Less than a century ago it was possible for US Attorney General Judson
Harmon without embarrassment to assert that "[tihe fundamental principle of
international law is the absolute sovereignty of every nation, as against all
others, within its own territory," and therefore to conclude that "the rules,
principles, and precedents of international law impose no liability or obliga-
tion" which inhibits a state from using the resources within its territory as it
chooses without regard to the impact upon others.
SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL Eco-
LOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 142 (1979), quoting 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281 and 283
(1893-97).
69. See note 81 and accompanying text, infra.
70. Id.
71. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas - "So exercise your right so as not to injure
another."
72. See, e.g., Weiss, Environmental Disasters in International Law, 1986 ANUARIO
JURIDICO INTERAMERICANO (1988) [hereinafter Weiss]. See also discussion of the Montreal
Rules and OECD Report at note 92-108 and accompanying text, infra. This is the position
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principle provides the basic impetus for this topic:"3 Special Rapporteur
Quentin-Baxter has called it "[tihe starting point for the construction" of
a regime of compensation."4
The complementary, but subsidiary concept that also drives this
topic is the principle that no victim should remain uncompensated. 5 The
Stockholm Declaration did not endorse this per se, but does require
States to "co-operate to develop further the international law regarding
liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environ-
mental damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of
such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.""6 The policy involved here
is one seemingly impervious to opposition: "Society will not allow the cost
of injury to remain entirely on a victim's shoulders as if he were merely a
legal object and not the subject of countervailing legal rights."7 Professor
Handl refers to "the establishment of an international legal framework
the Restatement takes, announcing in its Introductory Note on the Law of the Environ-
ment, that "[tihe principles discussed in this Part are rooted in customary international
law," and "originated in rules relating to the responsiblity of a state for injuries caused to
another state or to its property, or to persons within another state's territory or their prop-
erty." American Law Institute, 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
100 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Restatement refers to the Cor/u Channel Cases
(see note 165 and accompanying text, infra) and to the work of Judge Lauterpacht for sup-
port. Judge Lauterpacht, writing on "restrictions upon Territoral Supremacy," stated that:
A State, in spite of its territoral supremacy, is not allowed to alter the natural
conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural condition of
the territory of a neighbouring State - for instance, to stop or to divert the
flow of a river which runs from its own into neighbouring territory. A State is
bound to prevent such use of its territory as, having regard to the circum-
stances, is unduly injurious to the inhabitants of the neighbouring State, e.g.,
as the result of working of factories emitting deleterious fumes.
1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 290-91 (8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 1955).
73. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter states that despite the fact that the question of
liability for harm as a result of wrongfulness or as a result of strict liability is the point
where "doctrine falters and parts company with State practice," the principle of non-harm
expressed in the sic utere maxim has great potency as the "principle governing legal devel-
opment." Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at 38.
74. Id. at 56.
75. This principle is certainly one recognized in municipal law systems. See, e.g.,
Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, cert. denied sub nom. Rexall
Drug Co. v. Tigue, 58 U.S.L.W. 3290 (1989). In this case where the fact that the injury the
plaintiffs suffered remained dormant and undiscernable for such a long time that their
cases, when they were finally filed, faced what would normally be insurmountable proce-
dural and causation (identification of tortfeasor) problems, New York's highest Court stated
that:
[I]t would be inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of a modern society
to say to these plaintiffs that because of the insidious nature of an injury that
long remains dormant . . . the cost of injury should be borne by the innocent
and not the wrongdoers ... . [T]he ever-evolving dictates of justice and fair-
ness, which are the heart of our common-law system, require formation of a
remedy for injuries. . .
76. Stockholm Declaration, Principle 22. See note 81 and accompanying text, infra.
77. Goldie II, infra note 168, at 181.
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that will assure effective compensation to victims of transnational pollu-
tion," as one of the key objectives of attempts to determine principles of
liability in this area.7" In his view, in addition to "the more obvious goal
of restoring as closely as possible the victim's status quo ante," establish-
ment of principles of liability would also internalize the costs of accidents
associated with a particular activity, thus making "the choice among com-
peting goods and services approximate a rational decision because the
price of the items . . . will more truly reflect the costs of production."79
Special Rapporteur Barboza echoed Professor Handl when he stated that
absent a compensation regime
these activities actually transfer the cost from the agent to the victim.
Through the damage done to them, third parties would be paying the
cost that should be charged to the enterprise. At the international
level, other States would be paying for an activity beneficial to one
particular State. It could be justifiably argued that reparation consti-
tutes a veritable "internalization" of costs. Costs which appear to be
unjustly dissociated from an enterprise or activity are absorbed by it,
become internalized.80
B. Formulations of International Organizations
The principles dicussed above have been the starting point for pro-
nouncements by several international organizations of principles designed
to delimit or govern international environmental issues.
The United Conference on the Human Environment, after a 1972
meeting in Stockholm, issued a proclamation setting forth a series of
principles that have guided all subsequent considerations of international
environmental legal standards." In stirring rhetoric, the Conference pro-
nounced that "man is both creature and moulder of his environment,
which gives him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for
intellectual, moral, social and spiritual growth.""s The Conference also
proclaimed that "[t]he protection and improvement of the human envi-
ronment is a major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and eco-
nomic development throughout the world; it is the urgent desire of the
78. Handl I, infra note 182, at 560.
79. Id. at note 157. See also notes 169 and 214, infra.
80. First Report, supra note 6, at 54.
81. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment: Final Doc-
uments Adopted June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]. This meeting has been described as
"an event heralded by many commentators as the onset of a new level of global environmen-
tal consciousness among national governments." Wetstone & Rosencranz, Transboundary
Air Pollution in Europe: A Survey of National Responses, 9 COL. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1983)
[hereinafter Wetstone & Rosencranz]. In the view of these publicists, the Stockholm Decla-
ration "still provides the single most important and persuasive multilateral commitment to
the principle that nations have a responsibility to assure that their actions do not cause
damage to foreign environments." Id.
82. Id.
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peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments. 'a3 The Con-
ference set forth twenty-six "Principles" and an "Action Plan for the
Human Environment" consisting of 109 "Recommendations." The most
important of the Principles, in terms of transboundary environmental
harm, are as follows:
Principle 21
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit
their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and
the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22
States shall co-operate to develop further the international law re-
garding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage caused by activities within the jurisdic-
tion or control of such States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.
Principle 23
Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the in-
ternational community, or to standards which will have to be deter-
mined nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the sys-
tems of values prevailing in each country and the extent of the
applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced coun-
tries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost
for the developing countries.8'
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, in his Second Report, stated
that he saw in these Principles "the need for the orderly development of
international law" in the areas in which he was convinced he had to
cover. In one of the many references in his reports to the wrongfulness/
strict liability and soft law/hard law dichotomies that strain the topic, his
work, and the Commission's consideration of it, he stated that:
The equipoise of the two halves of Stockholm Principle 21 evokes a
balancing of interests that cannot be attained in terms of the simple
dichotomy between right and wrong. The repeated references, in the
text of the [then] draft Convention on the law of the sea and in other
83. Id.
84. Id. The General Assembly reinforced Principle 21 in its December 15, 1972 Resolu-
tion 2995 (XXVII) on Co-operation Between States in the Field of the Environment, stating
that "in the exploration, exploitation and development of their natural resources, States
must not produce significant harmful effects in zones situated outside their national juris-
diction." 115 States voted in favor of this Resolution, none opposed it, and only 10 States
abstained.
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international instruments, to the "further development of interna-
tional law relating to responsibility and liability" is a further indica-
tion that solutions are not expected within a two-dimensional frame. 5
The year after the Stockholm Conference, the Council of the Euro-
pean Communities issued a statement of principles and objectives that
endorsed the sic utere concept of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declara-
tion and adopted a "polluter-pays" principle,88 declaring that
the costs associated with environmental protection against pollution
must be allocated according to uniform principles throughout the
Community so as to avoid distortions in trade and competition which
are incompatible with the harmonious functioning of the common
market. "7
The thought was obviously that imposing such liability would act as a
deterrent: "Charging to polluters the costs of anti-pollution measures, ac-
cording to uniform principles throughout the Community, should en-
courage them to avoid or reduce it.""8 While this seems to foreshadow the
compensation regime now under consideration at the ILC and can be in-
terpreted as involving a sort of strict liability principle,8 9 there was also
recognition that something more was required to bring difficult issues, es-
pecially those related to transboundary pollution under control:
This recommendation is only an initial step in the environment pro-
gramme and in due course the Commission will submit to the Council
all the relevant proposals, with particular reference to the harmoniza-
tion of instruments for administering the "polluter pays" principle
and its application specifically to problems posed by cross-frontier
pollution. 0
The next development was the adoption by the International Law
85. Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Baxter, Special
Rapporteur 1 67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41 346 and Add. 1 and 2, reprinted in [1981] II Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N., U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1981 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter Second
Report].
86. Council of the European Communities, General Secretariat Press Release (1935/
74, presse 87) of November 7, 1974, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 138 (1975) [hereinafter EC Pol-
luter-Pays]. The EEC Council also issued a Directive, on June 27, 1985, on Environmental
Impact Assessment, that mandates information exchange and consultation.
87. Id. In this there are, again, echoes of Professor Handl's theory of cost internaliza-
tion and Professor Goldie's theory of expropriation. See notes 79, supra, and 169 and 214,
and accompanying text infra.
88. Id. at 139.
89. It foreshadows the ILC work precisely because it is, at root, an expression of strict
liability. The foremost commentary on torts in the United States states that:
The "polluter pays" theory of the OECD is exactly the traditional theory of
strict liability in tort, at least as it has developed in the common law systems,
and which is rooted in "the general feeling in the community that 'he who
breaks must pay.' "
PROSSER, infra note 214, at §75.
90. EC Polluter-Pays, supra note 86, at 139.
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Association9 ' of the Montreal Rules in 1982,92 which were focused specifi-
cally on "transfiontier pollution," 93 and which set forth rules of interna-
tional law that it states are "applicable except as may be otherwise pro-
vided by convention, agreement or binding custom among the States
concerned."' Article 3 (Prevention and abatement) of the Montreal
Rules is a seemingly strong statement of the sic utere principle: "States
are in their legitimate activities under an obligation to prevent, abate and
control transfrontier pollution to such an extent that no substantial in-
jury is caused in the territory of another State."95 Professor Quentin-Bax-
ter, while recognizing the effort involved in formulating these rules and
the beneficial results they do provide, nevertheless detailed the ways "the
Montreal Rules and [his] topic are in sharp contrast and have comple-
mentary roles." ' Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter also emphasized the
technical difficulties involved in any assessment of "substantiality" of
transfrontier pollution damage, and noted that these difficulties are "least
likely to be resolved" in situations where the lawfulness of the conduct of
a State is in question. 7 He also examined how the Rules, especially those
embodied in article 3, would operate, and concludes that the "real effect"
of that article "is to produce a very weak obligation indeed."9 8
91. The International Law Association ("ILA"), "the oldest and largest international
organization of lawyers," is a non-governmental group of publicists and practicioners of both
public and private international law. It was organized in 1873 and is dedicated to, in the
words of art. 2 of its Constitution, "the study, elucidation and advancement of international
law, public and private, the study of comparative law, the making of proposals for the solu-
tion of conflicts of law, and the furthering of international goodwill and understanding."
Stodter, International Law Association, 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L. 182, 182 (1986).
92. Resolution No. 21982 on Legal Aspects of the Conservation of the Environment,
adopted by the International Law Association at its Sixtieth Conference, held in Montreal
August 29-September 4, 1982, reprinted in ILA, Report of the Sixtieth Conference, Mon-
treal, 1982, 1-3, (London, 1983) [hereinafter Montreal Rules].
93. Id. at art. 1.
94. Id. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter said that the Montreal Rules are "at least in
regard to pollution, a body of customary rules giving rise to state responsibility." Quentin-
Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 24.
95. Montreal Rules, supra note 92, at art. 3.
96. Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 26. Mr. Quentin-Baxter notes
that the Montreal rules (1) eliminate "from their purview ... the whole area of the globe
not included within the territory of a State ..."; (2) exclude "any form of long-range
pollution"; and (3) are only concerned "with the chronic or cumulative effects of pollution,
excluding the release of substances which are merely 'likely to' result in deterious effects" of
the nature described in the definition of "pollution" included in art. 2 of the Rules. Id.
97. Id. at 27.
98. He notes that the comments on art. 3 state that "[firom the fact that causing sub-
stantial damages on the territory of the other State constitutes an internationally wrongful
act results the duty for the polluting State to cut down transfrontier pollution to such an
extent that the transfrontier damages cannot any more be termed substantial." He points
out that this Rule is therefore
an attempt . . .to combine the notion of avoiding a wrongful act or omission
of the State with that of avoiding substantial transboundary loss or injury; but
despite the apparently absolute nature of the obligation . . .the real effect of
this amalgam is to produce a very weak obligation indeed. Under article 3 ...
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Another multinational effort to formulate rules on the environment
and, specifically, responsibility and liability for transfrontier pollution,
was published by the OECD99 in 1984.100 The OECD's Environment Com-
mittee reported that it "found that all Member countries recognize cer-
tain basic legal obligations, which are the counterpart of rights they enjoy
in accordance with their territorial jurisdiction."10' The Committee la-
beled this expression of the sic utere principle as a "customary rule" of
"due diligence" imposed on all States in order that the "activities carried
out in their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment of other
States." (emphasis in original)" 2 The sources of these legal obligations,
according to the Committee, are the acknowledgment by States that
"promotion of decent environment should be recognized as one of the
fundamental human rights,"' ' and increasing recognition by States that
wrongfulness flows only from the fact of loss or injury. . . . It does not, how-
ever follow - as article 3 . ..and the commentary might seem to imply -
that the actual occurrence of the transboundary loss or injury will always entail
the responsibility of the source State for a wrongful act or omission; for the
responsibility of the source State will not be engaged unless the State authori-
ties had the means of foreseeing that loss or injury was likely to be caused, as
well as the duty to prevent its occurrence.
Id. at 7 28.
Likewise, Special Rapporteur McCaffrey has noted that the art. 3 obligation of States
to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollution is qualified. Article 3, in its entirety
reads:
Without prejudice to the operation of the rules relating to the reasonable and
equitable utilisation of shared natural resources States are in their legitimate
activities under an obligation to prevent, abate and control transfrontier pollu-
tion to such an extent that no substantial injury is caused in the territory of
another State.
As Special Rapporteur McCaffrey put it, the effect of the subordination of the .obliga-
tion to the rules relating to reasonable and equitable utilization "would seem to be that an
activity that causes substantial transfrontier pollution injury may none the less be 'reasona-
ble.and equitable' and thus lawful." McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 7 70.
99. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") is an in-
ter-governmental entity of industrialized States headquartered in Paris. "Its overall aim is
to promote sound economic growth in the member and non-member States, with particular
emphasis on economic expansion in developing States, as well as an increase in world trade
generally." Hahn, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 5 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA INT'L L. 214, 214 (1983).
100. OECD, Responsibilities and Liability of States in Relation to Transfrontier Pol-
lution," reprinted in 13 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 122 (1984) [hereinafter OECD Report]. This was
not the OECD's first venture into the areas of international pollution control and environ-
mental protection. In 1974, the OECD Council adopted a recommendation on principles of
transfrontier pollution, including duties to inform, consult, exchange information and warn
of dangers. In 1977, the Council "adopted a recommendation on implementation of a regime
of equal right of access and non-discrimination in relation to transfrontier pollution." See,
generally, McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 50, at V 57-58 and 62. See also OECD,
Environmental Committee Group of Experts, The 'Polluter Pays Principle' in Relation to
Accidental Pollution, Doc. No. Env/Eco/88.2 (1st rev.) (Oct. 17, 1988).
101. OECD Report, supra note 100, First Report at T 6.
102. Id. See also note 72 and accompanying text, supra.
103. OECD Report, supra note 100, First Report at 1 7.
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"the environment constitutes a common resource or heritage ..
The Committee also discussed the "moral obligations" that guide protec-
tion and prevention efforts.10 5
The Committee, like many others who have explored the issue of
which is the proper theory under which compensation for pollution dam-
age can or should be imposed, foundered on the "rocky outcrop" of
wrongfulness vs. strict liability. Despite a confident statement that
"[i]nternational liability for transfrontier pollution derives from general
legal principles," and "is engaged by a failure to comply with a customary
or treaty obligation,"' ' it also states that "[n]evertheless, it should be
noted that some Member countries consider that under international law,
a State must ensure that no environmental damage is caused to other
countries emanating from regions under its jurisdiction. In particular,
some of these Member countries argue for the introduction of a system of
strict liability." (emphasis in original) 0 7 It concluded its report by noting
that it had outlined the practices needed for a "policy of protection
against transfrontier pollution," but added the caveat that "[t]he ques-
tion of whether or not any of these practices amount to an obligation
under present international law is neither raised nor answered."' 08
Last year, twenty-four nations 0 9 agreed on the Declaration of the
Hague on March 11, 1989.1"' Another non-binding statement of princi-
ples, the Declaration, like the OECD Report, nevertheless evidences in-
creased international recognition of the urgency of environmental issues.
It asserts that "[blecause the problem is planet-wide in scope, solutions
can only be devised on a global level," ' and that solutions depend not
only on "implementation of existing principles but also [on] a new ap-
proach, through the development of new principles of international law
including new and more effective decision-making and enforcement
mechanisms." ' 2
The World Commission's 3 Brundtland Report, 14 like the OECD
Report and the Declaration of the Hague, move to a wrongfulness analy-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id. at 13.
107. Id. at 16.
108. Id. Second Report, 1 11.
109. The signatories are the Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Ivory Coast, Egypt, Spain, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Malta, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Senegal, Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela and
Zimbabwe. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 392, 395 n.6 (1989) [hereinafter Sands].
110. Sands, supra note 109, at 417 (Appendix).
111. Id. at 418.
112. Id.
113. See notes 30 and 58 and accompanying text, supra.
114. See note 59 and accompanying text, supra.
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sis for issues of transboundary harm." 5 The assumption in these recent
reports, that the only valid obligation in international law is one that, if
violated, invokes liability because a State has committed a wrong, is at a
great remove from the original assumptions of the ILC for its Interna-
tional Liability topic."' This will be discussed below in greater detail in
Section V.
C. International Agreements
The principles as formulated by publicists and pronounced by inter-
national organizations have also been incorporated in various interna-
tional agreements, many of which enunciate standards of "absolute" or
"strict" liability and avoid regimes of fault or wrongfulness.
A body of treaties has come into effect over the last twenty years that
emphasize, as Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter stressed he wanted to
in this topic,"' both prevention and reparation/compensation. These
treaties regulate activities that the international community has decided
it wants continued, but which it has also decided, in many cases because
these activities involve risks and could possibly cause injuries or damage,
can only be conducted under a liability regime."'
1. The Space Damage Convention
The most unusual of these treaties is the Convention on Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects." 9 This treaty ac-
knowledges, in its preamble, the ultimate infallibility of all prevention
efforts, noting that the Parties to the Convention had "take[n] into con-
sideration that, notwithstanding the precautionary measures to be taken
by States and international intergovernmental organizations involved in
the launching of space objects, damage may on occasion be caused by
such objects."' 2 0 It takes the seemingly uncompromising position that
"[a] launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for
damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to air-
craft in flight,"" but sets forth exculpatory standards in a subsequent
article,' 2' and establishes a one year limitation on claims for damages. 1 23
115. See note 226 and accompanying text, infra. See also art. 21 of the Brundtland
Report's statement of General Principles and Recommendations, which delineates "State
Responsibility."
116. See notes 32-46 and accompanying text, supra.
117. See note 246 and accompanying text, infra.
118. Many of them fall into the category of "ultra-hazardous" activities first discussed
by Professor Jenks. See note 215 and accompanying text, infra.
119. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter Space Damage Convention].
120. Id. at preamble.
121. Id. at art. II.
122. Id. at art. VI.
123. Id. at art. X.
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2. The Maritime Pollution Conventions
The first of another group of treaties, which pertain to liability for
marine pollution from oil carrying vessels, the International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damages, was signed in 1969. It holds
the owner of the ship involved in a spill "liable for any pollution damage
caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged from the ship."12
The treaty establishes a maximum amount of liability for the owner, un-
less the accident was the result of actual fault of the owner. 1 5 The strict
liability rather than fault-based nature of the obligation is therefore well
established. But like virtually all strict liability regimes, the treaty speci-
fies circumstances that preclude imposition of liability, 2 ' and limits the
obligation temporally. 2 7 It also requires that owners of ships carry insur-
ance sufficient to satisfy their liability under the treaty. " It vests juris-
diction for actions based on its violation in the courts of the contracting
States, " and includes a waiver of sovereign immunity for ships owned or
operated by a State.'30
A parallel series of treaties established an international fund to cover
the costs of pollution damages not completely covered under the regime
of owner liability established in the basic treaties. These Conventions
state that their purpose is to prevent uncompensated damages. "' Contri-
butions to the fund are required from the consignees of oil shipments,
who make the contributions on behalf of their States. 2 The contribu-
tions are "calculated on the basis of a fixed sum for each ton of oil
received."' 3 3
124. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, art. III, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, [hereinafter Oil Pollution Damage Convention]. Special Rap-
porteur Quentin-Baxter referred to this as an absolute liability standard. Quentin-Baxter
Fifth Report, supra note 4, at 5.
125. Oil Pollution Damage Convention, supra note 124, at art V. 1-2. Protocols of 1976
and 1984 to this treaty increased the maximum amounts for which owners are liable. See
Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov.
19, 1976, art. II.1, IMCO No. 77.05.E; and Protocol to the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, May 25, 1984, art. 6, reprinted in 6 BENEDICT ON ADMI-
RALTY 6-77 (7th ed. rev.).
126. Oil Pollution Damage Convention, supra note 124, at art. 111.2.
127. Id. at art. VIII. This amounts, in effect, to a three year statute of limitations.
128. Id. at art. VII.
129. Id. at art. IX.
130. Id. at art. XI.
131. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Com-
pensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, art 2.1, art. 4, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57. [herein-
after 1971 Fund Convention]. See also Protocol to the International Fund for Compensation
for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 19, 1976, IMCO No. 77.05.E; and Protocol to the Interna-
tional Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, May 25, 1984, reprinted in 6 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 6-116 (7th ed.
rev.).
132. 1971 Fund Convention, supra note 131, at art. 10.
133. Id. at art. 11.
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Another treaty that deals with liability for maritime pollution in a
manner similar to that employed by the Maritime Pollution treaties is the
1977 North Sea Convention on Exploration and Exploitation.""
3. The Nuclear Damage Conventions
A body of treaties on civil liability for nuclear damage, are, likewise,
by their very titles, focused on "the desirability of establishing some min-
imum standards to provide financial protection against damage resulting
from certain peaceful use of nuclear energy."' 5 The 1963 Vienna Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage holds the operator of a nuclear
installation liable upon proof of causation that the damage complained of
is the result of a nuclear accident,16 and specifies that this liability "shall
be absolute.
'1 3 7
The 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy states, in its preamble, that its parties are "[d]esirous of
ensuring adequate and equitable compensation for persons who suffer
damage caused by nuclear incidents."'3 s This treaty, too, holds operators
liable for damage "caused by a nuclear incident,"' 3 9 and creates a com-
pensation regime comparable to that of the Vienna Convention although
it does not use the word "absolute.'
40
The 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nu-
clear Ships"" has a similar provision for compensation by an operator
upon proof of causation with respect to damage incurred,'4 2 stating that
the operator "shall be absolutely liable,' 4 3 and the same sort of exculpa-
tory standards 4 and compensation regime 145 as the other treaties in the
134. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Explora-
tion for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, May 1, 1977, reprinted in SELECTED
MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN ENVIRONMENT 474 (Kiss, ed. 1983, United Nations Environment
Programme).
.135. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, pream-
ble, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265.
136. Id. at art. II.
137. Id. at art. IV. Despite the use of the term "absolute" in the first clause of this
article, the remaining clauses set out the exemptions to liability, making it clear that "abso-
lute" here does not mean without exception.
The treaty also sets forth, in art. VI, a "statute of limitations" of ten years on the right
of compensation, and, in art. V, limits the liability of a nuclear installation operator to five
million dollars for any one accident. Art. VII requires operators to maintain insurance suffi-
cient to cover the liability they are subject to under the treaty.
Jurisdiction, under art. XI, is vested "only with the courts of the Contracting Party
within whose territory the nuclear accident occurred."
138. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29, 1960,
956 U.N.T.S. 251.
139. Id. at art. 3.
140. See id. at arts. 8, 9, 10 & 11.
141. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962.
142. Id. at art. II.
143. Id.
144. Id. at arts. 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6.
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The 1971 Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Mari-
time Carriage of Nuclear Material states in its preamble that it was
designed to parallel the earlier treaties and ensure "that the operator of a
nuclear installation will be exclusively liable for damage caused by a nu-
clear incident occurring in the course of maritime carriage of nuclear
material."""6
4. Pollution Treaties
International agreements on pollution-related topics are less likely, if
they deal with liability at all, to make it either strict or absolute.
The European Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion of 1979'1 states in its preamble that it aims "to promote relations
and co-operation in the field of environmental regulation."'" 8 It estab-
lishes "Fundamental Principles," ' 9 which commit States to "endeavor to
limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution
including long-range transboundary air pollution.' 50 States also commit
themselves to developing policies and strategies "by means of exchanges
of information, consultation, research and monitoring.' 5' The emphasis
is definitely on cooperation and interaction. The Convention includes no
provisions whatsoever for liability for damages caused by the pollution it
seeks to limit, reduce and prevent. Although it has been criticized as inef-
fective, it has also been emphasized that its "wide scope .. .must be
welcomed."' 52 The Convention also established a "cooperative program
for the monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transmission of air
pollutants in Europe.'
5 3
That liability is still an issue is demonstrated by the lack of an article
defining or imposing it in the recently concluded Convention on Trans-
145. Id. at arts. III, IV, V, VII and X.
146. Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
Material, Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255.
147. Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, T.I.A.S.
10541, U.N. Doc. ECE/HLM.1/R.1 reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979) [hereinafter European
Convention].
148. Id. at preamble.
149. Id. at arts. 2-5.
150. Id. at art. 2.
151. Id. at art. 3.
152. Rest, Responsibility and Liability for Transboundary Air Pollution Damage, in
TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION 299, 302 (Flinterman, Kwiatkowska & Lammers, eds. 1986)
[hereinafter Rest]. See also Fraenkel, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447,
449, 475-76 (1989).
153. European Convention, supra note 147, at art. 9. This treaty "marked a major ad-
vance in the level of international attention given to transboundary pollution and resulted
in the establishment of important joint research and monitor-efforts." Wetstone & Rosen-
cranz, supra note 81, at 15-16. It nevertheless did not require abatement or even impose
"standstill" standards. Id.
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boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes."" This suggests that perhaps
the slow progress of the ILC on the topic of international liability over
the last ten years is not the result of shortcomings of that organization,
and is perhaps instead a function of the unwillingness of States to agree
to limit their independence of action, and thereby, perhaps, their sover-
eignty, by agreeing to subject themselves to international liability to other
States.
A treaty that employs an alternative to the liability route and that
appears to have a good chance of success is the 1987 Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.1"' The parties to the Convention,
aware, as they stated in the preamble, "of the potentially harmful impact
on human health and the environment through modification of the Ozone
layer, ' 1" established obligations for States "to take appropriate. . . mea-
sures . . . to protect human health and the environment against adverse
effects. '15 7 The "shall" of this provision makes seem like those who
drafted this Convention intended to move far beyond the hortatory provi-
sions of the European Convention. Failure to comply with the require-
ment to take such appropriate measures, or to "conduct research and sci-
entific assessments "158 or cooperate in the legal, scientific and technical
fields,15 ' constitutes a breach of a treaty obligation.
D. Cases
The exemplar case for this area of law is the Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion. sO The Trail Smelter dispute "covered a period of thirteen years
from 1928 to 1941. '116 A Canadian company, the Consolidated Mining
154. Basel Convention the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.80/3. The liability provision of this
treaty, article 12, is captioned "Consultations on Liability," and provides that the "Parties
shall co-operate with a view to adopting, as soon as practicable, a protocol setting out appro-
priate rules and procedures in the field of liability and compensation for damage resulting
from the transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous wastes and other wastes." Id.
at art. 12.
155. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, re-
printed in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987) [hereinafter The Ozone Convention].
156. Id.
157. Id. at art. 1.
158. Id. at art. 3.
159. The Ozone Convention, supra note 155, at art. 4. But even the ozone danger has
failed to mobilize States completely: "Eighty nations signed a declaration May 2 to back
tougher measures to reduce ozone-destroying chlorofluorocarbons released into the atmo-
sphere, but backed away from a controversial plan for an international fund to help devel-
oping nations phase out use and production of the damaging chemicals." BNA, Daily Re-
port A-25 (May 9, 1989). Moreover, "[t]he 80-nation declaration is not binding on
governments of countries that signed the document, a point criticized by environmental-
ists." Id.
160. III RPT. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1911 [hereinafter Trail Smelter]. Special Rapporteur
McCaffrey refers to this as "undoubtedly the foremost international decision involving tran-
sfrontier pollution." McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 85.
161. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, [1963] CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 213 (1963). The
VOL. 18:2
TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
and Smelting Company of Canada, Limited, operated a smelter in British
Columbia, on the Columbia River about eleven miles from the interna-
tional boundary. The smelter emitted sulphur dioxide that drifted down
the Columbia River Valley and harmed crops, woodlands and fisheries in
the State of Washington. Canada admitted liability and the United States
and Canada established an arbitral tribunal to settle the question of dam-
ages, authorizing it "to apply the principles of both international law and
of the jurisprudence developed by United States courts in disputes be-
tween states of the Union."' 62 In 1941, when it announced its decision,
the arbitral tribunal stated that its finding comported with both of these
systems:
[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another State or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by
clear and convincing evidence. 6 3
Like many others, Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter noted that the
Trail Smelter tribunal, in announcing this limitation on sovereignty,
echoed the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case.16 4
The reference by the International Court of Justice to "every State's obli-
gation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other States,'165 was, according to Special Rapporteur Quen-
tin-Baxter, an affirmation that "the security within their own borders
which respect for international law can offer States is a charter of liberty,
not of license. 1 6 6
Although some insist that Trail Smelter stands for the proposition
that transfrontier pollution is an international wrong that engages state
responsibility,'16 7 others have declared that the decision of the tribunal
turned not on the mere fact of pollution, nor on "the creation merely of a
risk of injury, but on the causation of actual injury . . .,"" and that it
description of the facts of this case is generally drawn from this article.
162. Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at 33.
163. Trail Smelter, supra note 160, at 1965.
164. According to Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, the language of the Corfu Channel
decision, "which may be regarded as an expression of the maxim sic utere tuo et alienum
non laedas, has been relied upon frequently by commentators and iribunals dealing with
problems of transfrontier pollution." McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 1 83.
165. Corfu Channel [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22.
166. Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at 36.
167. See, e.g., Akehurst, International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising
Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, XVI NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 5 (1985)
[hereinafter Akehurst]: the Trail Smelter decision stands for the proposition that "there is a
duty not to permit such use," and supports the view that "liability for environmental dam-
age is liability ex delicto ......
168. Goldie, Concepts of Strict and Absolute Liability and the Ranking of Liability in
Terms of Relative Exposure to Risk, XVI NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 175, 215 (1985) [hereinafter
Goldie II].
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depended "upon different standards from those usually associated with
fault." '
Another case often cited is the Lake Lanoux arbitral decision of
1957,1 0 which also points out limitations on sovereignty by emphasizing
that States, in a world with an interdependent environment, must be
aware of and take into account the interests of other sovereigns. In this
decision, France, which "proposed to draw off, within its own territory,
water that would have flowed to Spain, substituting water of equivalent
quantity and quality, so that the flow reaching the Spanish border would
not have been substantially affected," ' was held not to have violated the
rights of Spain. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter has described the tri-
bunal's formulation of the sic utere principle as "so succinct that it has a
faintly sibylline ring: 'France is entitled to exercise her rights; she cannot
ignore Spanish interests. Spain is entitled to demand that her rights be
respected and that her interests be taken into consideration.' ""7
E. State Practice
In what is known as the Cosmos 954 case, Canada claimed in excess
of $6 million from the Soviet Union "for compensation for damage the
result of the intrusion into Canadian air space of a Soviet space object,
the Cosmos 954 satellite, and the deposition on Canadian territory of haz-
ardous radioactive debris from the satellite. 1 73 Canada stated that its
claim was based "jointly and separately on (a) the relevant international
agreements and in particular the 1972 Convention on International Lia-
bility for Damage Caused by Space Objects' 7 4 to which both Canada and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are parties, and (b) general prin-
ciples of international law.' ' 7 5 Article II of the treaty provides that "[a]
launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in
flight. 1 76 Canada also relied on the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing
"169. Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International
Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189, 1227 (1965) [hereinafter Goldie I]. In connection with his
theory of international pollution as a form of unjust enrichment, Professor Goldie states
that the Trail Smelter case teaches that, "in international law, unjust enrichment also
comes out when the creation of a risk with a consequential infliction of injury becomes an
act of unjust enrichment." Goldie II, supra note 168, at 247. He is hopeful that an interna-
tional rule of absolute liability is now in "the borderland between lex lata and lex ferenda,"
and that even with such an "ambiguous, incipient status," it "may be perceived as offering a
shielding regime for a party against unbridled risk-creation without, however, imposing pos-
itive rights and duties." Id.
170. XII RPT. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 281 (1957).
171. Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report, supra note 4, at 22.
172. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra note 85, at 61, quoting 23 of XII RPT.
INT'L ARB. AWARDS, supra note 170.
173. 18 I.L.M., 899, 902 (1979).
174. Space Damage Convention, supra note 119.
175. 18 I.L.M., supra note 173, at 905
176. Space Damage Convention, supra note 119, at art. II.
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the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, in-
cluding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,"' to which again, both Ca-
nada and the U.S.S.R. were parties, and which provides, in article VII,
that "[e]ach State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the
launching of an object into outer space . . . is internationally liable for
damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or judicial
persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space
"2178or in outer space ... .
Canada also asserted that:
The principle of absolute liability applies to fields of activities having
in common a high degree of risk. It is repeated in numerous interna-
tional agreements and is one of "the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations" (Article 38 of the Statute of The Interna-
tional Court of Justice). Accordingly, this principle has been accepted
as a general principle of international law. 79
F. Ex Gratia Payments
One of the ways that States have traditionally taken into considera-
tion the interests of other States, especially when not to do so might po-
tentially expose them to charges of wrongfulness and, perhaps, therefore,
traditional state responsibility obligations, is by making ex gratia pay-
ments. One of the most famous examples of this practice was the
Fukuryu Maru incident involving the United States and Japan. In 1954,
when the United States exploded a test "hydrogen bomb on Eniwetok
atoll in the Marshall Islands, some Japanese fishermen on the high seas
were injured and a fishing resource customarily exploited by Japan was
contaminated by radioactive fallout."' 80 The U.S. Government expressed
its concern and regret and paid $2 million in damages "on the under-
standing that the sum would be distributed in an equitable manner at the
discretion of the Japanese Government.' 81 Another case involving Japan
177. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S.
205, No. 8843.
178. Id. at art. VII.
179. 18 I.L.M., supra note 173, at 907.
180. Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at V 37.
181. Goldie I, supra note 169, at 1233. Other examples of ex gratia payments, as out-
lined by Professor Maier in a recent article include:
[P]ayment [by the United States] to Switzerland after World War II of ex
gratia compensation for the accidental bombing raid of Schaffhausen, [the
Fukuryu Maru incident payment] and, most recently . . .payments . . . of
$1.6 million to individuals whose person or property was injured during the
invasion of Granada.
Other nations have acted similarly in similar situations. The Iraqis, while
denying legal liability, have offered to pay for the injuries and deaths that re-
sulted from the missle attack on the U.S.S. Stark. Israel paid the United
States some $7 million in what it designated ex gratia compensation for its
attack on the intelligence ship U.S.S. Liberty. The Israelis also paid Libya ex
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and marine damage arose when the Liberian tanker Juliana ran aground
and split apart off Niigata, on Japan's west coast. The oil it spilled dam-
aged local fisheries. The Liberian Government offered 200 million yen in
compensation, which the Japanese accepted. 82
Ex gratia payments were in the news again recently, in the wake of
the downing, by the U.S.S. Vincennes, of Iran Air Flight 655 in the Per-
sian Gulf on July 3, 1988. Although former President Reagan announced
the regrets of the U.S. "within a few days" and "promised that the
United States would make an ex gratia payment to the families of the
victims,"18 3 Iran has refused to agree and has asked the International
Court of Justice to consider the case.18'
One commentator has emphasized that ex gratia payments are useful
because they carry no legal obligation, stating that, "[a]lthough, in the
abstract, a legal rule requiring compensation might seem to make sense,
in reality, given the current state of international fact-finding and adjudi-
cation, it does not."'8 5
This same publicist also emphasizes that ex gratia payments are
preferable when "acknowledging legal liability might be politically unac-
ceptable to the nation involved." He also points out that they comport
with the no-uncompensated-victim principle:
If the problem of compensation is made to depend, in every instance,
upon the outcome of legal argument about the current content of cus-
tomary international law, it is likely that flexibility would be lost, and,
at the same time, future victims might find themselves denied recom-
pense until after years of international litigation."'
III. THE ISSUE OF STRICT LIABILITY AS TREATED BY THE SPECIAL
RAPPORTEURS ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY
As we have seen, Special Rapporteur Barboza's last two reports are a
study in contrasts, if not confusion. His approach in his Fourth Report
seems to be from the beginning of a situation or an incident, focusing on
liability for the creation of risk, rather than from the end, with considera-
tions of liability for injuries suffered, which has been the traditional focus
of this topic. With his Fifth Report he reinserted liability for injuries ac-
tually suffered and limited the topic, as Special Rapporteur Barboza had,
to injuries that are caused or likely to be caused by the "physical conse-
gratia for the downing of a Libyan passenger plane in 1973.
Maier, Ex Gratia Payments and the Iranian Airline Tragedy in Agora: The Downing of
Iran Air Flight 655, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 328-29 (1989) [hereinafter Agora].
182. Handl, State Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by
Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 547 (1980) [hereinafter Handl I].
183. Agora, supra note 181, at 318 ("Introduction").
184. Suit Dismissed in Iran Jet Case, N.L.J. 3 (Nov. 27, 1989).
185. Agora, supra note 181, at 329.
186. Id.
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quences" of the activities undertaken. ' He nevertheless retained the
elaborate but still vague liability-for-risk standard that caused so much
controversy.
Special Rapporteur Barboza's revisions in his Fourth Report revived
the debate over "strict liability"' 8 on the international plane, but the re-
visions of his Fifth Report are, according to Ambassador Barboza,
designed to avoid the spectre of "dreaded" absolute liability, making any
and all discussions of it unnecessary. The approach of his Fourth Report
provoked debate of the strict liability issue, and his retreat from that po-
sition in his Fifth Report, obviously designed to sweep that controversy
under the rug, is inadequate to accomplish that goal. Even his readapta-
tions of some of the approach and some of the language of his predecessor
have failed to satisfy those critical of his liability-for-risk standard.
The issue of strict liability is too important to this topic for the Spe-
cial Rapporteur to try to ignore it. He should embrace the debate on this
issue and work to channel and guide it so that States are able to reach a
consensus. Provocation of debate followed by denial simply won't do.
Strict liability has been at the heart of the debate on this topic since
the beginning of the ILC's work. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter
worked long and hard to quell the controversy he encountered on the is-
187. Use of the word "injury" here, and in all discussions of this topic, should, if Spe-
cial Rapporteur Barboza has his way, be completely abolished. A corrigendum to his Fifth
Report notes that "whenever the word 'injury' appears in the report, it should be replaced
with 'harm.'" Fifth Report, supra note 14, Corr. 1. Ambassador Barboza seems to be slowly,
but inexorably, redefining his topic by changing the words used to be describe it. See note
267 and accompanying text, infra, for discussion of his substitution of the word "activities"
for "acts." See also notes 40-45 and accompanying text, supra, for discussion of the honor
paid the title when work on this topic commenced.
188. In this paper, "strict liability" is used to cover what is usually understood to be
encompassed by that term as well as what is usually referred to as "absolute liability." See
discussion of strict liability at note 214 and accompanying text infra. On the difference
between "strict liability" and "absolute liability," Professor Goldie has stated that:
Some writers use the term "absolute liability" to indicate the form of liability
imposed by the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher....
On the other hand, Professor Sir Percy Winfield's article, The Myth of Abso-
lute Liability, has been generally influential in bringing about the selection of
such terms as "strict liability" and "liability without fault" in preference to
"absolute liability." Professor Winfield argues that the exculpating rules which
courts have developed to mitigate the rigour of the defendant's liability under
Rylands v. Fletcher render the adjective "absolute" something of a misnomer;
hence the phrase "strict liability" has come to be preferred.
Goldie I, supra note 169, at 1215-16. Professor Goldie goes on, however, to state that he uses
the terms "absolute liability," not because he disagrees with Professor Winfield, but so as to
"indicate a more rigorous form of liability than that usually labelled 'strict.' " Id. 1216. See
also Goldie II, supra note 168, at 194-95.
As we saw in section II, "strict," too, is somewhat of a misnomer. There is no regime
that imposes liability absent proof of causation and, although some regimes may establish
fewer rather than more exculpating or mitigating factors, such factors are never absent
altogether.
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sue,1 8 9 and developed his elaborate "continuum" theory as part of that
effort. Although Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter devoted a great deal
of effort to avoiding adoption of a strict liability standard that Special
Rapporteur Barboza has, with his most recent Report, declared it
"dreaded," that is precisely the standard that has, as we have seen, been
codified in many of the treaties and much of the state practice in this
area. It was also the standard that those who initiated the work of the
Commission on this topic assumed would apply in this area of the law.
The Working Group on International Liability for Injurious Conse-
quences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law stated
in its 1978 Report that
[t]he most constant feature of [the conventional subject-by-subject]
regimes [designed to regulate liability for 'damages inherent in certain
major fields of activity made possible by modern technology'] is the
adoption of a rule of absolute liability - that is, a liability that arises
from the very fact that injurious consequences have occurred, without
reference to the quality of the action that led to the occurrence. 90
Once he assumed the role of Special Rapporteur, however, Mr. Quen-
tin-Baxter began to emphasize the difficulties with a rule of strict liabil-
ity 91 and to move the topic away from specifying such a standard. In his
Second Report to the Commission, Mr. Quentin-Baxter used a "sweeping
metaphor" to express the strict liability issue: "doctrine is a wave that
breaks and scatters around the rocky outcrop of 'strict' or 'absolute' or
'no-fault liability' or 'liability for risk.' "19' Mr. Quentin-Baxter made it
clear that he sided with those who opposed including such a standard in
his work because "strict liability regimes are always the product of con-
vention, and. . . customary law obligations relevant to the avoidance and
prevention of harm are always founded in responsibility for wrongful-
ness." 193 In non-conventional situations, in his view, "no very satisfactory
189. One publicist has stated that some of Quentin-Baxter's "influential critics ...
seemed to suggest that the subject was founded on grave misconceptions, and ought not to
exist," while others wanted to "enlarge the scope of 'international liability' in a manner that
would endanger its continued study." Pinto, supra note 45, at 18.
190. 1978 ILC Report, supra note 33, at 151.
191. Mr. Quentin-Baxter stated, in his Preliminary Report, that "questions of liability
are almost a forbidden subject." Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 42, at 5.
192. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra note 85, at 11.
193. Id. at 12. See also Bedjaoui, Responsibility of States: Fault & Strict Liability,
10 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT'L L., 358, 360 (1987) [hereinafter Bedjaoui]:
However conscious States might be of the vital nature of the interests at stake,
it is only on a conventional basis that it has been possible for them to feel
bound by this new, more onerous and stringent form of liability. That is one of
the distinctive characteristics of this form of liability as compared with the
classic type, which has customary roots. The conventional endorsement of lia-
bility for ultra-hazardous activities shows how States are above all concerned
with the reparation of loss or injury, and much less with what is in this context
the secondary point as to whether the State causing the damage acted in a
legitimate or a wrongful way, or exercised reasonable care in carrying on its
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way has been found to demonstrate that this onerous principle is self-
limiting.' 9 4 Noting that he did not invoke a principle of liability without
fault, and that this was a view shared by both the Commission and the
Sixth Committee,' Mr. Quentin-Baxter clearly viewed getting this diffi-
cult issue under control as one of his most important tasks.196 In his Sec-
ond Report he also expressed the view that "regimes of strict liability...
are only one, and not always the best method of discharging obligations
towards those who may be adversely affected by an activity that is
predominantly beneficial. '"'9
By. his Fourth Report, Mr. Quentin-Baxter was expressing the opin-
ion that if the Commission were to identify "acts, not prohibited by inter-
national law with the strict liability of the State, it would outstrip the
pace of the international community's advance and would run the risk of
obscuring the genuine, underlying momentum of that advance. '
activities.
Thus, the basic of wrongfulness belonging to classic responsibility is here
supplanted by the principle of causality, the most common feature of these
conventional regimes is the adoption of a rule of absolute liability whereby
liability results from the very fact of injurious consequences without there be-
ing any need to qualify the act that gave rise to them.
194. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra note 85, at $ 11. Commentators support
this. One has criticized strict liability, because, "as its name implies, [it] is not sensitive to
varying conditions, i.e., it cannot be modulated to take account of differences in circum-
stances. In this respect, it is not ideally suited to dealing adequately with the wide variety of
situations now envisaged under the topic." Magraw I, supra note 5, at 327. For support of
the proposition that strict liability is a sort of genie that, once let out of the bottle, is quite
difficult to control or limit, see Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10
CARDOzo L. REV. 2301 (1989).
195. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra, note 85 at 1 11.
196. He believed that
by maintaining the objectives of the present topic, it should be possible to re-
lieve the extreme discomfort associated with each of the opposing doctrinal
positions. . . . If strict liability ceases to have the apparent character of an
ungovernable encroachment upon the orthodox doctrine of State responsibil-
ity, it will be freed to take an appropriate place among measures that may be
required when a beneficial activity entails substantial transnational dangers
which are not entirely preventable.
Id. at 1 14.
197. Id. at 46. By declaring that "[sitates are, fortunately, leaning more towards pre-
vention than a broader guarantee," id. at 1 82, Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter seemed
to side with those who advocate control by means of agreed upon standards rather than
prevention encouraged by imposition of penalties for its failure. Indeed he has denigrated
strict liability by referring to it, "[i(n an [sic] conventional regime" as a "commutation of an
obligation of prevention." Id. at 92.
198. Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 57. See also 60-62. Professor
Handl has made the point that Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter developed the contin-
uum of obligations and relied on the shared expectations concept of his schematic outline in
an attempt to achieve greater acceptance for the proposed articles and avoid the controversy
engendered by proposals involving strict liability:
[I]n Quentin-Baxter's scheme of things the principle of strict liability is rele-
gated to a subsidiary role. Its strong moral and utilitarian appeal, quite apart
from its foundation in international practice is acknowledged only indirectly
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With Special Rapporteur Barboza there was a great change in the
rhetoric employed, especially with respect to strict liability. As the Com-
mission described its discussion of his Preliminary Report, Ambassador
Barboza was not at all shy about raising the strict liability issue:
In the view of the Special Rapporteur, it was also necessary to con-
sider the operation of the obligation of reparation and its basis in in-
ternational law. The investigation inevitably led to liability for risk,
known in English as 'strict liability,' . . . in the view of the Special
Rapporteur, it could not be denied that its main basis was simply
'strict liability."99
In his first Report, Ambassador Barboza identified strict liability as "the
very heart of the topic,"2 00 again emphasizing that strict liability "is not
monolithic" and that "there are various degrees of strictness."20 ' He at-
tacked head-on those Mr. Quentin-Baxter had worked so hard to placate:
[T]he concept of liability for risk, or strict liability, has aroused some
strong opposition in the Commission and in the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly, for it has been said, perhaps rightly so, that it
is not based on any norm of general international law." 2
Having stated this, he went on, however, to demonstrate that strict liabil-
ity is an inevitable concomitant of territorial sovereignty, because sover-
eignty, in an interdependent world is never absolute:
[Wie have all the elements that are needed to present [strict] liability
almost as a consequence which derives from premises that can be
borne out by pure logic. These premises are at the cornerstone of the
international legal order ....
[S]overeignty is, like the god Janus, two-faced. This is so because
of an inherent contradiction: there is no true sovereignty when there
is coexistence with other equal entities. The idea of sovereignty is in-
compatible with the idea of multiplicity . . . . Thus, the concept of
absolute freedom of action of a State in its own territory, based on the
premise that any activity authorized by the source state is valid, and
that if it causes damage, that damage cannot be compensated for
under international law, is as far removed from reality as the opposite
and in a circuitous fashion .... But the prospect of acceptability comes at the
cost of a significant dilution of the normative contents of liability.
... The final outcome might be less than desirable.
Handl II, supra note 45, at 72.
199. 1986 ILC Report, supra note 6, at 197. The Commission went on to paraphrase
Ambassador Barboza thusly:
Although there had been objections to strict liability, it had been stated in
support of it, first, that it was not a monolithic concept, since it involved dif-
ferent degrees of strictness, and, when combined with mitigating factors, be-
came a sufficiently flexible instrument; and, secondly, that it was not certain
that it did not have a basis in international law.
Id. at 199.
200. Second Report, supra note 6, at 1 19. See also 26, 46.
201. Id. at 48. See also note 188, supra.
202. Id. at 52.
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assumption, namely that, since it is forbidden to cause damage be-
cause it would interfere with another state's use and enjoyment of its
territory, any activity likely to create risk is in principle prohibited,
and cannot be undertaken without the prior approval of the other
States ....
A legal norm, then cannot be based on an international "reality"
which does not exist, since absolute independence or absolute sover-
eignty, does not exist. In contrast, interdependence has always existed
and is becoming more and more prevalent; it is also the basis in inter-
national law for liability for risk . . . . It could justifiably be argued
that reparation constitutes a veritable "internalization" of costs.2"'
The Commission debated strict liability at some length in connection
with its review of Ambassador Barboza's Second Report.0 4 The discus-
sion at the Commission reflected the deep rifts considerations of strict
liability seem to engender in the international community.2 0 5 Special
203. Id. at 52-54. Here, Ambassador Barboza seems to adopt Professor Goldie's the-
ory that strict liability, on the international plane, provides a means of compensating those,
who like victims of transboundary pollution, are victims of what amounts to expropriation.
See Goldie II, supra note 168, at 212-17. See also 1986 ILC Report, supra note 6, at 199.
Prosser and Keaton, too, say that one of the reasons that can be advanced for a theory of
strict liability is the
notion that the benefits derived from conduct produce an "enrichment" that is
"unjust" unless the actor pays for the harms done .... Under this . . . princi-
ple ... , the costs of conduct, including the costs of compensating for harms it
causes, should be borne by the actor, who in turn will be able to pass those
costs along to others who benefit from the actor's conduct. The net effect is
that costs may be borne by those who benefit and, ideally, in proportion to
their respective shares of the benefits.
PROSSER, infra note 214, at § 85.
Special Rapporteur Barboza's analysis of the current nature of sovereignty, while sure to be
viewed as heretical by some, is not without its supporters. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Jes-
sica Tuchman Mathews has said:
The assumptions and institutions that have governed international relations in
the postwar era are a poor fit with the new realities [of "resource environmen-
tal and demographic issues"]. Environmental strains that transcend national
borders are already beginning to break down the sacred boundaries of national
sovereignty, previously rendered porous by the information and communica-
tions revolutions and the instantaneous global movement of financial capital.
The once sharp dividing line between foreign and domestic policy is blurred,
forcing governments to grapple in international forums with issues that were
contentious enough in the domestic arena.
Mathews, Redefining Security, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 162, 162 (1989).
204. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Thirty-ninth
Session U 183-86, reprinted in [1987] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. 111-13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A 1987 (Part 1).
205. Some members took the position that the " 'strict liability' which was suggested by
the Special Rapporteur as the main underlying concept of this topic did not exist in interna-
tional law." Id. at V 183. Others
disagreed with the assertion that the- concept of strict liability did not exist in
international law. It was incorporated, as a concept if not as a term, in a num-
ber of multilateral treaties. The principle was incorporated in the Trail
Smelter arbitration, the Gut Dam claims, and in many other forms of State
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Rapporteur Barboza evidently took the negative comments to heart, be-
cause he made almost no mention of the topic in his Third Report except
to point out that his liability regime provides for liberal exculpation,0 6
and virtually no mention of strict liability per se appears in his Fourth
Report. °0 But, as we have seen, the liability-for-risk regime proposed in
Ambassador Barboza's Fourth Report engendered great controversy.
Neither the Special Rapporteur nor his critics"' used the term "strict
liability," but that seems to be exactly what was once again the cause of
the controversy and the unnamed topic of the debate on the liability-for-
risk proposal.
Ambassador Barboza had long advocated including creation of risk
within the scope of the topic, but, as we have seen, dropped all references
to strict liability after the debate on his Second Report. If he intended
the liability-for-risk regime he proposed in his Fourth Report to function
as a strict liability regime, admitting that that was his intention probably
could not have engendered more controversy than the "risk"-based the-
ory did. Instead, Special Rapporteur Barboza has claimed that "the con-
practice. . . .Strict liability was the basis on which a solution to the funda-
mental problems under the present topic should be sought. The schematic out-
line conformed to a modified version of strict liability and that was a reasona-
ble approach.
Id. at 185.
Special Rapporteur Barboza
stated that the concept of strict liability was known in most domestic legal
systems, whether they belonged to the civil law or common law tradition. By
using the expression 'strict liability,' he therefore was relying on a common
legal concept holding that, for certain activities or under certain circumstances,
if a causal relationship was established between an activity and an injury, there
was liability. Nor was that principle entirely alien to international law.
Id. at V 186. He also stated that he "saw no contradiction" between that principle and pre-
vention. Id. But he also nevertheless began the process of backing away from a "strict" form
of strict liability:
Strict liability did not need to be incorporated in the present topic to the same
degree as was known in domestic law or some conventional regimes of interna-
tional law; but what was important in this topic was the notion that the estab-
lishment of a causal relationship between certain activities and certain injuries
was sufficient to entail liability. Strict liability provided that basis. At the same
time, it did not preclude modifications the Commission might wish to intro-
duce, such as a number of factors which could be taken into account for deter-
mination of the extent of liability and amount of damages.
Id.
206. Third Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law 30, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/405, reprinted in
[1987] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1987 (Part 1) [hereinafter Third
Report). The bold assertions of his Preliminary Report obviously did not do much to per-
suade States concerned about protecting their sovereign prerogatives. Gone, too, is any ac-
knowledgment, as there had been earlier, that this topic is one that properly encompasses
development as well as codification of international law.
207. Fourth Report, supra note 8.
208. See discussion of the reaction to the Fourth Report at notes 8-13 and accompany-
ing text, supra.
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cept of 'activities involving risk,'" was introduced in his Fourth Report so
as to avoid including strict or absolute liability within the scope of the
topic," 9 and that "the concept of 'risk' could establish limits which
would, in particular, prevent kinds of 'absolute' [or strict] liability from
being incurred, in which any and all transboundary injury would have to
be compensated."2"0 Bowing to the criticism nevertheless leveled at the
articles proposed with his Fourth Report, he added liability for actual
harm caused to his liability for risk standard and declared that adhering
to the concepts he had set forth would not "incur the dreaded 'absolute
[or strict] liability.' ,211 This, however, as we have seen,212 did not quiet
the debate or resolve the disagreements over the liability-for-risk stan-
dard, and many still remain quite dissatisfied with it.
It seems that Special Rapporteur Barboza managed to raise the spec-
tre of strict liability without even openly mentioning it, and that he has
now extravagantly, and perhaps unnecessarily, renounced any interest in
such an approach to liability. He provoked a spirited but misdirected de-
bate and seeks to resolve it by abjuring any further consideration of a key
concept that he has now tarred with the sobriquet "dreaded." He has
denied the international community the opportunity to debate in any co-
herent fashion either the question of strict liability itself or the question
of its proper relationship to the problem of transboundary pollution.
IV. STRICT LIABILITY THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Despite the great difficulty Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter had
with the concept of strict liability, and the problems it continues to cause
Special Rapporteur Barboza, the concept is certainly not unknown on the
international plane, as we saw in section II above, and models for strict
liability standards exist in numerous municipal law systems. The World
Commission takes the position that the "increasing acceptance of strict
liability for ultrahazardous activities at the national level is evidence of
an emerging principle" of international law. 213 In addition to covering
209. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 7.
210. Id. at 4.
211. Id. at 12. One of the means of avoiding the spectre of strict liability is use of the
"concept of 'activity' as opposed to 'act.'" Id. See discussion of this distinction at note 267
and accompanying text, infra.
212. See notes 8-13 and accompanying text, supra.
213. Brundtland Report, supra note 59. Despite the World Commission's assertion that
there may well be a general principle of international law for strict liability, at least for
ultra-hazardous materials, one publicist writing the same year the World Commission re-
leased its report has noted that "there may well not be any international law norm of any
type for international accountability for lawful activities. The survey compiled by the Secre-
tariat [see note 214, infral contains an impressive compendium of relevant state practice
that supports the [Quentin-Baxter] schematic outline in many respects. However, the bulk
of that state practice, at least in its bilateral form, is European and North American. If the
survey is accurate in this regard, the state practice may not be sufficiently representative to
establish customary international law, irrespective of the requirement of opinio juris."
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
"ultrahazardous" activities, municipal laws and decisions also deal with
products, including food and drugs as well as many manufactured goods,
and extend, in some jurisdictions, to accidents at the workplace and on
the highway.2"
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 320.
' 214. The British case most frequently cited as the source of Anglo-Saxon strict liability
law is Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865) [hereinafter Fletcher 1],
rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866) [hereinafter Fletcher 2], aff'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L.
330 (1868) [hereinafter Rylands]. The finder of fact pronounced the defendants free from all
personal blame. In a famous statement Justice Blackburn, in the Exchequer Chamber, for-
mulated the rule of the case thusly:
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if
it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does not do so is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
Fletcher 2 at 279-80. The House of Lords limited the sweep of Justice Blackburn's formula-
tion to extraordinary, non-natural, unusual uses of land, Rylands at 338. With this restric-
tion, Rylands has been widely-followed in British courts, and to determine what is a non-
natural use, "the English courts have looked not only to the character of the thing or activ-
ity in question, but also to the place and manner in which it is maintained and its relation
to its surroundings." PROSSER & KEATON ON TORTS § 78, at 546.5c (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER]. In this we see the origin of the special scrutiny applied, on the international
plane, to activities at or near a State's border.
The strict liability rule also applies in the large majority of U.S. jurisdictions, with its
acceptance still expanding. "The conditions and activities to which the rule has been ap-
plied have followed the English pattern," PROSSER, supra, § 78 at 549, and "the American
decisions, like the English ones, have applied the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher only to
the thing out of place, the abnormally dangerous condition or activity which is not a 'natu-
ral' one where it is." Id. And in those jurisdictions where strict liability, per se, is still not
accepted, the type of liability imposed in Rylands v. Fletcher is so often otherwise applied
on nuisance theory, "that it is quite evident that ... the principle is in reality universally
accepted." Id. at 551.
American courts have also adopted strict products liability. As Prosser & Keaton put it:
One of the most dramatic [events] in American law is the rapid spread of strict
products liability throughout American states in the 1960's and 1970's. The
theory has been applied, for example, to power machinery of all types (includ-
ing cars), to food and drugs, and in a few cases to construction of buildings.
PROSSER, supra, § 85, at 611.
The leading U.S. products liability case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), which rested on a theory of implied warranty, opened the prover-
bial judicial floodgates, and the period since that fall of the "citadel of privity," PROSSER,
supra, § 97 at 690, has been marked by rapid development of liability not based on fault.
These principles were included in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, (1964),
shortly after the ruling in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963), the first case adopting strict products liability as an inde-
pendent basis for tort liability. The cases that followed have expanded the scope of this
liability significantly. Defendants have generally not been able to exculpate themselves from
liability on a state of the art defense, see PROSSER, supra, at § 99. Plaintiffs' cases have been
made easier when it is difficult to identify the defendant among many who potentially fit
that role by the development of alternative liability theory (see, e.g., Menne v. Celotex
Corp., 641 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Kan. 1986), Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948);
and enterprise or market share liability theory (see, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980)). In all of
these cases, particular defendants have been able to exculpate themselves upon a sort of
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It is in the area of liability for ultrahazardous activities, however,
that there has been the most formal activity on the international law
front. Professor Jenks foretold this in a pioneering article in 1966:
Today, alongside classic responsibility with its rival theories, some
new forms of liability have been emerging which not only ignore the
concept of fault as a constituent factor of the internationally wrongful
act but do not even inquire whether the act attributable to the State
is wrongful. This is the outcome of scientific and technological ad-
vances which have obliged international law to adapt itself to new cir-
cumstances. Within a few decades, man's power over nature has in-
creased in a spectacular and often frightening degree. More especially,
the harnessing of nuclear energy, the conquest of space, the exploita-
tion of the sea-bed, the transport and use of liquid or gaseous hydro-
carbons, have drawn humanity into new activities which though they
are for the most part not prohibited, are abnormally dangerous ...
The problem posed by these new activities does not derive from
negative causation theory, i.e., by showing that the product that harmed the plaintiff was
not, or could not have been, theirs. But the theory of strict products liability seems to be on
the move again, and a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of New York, Hymowitz v. Eli
Lilly, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, cert. denied sub nor. Rexall Drug Co. v. Tigue, 58
U.S.L.W. 3290 (1989), denies the defendants that route of exculpation in certain
circumstances.
The majority of the jurisdictions in the United States have also adopted statutory no
fault compensation schemes with workers' compensation systems and mandated no-fault
automobile insurance programs.
In at least the United States, therefore, the theory of strict liability has evolved to the
extent that it provides significant opportunities to an injured plaintiff for recovery from
even a defendant who has committed no wrong, who is, in a legal sense, without fault.
In other jurisdictions, strict liability for ultrahazardous activities also has wide accept-
ance. The World Commission has identified national legislation or judicial decisions in the
following jurisdictions: France; the Federal Republic of Germany; the U.S.S.R.; Mexico;
Venezula; Egypt; Libya; Senegal; Madagascar; Ethiopia; India; Thailand; Syria; Kuwait;
Iran; Iraq; Jordan; Lebanon; Turkey; and Japan. Japan as well as the Federal Republic of
Germany also have provisions for strict liability for various types of pollution damage.
Brundtland Report, supra note 59, at 83-84. See also Survey of State Practice Relevant to
International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by
International Law: Study Prepared by the Secretariat, 37 U.N. GAOR International Law
Commission at 222-34, 11 362-86, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/384, October 16, 1984 [hereinafter Sec-
retariat Study].
Prosser & Keaton view strict liability theory as a natural evolution of legal thought:
In Anglo-American law ... the fault principle was clearly dominant between
the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. By the end of that hundred-
year period, however, a number of different developments foretold increased
influence of the strict accountability principle. In the first half of the twentieth
century, the system for compensating worker injuries shifted from a basis in
fault to a basis in strict accountability. In the years since 1950, a second major
shift has occurred-an almost universal acceptance of strict products liabil-
ity-and application of the fault principle to highway injuries has been eroded
in some states by no-fault legislation. The time may be near, if it has not al-
ready arrived, in which more compensation is paid on the basis of strict ac-
countability than on the basis of fault.
PRossER, supra, § 85 at 615.
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the question whether they are legitimate or wrongful, but from the
fact that, even if they are essential or beneficial, they embody an in-
herent risk of transboundary harm. The new liability problem there-
fore presents itself in terms of loss or injury suffered in consequence
of activities which, however useful, are ultrahazardous, irrespective of
whether the State causing the harm did or did not take every desira-
ble precaution. The new idea is that due diligence affords no exemp-
tion from reparation for damage caused. 15
Professor Weiss has pointed out that at the time of Professor Jenks' arti-
cle, the idea of "liability for ultrahazardous activity was still controver-
sial," but that it has "since gained wide recognition."2 1 Whether or not
such strict or absolute liability can apply in situations other than those
involving "ultrahazardous" activities is, it seems, at the heart of the Com-
mission's work. To some, it does not seem at all radical:
Activities making use of the latest scientific discoveries and concerned
with modern forms of utilization or exploitation of the sea, of space or
of nuclear energy are not the only ones to pose such problems. There
are also more traditional activities or subject matters to which such
absolute liability management appropriately apply: for example, the
use and regulation of rivers that traverse or separate the territories of
several States . . . the prevention of damage caused by floods or the
melting of the snows; the exploitation of land in border areas; the
propagation of fire or explosions across national frontiers; the contam-
ination of human beings, animals or plants by diseases from other
countries; the transfrontier pollution of fresh water." '
215. Jenks, Liability for Ultrahazardous Activities in International Law, 117 RECUEIL
DE COURS 99 (1966).
216. Weiss, supra note 72. Professor Weiss noted, however, that the evolution of tort
law strict liability seems not to have extended beyond such ultra-hazardous activities, be-
cause her "recent review of more than 80 treaties dealing with international responsibility in
the environmental field revealed that they primarily addressed ultrahazardous activities or
massive oil pollution of the marine environment, rather than more general transfrontier en-
vironmental harm." Id. See also Gaines, International Principles for Transnational Envi-
ronmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help Break the Impasse? 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 311, 316-17 (1989) [hereinafter Gaines]: "international law has accumulated
a growing body of treaties, conventions, and other indicia of 'State practice' with respect to
ultrahazardous activities and certain other narrowly defined problems. To this extent, the
concept of transnational liability has already gained international acceptance."
217. Bedjaoui, supra note 193, at 361. Mr. Bedjaoui went on to express the opinion that
"[tlo some minds, it is not inconceivable that one day such liability may even become appli-
cable in the international economic and financial field, for example, in the case of trans-
boundary losses sustained by foreign states or their nationals on account of a State's sover-
eign decision to devalue its own currency." Id. This precise question has been the source of
considerable controversy in connection with this topic.
Although Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, in his Preliminary Report, noted that
"the specific context in which the topic is discussed has always been that of environmental
hazard, caused by human activity and magnified by modern industrial and technological
needs and capacities," Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report, supra note 40, at 14, he also
stated that even though most of the examples he used in his Preliminary Report were
"drawn from the field of the environment . . . an attempt [was] made to show that the
principle reflected in the title of the topic does not limit itself to the field of the environ-
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Transboundary pollution in general certainly belongs on this list.
V. EFFECTS OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR BARBOZA'S APPROACH TO THE ISSUE
OF STRICT LIABILITY
A. The "Wrongfulness" Issue
As we have seen, Special Rapporteur Barboza has tried to effect a
major revision of the scope and perhaps the intent of the draft articles on
state liability for injuries caused by acts or activities not contrary to in-
ternational law. His "liability for risk" was arguably nothing more than
the "strict liability" assumed to be the standard when this topic was
launched. But even the indirect debate of strict liability this proposed
standard provoked proved once again, as it has since the beginning of
consideration of this topic, to be a source of contention in the Commis-
sion and in the Sixth Committee.
One of the by-products of Ambassador Barboza's focus on risk and
struggle with the strict liability issue was a revival of the basic issue of
wrongfulness versus acts not prohibited by international law and how lia-
bility/reparation schemes should properly be constructed." 8 He pointed
out that in the 1987 Commission debates it was noted that "polluting
ment." Id. at 62. The Draft Articles initially proposed did not limit the topic to the field of
the environment, and the provision on the scope of the articles provided that they would
apply when "activities undertaken within the territory or jurisdiction of a State give rise,
beyond the territory of that State, to actual or potential loss of injury to another State or to
its nationals .. " Second Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, by Mr. Robert Q. Quentin-Bax-
ter, Special Rapporteur 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/346/Add. 1 and 2, reprinted in [1981] II
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N. U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1981 (Part 1) [hereinafter Quentin-Baxter
First Report].
By the time of his Fourth Report, Mr. Quentin-Baxter was referring to the "physical"
limitation as one made as a matter of course: "there is a rather general expectation that the
field of application will include all physical uses of territory giving rise to adverse physical
transboundary effects." Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 48, at 17. By the Fifth
Report, the limitation was definite: "the activities and situations with which the present
topic deals must themselves have a physical quality, and the consequences must flow from
that quality. ... Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report, supra note 4, at 18. See also id. at 22-
34.
There was an initial hint from Special Rapporteur Barboza that he would, as part of his
special efforts to address the concerns of Third World nations in connection with this topic,
consider expanding the topic once again. In the 1986 ILC Report on its consideration of the
topic, it was noted that Special Rapporteur Barboza "had accepted, as a point of departure,
that the topic related primarily to the duties of the source State to avoid, minimize or repair
any appreciable or tangible physical transboundary loss or injury caused by an activity in-
volving risk. However, the Special Rapporteur did not rule out the possibility of modifying
this scope if the development of the topic made it desirable." 1986 ILC Report, supra note
6, at 195. This, however, was completely precluded by the time of Ambassador Barboza's
Fourth Report, in which he said that "in connection with international economic issues -
especially those relating to the adumbration of the new international economic order," the
topic had the potential to be "either a rogue elephant or a useful beast of burden," Fourth
Report, supra note 8, at 46. See also Gaines, supra note 216, at 314-16, 322-26.
218. See notes 45 & 193 and accompanying text, supra.
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activities which produced their effects gradually, cumulatively and con-
tinually, presented a problem as to their inclusion in our draft." ' Rais-
ing an issue that has been raised on many occasions by publicists,2 0 he
stated that "[t]he first question is whether pollution that causes apprecia-
ble injury is prohibited by general international law. ' 221 Such pollution
might be "prohibited by general international law," and would therefore
"not fall within the purview of [the] topic because [it would involve] deal-
ing with an unlawful act. '2'  Nevertheless, after minimal consideration,
219. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at T 8.
220. Most notably, Professor Handl, who takes the view that "the debate within the
Preparatory Committee charged with drafting the Stockholm Declaration clearly reveals
strong opposition by several delegates to the idea that Principle 21 could be interpreted as
imposing absolute or strict liability." Handl I, supra note 182, at 536. State practice, too, he
believes, supports his "fault, not strict liability" theory: "clear confirmation of the fault
principle as the international legal standard for transnational pollution in general emerges
from an analysis of different instances when the issue of liability was pertinently raised." Id.
at 536-37. He accepts strict liability only in situations involving accidents: "the distinctive
criterion [is] continuous as against accidental transfrontier pollution[:] . . . the former en-
gages the international liability of the controlling state only when the state incurs fault in
failing to prevent the damage from occurring, while the latter involves strict liability." Id. at
541. He has labeled the ILC's work on the international liability issue an "awkward" situa-
tion because it indicates "prima facie ... the existence in general international law of strict
state liability." Id. at 551. See also Handl II, supra note 45, at 50-51.
221. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at T 9.
222. Id. Although Special Rapporteur Barboza goes on to state that he believes that the
Commission would not "unanimously accept" the idea that there is such a prohibition, id. at
9 10, he tips his hand by also stating that:
Continuous pollution functions by accumulation. Pollutants which, in small
quantities and for a limited period of time, would not cause appreciable trans-
boundary injury, accumulate after a certain period of uninterrupted flow and
cause such injury. An activity resulting in substantial transboundary injury
cannot be allowed to continue unpunished and without the establishment of
some form of regulation.
Id. at 1 12 (emphasis added). Punishment, of course, implies wrongfulness. Liability for
injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by international law would involve compensa-
tion and restitution, if possible, to the condition that obtained before the injury. See also
Third Report, supra note 206, at V 60(b).
On the issue of the wrongfulness/strict liability distinction, it might be helpful to con-
sider the views of domestic law experts in this area. Strict liability is generally thought of as
liability without fault, but Prosser and Keaton question the traditional nomenclature thusly:
[Ilt may be questioned whether "fault," with its popular connotation of per-
sonal guilt and moral blame, and its more or less arbitrary legal meaning,
which will vary with the requirements of social conduct imposed by the law, is
of any real assistance in dealing with such questions, except perhaps as a de-
scriptive term. It might be quite as easy to say that one who conducts blasting
operations which may injure a neighbor is at "fault" in conducting them at all,
and is privileged to do so only in so far as he insures that no harm shall result,
as to say that he is not at fault, but is liable nevertheless. If he is not "at fault"
because the social desirability of the blasting justifies the risk, his conduct is
still so far socially questionable that it does not justify immunity. The basis of
his liability in either case is the creation of an undue risk of harm to other
members of the community. It has been said that there is "conditional fault,"
meaning that the defendant is not to be regarded as at fault unless or until his
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Ambassador Barboza concluded that he did not think "the Commission
would unanimously accept" the idea that there is "a prohibition at an
operative level against acts which give rise to appreciable injury by means
of transboundary pollution."2 3
conduct causes some harm to others, but he is then at fault, and to be held
responsible.
Once the legal concept of "fault" is divorced, as it has been, from the per-
sonal standard of moral wrongdoing, there is a sense in which liability with or
without "fault" must beg its own conclusion. The term requires such extensive
definition, that it seems better not to make use of it at all, and to refer instead
to strict liability, apart from either wrongful intent or negligence.
PROSSER, supra note 214, § 75, at 537-38.
Despite the simple elegance of an approach that refuses to founder on the "rocky out-
crop" of strict liability, there have been articulate formulations of why maintaining the dis-
tinction between liability for acts that are wrong and liability for acts that are not wrong is
desirable:
Since compensation is of course payable for wrongful acts, it may be wondered
whether there is any real difference between a duty to pay compensation for a
lawful act and a duty to pay compensation for a wrongful act. It is submitted,
however, that the distinction is important for two reasons. First, the amount of
compensation payable for a lawful act is probably less than the amount of
compensation payable for a wrongful act ...
The second point is that a certain stigma attaches to the commission of an
unlawful act. States may therefore be reluctant to pay compensation for
wrongful acts because they are unwilling to admit they have done anything
wrong. They may be more willing to pay compensation for lawful acts, because
such payments do not imply a confession of wrong doing. A rule requiring pay-
ment of compensation for lawful acts "should make easier a just, effective and
amicable settlement of any liability that may arise."
Akehurst, supra note 167, at 14-15.
Although there is some logic to [the] argument, the prospect of disregarding
the distinction between wrongful and nonwrongful acts under international law
is troublesome. First, it would diminish the stigma attaching to States that
engage in internationally wrongful activity ...
Second, a state cannot normally avoid the prohibition against engaging in
internationally wrongful acts by making monetary reparations ...whereas
such reparations may fulfill a state's obligations for nonwrongful acts ...
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 318.
The unwillingness of States to admit they have done anything wrong is illustrated best
in the examples of ex gratia payments examined above in notes 180-86 and accompanying
text, supra. It also seems plausible that States, especially developing States with an appetite
for more industry and technology as well as States of all types concerned about preservation
of their sovereign prerogatives, might be more willing to submit to a regime that, rather
than limiting their internal activities and giving other sovereigns the ability to require such
limitations, requires them, upon occurrence of a certain event, and only under those circum-
stances, to make reparations or pay compensation on a no-fault, even vaguely ex gratia-type
basis. See discussion in Magraw, The International Law Commission's Study of Interna-
tional Liability for Non-Prohibited Acts as it Relates to Developing States, 61 WASH. L.
REV. 1041, 1053 (1986) [hereinafter Magraw II].
223. Id. at 1 10. Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, too, has reached the same conclusion:
"it is doubtful that pollution, per se, of an international watercourse can be said to be pro-
scribed by contemporary international law." McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at
89 (Comment (4)). But see Sands, supra note 109, at 35, which discusses the movement, as
exemplified by the Declaration of the Hague [see notes 109-112 and accompanying text,
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Special Rapporteur Barboza thus skirted issues that special Rap-
porteur Quentin-Baxter had skirted as well:2"" whether all transboundary
pollution, by definition, is wrong, and whether consideration of that type
of injury within this topic is therefore more appropriately within the
scope of the State Responsibility topic of the Commission."' The World
Commission's Brundtland Report22 6 supports the wrongfulness approach.
It specifically states, in Article 21, that:
1. A State is responsible under international law for a breach of an
international obligation relating to the use of a natural resources or
the prevention or abatement of an environmental interference.
Reparation and/or compensation follow such an establishment of respon-
sibility. Article 21 continues thusly:
2. In particular, it [the responsible State] shall: a. cease the interna-
tionally wrongful act; b. as far as possible re-establish the situation
which would have existed if the internationally wrongful act had not
taken place; c. provide compensation for the harm which results from
the internationally wrongful act; d. where appropriate, give satisfac-
tion for the internationally wrongful act.1 7
Entangled in this are various legal and policy concerns, which, if not
considered and settled carefully, could do great harm to the establish-
ment of standards for the regulation and prevention of such polluting ac-
tivities and the compensation for harms they might cause. Considerations
of sovereignty, social benefit, third world versus first world and complex
technical issues are all in this mix.
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter was concerned about strict liabil-
ity being perceived as impinging upon state sovereignty by virtue of im-
posing a sort of state responsibility.22 And there are those who interpret
supra], toward recognition of "environmental degradation as a human rights issue affecting
'the right to live in dignity in a viable global environment.' [The Declaration] implicitly
accepts the legal right of individuals to protection of the international enviroment."
224. Special Rapporteur Barboza, in his Fifth Report, links this discussion from his
Fourth Report to his differention of liability for activities from liability for isolated acts,
which, he claims, is tantamount to the "dreaded" concept of strict liability. See discussion
of this distinction at note 267, infra and in his Fifth Report, supra note 14, at I 4-15.
225. Among the most vociferous of those who object to special consideration of the lia-
bility that can be incurred as the result of lawful acts is Professor Brownlie:
The Commission's decision to consider state responsibility and international
liability separately, despite the latter topic's derivation from the former, has
not met with universal approval. One commentator, Ian Brownlie, has objected
to considering international liability at all on grounds that it is "fundamentally
misconceived" in a manner that "may induce a general confusion in respect of
the principle of state responsibility."
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 316, quoting BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE
RESPONSIBILITY (Part 1) 50 (1983).
226. Brundtland Report, supra note 59, at 32.
227. Id.
228. See note 196 and accompanying text, supra.
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the Trail Smelter decision and the sic utere principle as focused on the
act of polluting, rather than on the injury caused by pollution sufficient to
cause harm transnationally. While environmentalists in particular might
wish to classify all pollutants and set standards to regulate their dis-
charge, 29 working all the time toward the goal of prohibiting all pollu-
tion, with the violation of those standards amounting to an international
wrong; the better approach for the Commission is one that works to es-
tablish residual rules to apply in situations for which no such specific
rules apply.23 Moreover, aside from the technical problems involved in
establishing such standards, this also would simply remove considerations
of transboundary pollution from this topic. Admittedly, establishment of
specific environmental standards to insure that pollution problems are
avoided is the ideal, but that is not a solution that can be achieved soon
or easily, or one that States will accept willingly. The best approach the
ILC can take is to work diligently on developing interim rules that can
provide some generally accepted international principles that will apply
until the ideal can be reached.
In the past Ambassador Barboza gave at least lip service to this ap-
proach. He echoed the sentiments of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter
stating that the objective of his work was to "meet the fairly modest
objectives of the draft, namely, to encourage States to work out agree-
ments regulating activit[ies involving risk], and, in the interim, to estab-
lish certain basic general and minimally exigent duties."2 '' But he is most
recently on record as being uncomfortable with including in the scope of
the topic the one type of risk-producing activity, transboundary pollution,
229. This is the approach of environmental statutes and regulations in the United
States. See, e.g.: the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-91i, and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
2601-71, which regulate air quality; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (the "Clean
Water Act"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-
300j-26, which regulate water quality; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-91i, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-31, and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 42 U.S.C. §§
9602-75("CERCLA" or "Superfund"), which regulate land disposal and clean-up of hazard-
ous waste. Note, too, that CERCLA imposes a stringent strict liability regime. See Gaines,
supra note 216, at 330-33. For European examples, see Protocol to the 1979 Convention on
Long-Range Transboudnary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen
Oxides or Their Transbroundary Fluxes, October 31, 1988 and Protocol to the 1979 Conven-
tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulpher Emissions or
Their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 Percent, July 1, 1985.
230. Special Rapporteur McCaffrey has demonstrated that outright bans of pollution
were included in treaties of the nineteenth and very early twentieth centuries, but were
replaced by treaty provisions designed to set standards, e.g., to insure that the quality of the
water would not be harmed. See McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 39-40. Some
more modern agreements do set quality standards to be met or maintained, sometimes in-
cluding annexes with 'black' lists of prohibited substances and 'grey' lists of substances to
be regulated, while others establish joint commissions to deal with pollution issues. Id. at 1
43-48.
231. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 4.
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that is least likely to be the subject of a general international agreement
because it lacks the hazardous crisis immediacy of many of the other ac-
tivities that have been the subject of international agreements.132 He had
earlier, when he embraced strict liability, acknowledged this problem. In
his view, perhaps it is a theory that can only properly be applied to dan-
gers that are not preventable - so that "garden variety" transboundary
pollution issues, which are really the only significant ones not yet sub-
jected to a conventional regime, should not be governed by a strict-liab-
lity-for-harm-from-legal-activities standard. Implicit in this are the as-
sumptions that (1) there should be no pollution; (2) that all pollution that
affects another sovereign involves an international wrong; and (3) that
this area should be excluded from the Commission's work on this topic,
with perhaps the establishment of international standards, which, if met,
would create a presumption of no wrongfulness. 3  But, despite the
trouble Ambassador Barboza seems to have encountered on the issue of
strict liability, even the General Assembly has recognized and endorsed
the idea that environmental harms must be corrected or compensated for
by those who cause them. There is no insistence on a finding of wrongful-
ness. Indeed, the General Assembly seems-to endorse a prevention regime
like that of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter as the other half of a
proper international environmental law regime: "[e]nvironmental degra-
dation can be controlled and reversed only by ensuring that the parties
causing the damage will be accountable for their action, and that they
will participate, on the basis of full access to available knowledge, in im-
proving environmental conditions. 2 34
But it is precisely transboundary pollution, and issues like it, that
States will not acknowledge are wrongful per se and that do not (unless
and until they reach crisis proportions, like the U.S.-Canada acid rain
dispute) attract the attention, mobilize the concern and engender the
fears of impending doom that experience demonstrates are necessary for
States to consider adopting conventional regimes."' That is precisely why
232. Indeed, when he defined "activities involving risk," Ambassador Barboza set out a
laundry list of activities most of which are already covered by international agreements. He
referred to activities
entailing the use of substances which are intrinsically dangerous, or potentially
dangerous because of the place, environment or way in which they are used.
Intrinsically dangerous substances would include, for example, explosives, radi-
oactive, toxic or flammable materials, or materials which cause damage to the
human organism or the environment as a result of contact or proximity. ...
One example of [substances that may be dangerous because they are used in
large quantities] is crude oil when it is being transported. ...
Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 22.
233. See First Report, supra, note 6, at 30-33.
234. UNEP Report, supra note 31, at 3(i).
235. In other words, it is only in the areas where there is no law already that it is
difficult for the Commission to discern what the law is or should be:
The problem arises, of course, only in those situations in which the conduct is
not readily identifiable as violative of an international obligation, or in other
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residual rules are necessary. Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, like Special
Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, has stated that he views his task for the Wa-
tercourses topic as one of drafting articles that "set forth residual
rules,"2 "6 i.e., to provide a general legal regime for situations in which
special agreements do not apply and in which special joint commissions
or other regulatory agencies are not in place. He specifically states that
the standard setting "list" approach23 7 is not "appropriate in a framework
instrument of a general nature" such as the draft articles on the Water-
courses and the International Liability topics.2 3 8 If transboundary pollu-
tion and issues like it are not dealt with by the Commission, and if the
concerted effort to codify or, if necessary, develop, general rules that gov-
ern such situations is abandoned, it will surely result in no international
mechanism whatsoever. Victims of the polluting activities of foreign sov-
ereigns or other foreign entities will thus be allowed to go
uncompensated.
In his Fifth Report, Special Rapporteur Barboza acknowledges the
persistence of difficulty with the wrongfulness issue. He predicts that the
current developments, divided as they are, point toward emergence of, in
effect, "two conventions, except that the two r6gimes (one of responsibil-
ity for wrongfulness and the other of causal liability) would coexist in the
same instrument. ' 2 9 According to Ambassador Barboza, "[t]he result
would be that, if injury occurred as a result of a breach of obligation of
prevention, responsibility for wrongfulness, with all that this involves,
would apply, while if those were fulfilled, causal liability, also with its
attendant laws, would apply. '24 0 He acknowledges the logical inconsis-
tency of the position he seemingly advocates, with his characteristic disre-
gard for the established parameters or definitions of his topic and with
his typical reliance on the new distinctions he has introduced to those
parameters and definitions:
It was pointed out that there was an inconsistency here with our man-
date of dealing with liability for acts "not prohibited". Aside from the
indifference shown by members to this apparent contradition, it can
be argued that this reasoning is applicable to a topic which deals with
"acts", not "activities": our mandate involves dealing with the conse-
quences of certain wrongful acts which are inextricably linked to an
activity which is not prohibited. The activity would continue to be
words, does not contravene a specific conduct-related norm of international
law. Where, for example, States fail to comply with specific international pollu-
tant emission or discharge standards, there can be no doubt about State
responsibility.
Handl II, supra note 45, at 57.
236. McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 52, at 27 (Comment (7)).
237. See note 230 and accompanying text, supra.
238. McCaffrey Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 89 (Comment (11)).
239. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 48. See generally discussion at 40-54.
240. Id. at 1 48.
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allowed and only the injurious "act" would have to cease.2 1
Finally, and astonishingly, he recommends as the best solution a
combination of a "soft-law" approach to the obligation of prevention and
imposition of a strict liability regime for reparation of harms actually
caused, the precise regime he has labelled "dreaded" and worked assidu-
ously to prevent being subjected to reasoned scrutiny and debate by the
international community:
Ironically, the least harsh solution for the State of origin would be the
existence of a single r6gime: that of causal or strict liability. Such a
regime would function as follows: prevention would not be required as
a separate obligation but would simply arise from the deterrent effect
of reparation under the regime of strict liability. [The prevention arti-
cle] would simply be an appendix to the obligations to co-operate and
would be without consequences in the event of a breach (except that,
if injury ocurred, compliance with obligations of prevention would en-
title the State of origin to pay reduced compensation). It would also
offer the following advantages: (a) State conduct would not be quali-
fied as wrongful; (b) an easy mechanism for assigning obligations
would be established; (c) reparation would be required which sought
only to restore the balance of interests, instead of being guided by the
principle of total restitution; and (d) lastly, the act would not have to
cease, although its effects would be the subject of reparation, and this
could sometimes produce a more flexible solution.242
It seems that Special Rapporteur Barboza is perfectly capable of ap-
preciating the "advantages" and "flexibility" of a strict liability approach
even though he seems more than reluctant to open this approach to
debate.
B. The Prevention Issue
With his Fifth Report, Ambassador Barboza, by modifying and ex-
panding his draft articles on "Co-operation," "Prevention" and "Repara-
tion,"24 3 also seems to be moving back toward a Quentin-Baxter-type po-
sition on prevention and a recognition of the need for residual rules.
Indeed, he states that "[iun the absence of a specific regime for a specific
activity, a general regime would be required which would be that con-
tained in our articles, which establishes obligations to inform, notify, ne-
gotiate a regime and negotiate with a view to possible reparation, accord-
ing to certain criteria, for the injury caused."2"
The treatment of the prevention issue was one of the great failures of
the draft articles presented in Ambassador Barboza's Fourth Report. Al-
though he seemed to claim there that his risk-based liability would effec-
241. Id. at 1 49.
242. Id. at 50.
243. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 16 (Articles 7, 8 and 9).
244. Id. at 15.
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tuate prevention as well as reparation/compensation, the Fourth Report
was not at all clear on that point. Indeed, Special Rapporteur Barboza
admitted that he had no fundamental conceptual framework for preven-
tion: "[iun order to include prevention in the topic, as repeatedly called
for in the Sixth Committee and the Commission, it would be useful to
establish an underlying principle.""' 5
Promoting prevention has, since the beginning of work on this topic,
been one of the primary goals. Indeed, all efforts to codify and/or develop
the law in this area have revolved around the twin poles of prevention
and reparation/compensation. The Secretariat reviewed numerous issues
in connection with prevention, noting that both the procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of prevention have been considered and provided for in
both treaties and state practice.2"' Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter
consistently recognized the importance of prevention, stating that it was
his intention to emphasize prevention as well as reparation: "[t]he Special
Rapporteur's second major concern was to ensure that the topic would
give pride of place to the duty, wherever possible, to avoid causing inju-
ries, rather than to the substituted duty of providing reparation for injury
caused." 4"
Because Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter considered prevention
to be one of the twin poles of his topic, he developed a "soft law" contin-
uum of obligations - to prevent, to inform, to negotiate, and to repair -
the operation of which would not require a finding of liability or responsi-
bility based on wrongfulness."" The elements of the obligation-of-States
regime constructed by Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter appear in Sec-
tions 2, 3, 4 and 5 of his Schematic Outline, which first appeared in his
245. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at § 103. His Fourth Report draft article on preven-
tion provided that "[slource States shall take all reasonable preventive measures to prevent
or minimize injury that may result from an activity which presumably involves risk and for
which no regime has been established." Id. at § 17. Aside from the redundancy, the use of
"presumably" seemed inappropriate for an instrument that proposed to impose interna-
tional obligations. It also seemed inconsistent with the "appreciable risk" standard estab-
lished in his draft Article 1. Id. But Special Rapporteur Barboza seemed to intend that that,
too, be controlled by his risk-based analysis.
246. Secretariat Study, supra note 214, at 253.
247. Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at § 9. See also Quentin-Baxter
Fourth Report, supra note 50, at § 50 ("majority opinion in the Sixth Committee has each
year given a strong endorsement to the proposal that prevention and reparation should both
be treated in the context of this topic"); and Quentin-Baxter Fifth Report, supra note 4, at
§ 46 ("there is enormous strength in the theme of voluntarism. The compulsion to regulate
dangers is provided by facts, not by law").
248. Professor Magraw refers to this as a "compound 'primary' obligation," Magraw I,
supra note 5, at 311, "based in large part on the concepts of good faith, cooperation, and
bon voisinage between the 'acting state' (also referred to as the 'source state') and the 'af-
fected state' (i.e., the state that is being or may be harmed) .. " Magraw II, supra note
222, at 1043. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter stated in his Third Report that "[plerhaps
the most important policy aim of the present topic is to promote agreements between States
in order to reconcile, rather than inhibit, activities which are predominantly beneficial, de-
spite some nasty side effects." Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at 39.
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Third Report. They represent his attempt to work out the relationship
between prevention and reparation that he considered at the heart of lia-
bility for acts not prohibited by international law. In his view "[o]ne great
advantage of these proposals is that they place side by side, and on the
same level, elements of prevention and of reparation for future loss or
injury." '249 It is only when events move off this continuum, with a failure
to make reparation, that state responsibility for a wrongful act comes into
play, yet, as Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter put it:
long before that point is reached, the acting State - if the risk of loss
or injury was forseeable - will have had every encouragement to
make proper provision, in consultation and negotiation with States
likely to be affected, to minimize the risks and to arrange suitable
coverage for any risks that are regarded as unavoidable and
unacceptable.25
If the consultations and negotiations required fail to lead to "an agreed
regime" for loss or injury, the "record of what transpired" during the pro-
cess of consultation and negotiation "will provide the best evidence" of
the affected State's right to reparation/compensation.5 Moreover, in
such a situation, "any failure of co-operation at an earlier stage may jus-
tify an inference in favour of an opposite party. 2 52
Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter specified that the obligations of
informing and negotiating contained in Section 2 and 3 did not, if vio-
lated, "give rise to any right of action." '253 Special Rapporteur Quentin-
249. Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at 1 21. The Special Rapporteur
stated that it was his view that "[p]rinciples 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration exactly
represent the relationship between the goals of prevention and reparation for which the
Commission should strive." Id. at 17.
250. Id. at 1 18.
251. Id. at t 26.
.252. Id. at 28. Chernobyl made it clear that the notification and assistance provisions
included on Mr. Quentin-Baxter's continuum are crucial. Within months, two new treaties
had been drawn up under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA").
The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1370
(1986), provides that "in the event of any accident involving facilities or activities of a State
Party or of persons or legal entities under its jurisdiction or control," id., art. 1, the State
Party shall "forthwith notify, directly or through the International Atomic Energy Agency
* . .those States which are or may be physically affected." Id., art. II. The Convention on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 1377 (1986), provides that a State Party that "needs assistance in the event of a
nuclear accident or radiological emergency, whether or not such accident or emergency
originates within its territory, jurisdiction or control ... may call for such assistance from
any other State party .. " Id. at 1378.
253. Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at 51; Quentin-Baxter Fourth Re-
port, supra note 50, at Annex. On the Watercourses topic, although Special Rapporteur
McCaffrey skates closer to a hard law obligation in the area of prevention, he, too, avoids
establishing an absolute rule: "While there is authority supporting.... an obligation not to
cause environmental harm, the Special Rapporteur believes that there is particular need for
the progressive development of international law in this area." McCaffrey Fourth Report,
supra note 52, at 89 (Comment (19)).
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Baxter stated that he believed his approach "reduces the nightmare that
a State may be absolutely liable for all physical transboundary loss or
injury generated within its territory or under its control to the not so
impossible dream that State's are never without the shadow of an obliga-
tion." '54 He emphasized this again later in the same Report:
The strength of the proposed articles lies, first, in their affirmation
that a source State is never without a legal responsibility in relation to
things done, within its territory or under its control, which give rise or
may give rise to a physical consequence affecting the use or enjoyment
of areas beyond the limits of that State's jurisdiction. Secondly, sub-
ject to any rules of prohibition of customary law - which lie outside
the scope of the present articles - the normal way for the source
State to discharge its responsibility is by reaching agreement with af-
fected States upon measures to prevent, or minimize and repair, the
actual or prospective adverse transboundary effects. Failing the possi-
bility of such agreement, the source State remains accountable for the
adequacy of its own efforts to take and implement the measures which
pay due regard to the interests of other States. Thirdly, these rules
are supported by the whole range of treaty and claims practice ex-
amined in the Secretariat's extremely valuable analytical study ...
Finally, against the background of rules and precepts already men-
tioned, there is enormous strength in the theme of voluntarism. The
compulsion to regulate is provided by facts, not by law. If law seeks to
assert a compulsion of its own divorced from fact, the impetus to legal
development is lost in empty disputation whether States act freely in
their own domain, or are constrained by need for prior agreement.,66
Well aware of the dangers of such "empty disputation," Special Rap-
porteur Quentin-Baxter, in his efforts to fulfill what he viewed as his task
of "legal development," walked a fine line between the opposing doctrinal
views at play here. Although his "soft law" continuum of obligations
might seem, by virtue of its softness, unsatisfactory or inappropriate, it
254. Quentin-Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 43.
255. Id. at 46. Professor Pinto has underscored Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's
point that it is the facts of pollution situations and other risks to man and the environment,
rather than doctrinal concerns, that are the best motivation for the establishment of law in
this area. In his view, the mechanism for the duty to cooperate set forth in the schematic
outline, which he believes be the basis for "a multilateral 'umbrella' treaty," seems to
contemplate two tiers of obligations: some that are contingent but arise di-
rectly from the treaty upon the occurrence of specified events, e.g., the percep-
tion of one State that an activity within its territory or control may give rise to
loss or injury to persons or things within the territory or control of another
State; and others that are in the nature of pacta de contrahendo and amount
to agreements to enter into more specific arrangements as situations of risk
emerge. In either case, the proposal moves in the direction of making obliga-
tions into questions of fact, thereby maximizing the agreement's efficacy; for
one of the most intractable difficulties connected with compelling co-operation
must surely be to demonstrate the breach of an obligation by a State under a
duty to cooperate where, in fact, it takes no action at all.
Pinto, supra note 45, at 38.
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has the virtue of satisfying neither the "wrongfulness" nor the "strict lia-
bility" camp. Moreover, it has met with generally favorable comment by
publicists.2 56
Despite the general approval, however, two aspects of Special Rap-
porteur Quentin-Baxter's schematic outline met with rather more criti-
cism, and do indeed seem rather troublesome: the "shared expectations"
standard for reparation and the "balancing of interests" that is to guide
negotiations and reparations.25 7 "Shared expectations" and "balancing of
interests" are chancy propositions at best in an international system of
States representing heterogeneous cultures and values.2"' Recalling that
256. Professor Magraw speaks favorably of the "hybrid" regime, and states his opinion
that "the fact that the 'compound 'primary' obligation' includes three duties (to prevent,
inform and negotiate) whose 'breach' does not entail international wrongfulness ... is not
problematic as long as the other legal consequences of their 'breach' are sufficiently clear."
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 317. He compares the obligations imposed under Special Rap-
porteur Quentin-Baxter's continuum to "the nonbinding international agreement frequently
encountered in international relations, whose utility and acceptability are recognized." Id.
Professor McCaffrey calls the "entire set of procedures" set forth by Special Rap-
porteur Quentin-Baxter "a finely-tuned mechanism which takes into account, insofar as pos-
sible, the needs of the two countries concerned, and avoids pointing the finger of blame at
either." McCaffrey, An Update on the Contributions of the International Law Commission
to International Environmental Law, 15 ENVTL. L., 667, 678 (1985). Professor McCaffrey
also expresses the opinion that
there is clearly a need to complement liability rules regarding transboundary
environmental problems with the kind of approach envisioned by Professor
Quentin-Baxter - namely a system of procedural, dispute-avoidance mecha-
nisms that factor in the needs and values of all concerned parties. This was a
large part of Professor Quentin-Baxter's vision and it is to be hoped that it will
become a reality within the near future.
Id.
Professor Pinto says that "[iun essence, the Special Rapporteur suggests that the Com-
mission move in the direction of recognizing a 'duty of co-operation.'" Pinto, supra note 45,
at 36. He points out that Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's route is one "travelled by
some municipal law systems," where it has been determined that
questions of liability for certain types of transboundary harm are of such com-
plexity that they cannot be satisfactorily resolved by reference merely to such
indicators as "fault" or "strict liability," but require examination in the light of
a variety of factors which can be adequately revealed and significantly applied
only through the positive co-operation of States concerned, procured through a
regime built with principles of customary law derived from existing treaties
and supported by an "obligation to cooperation."
Id. at 36-37.
Despite his approval of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's approach, which he terms
"correct," Professor Pinto also warns that "it is important not to minimize the difficulties
likely to emerge in the establishment and operation of a regime of cooperation, a notion the
legal context of which is being examined closely for the first time." Id. at 37.
257. Quentin-Baxter Third Report, supra note 5, at 53; Quentin-Baxter Fourth Re-
port, supra note 50, at Annex.
258. Professor Pinto has stated that "[dlisparities in value-systems among the States
concerned could well render it extremely difficult to give effect to the Schematic Outline's
requirement that "The reparation due to the affected State ... shall be ascertained in ac-
cordance with the shared expectation of the States concerned .. " Pinto, supra note 45,
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not all agree on the existence of customary international law with respect
to environmental harm, it seems especially hard to imagine the existence
of sufficient accord between developing and developed states for there to
be any reason to discuss "shared expectations."'28 9
Special Rapporteur Barboza, who, in his Preliminary Report, stated
that the Commission and the General Assembly had reacted favorably to
his predecessor's schematic outline,"' initially accepted the idea that
compensation/reparation for injury, prevention and the procedures out-
lined in the schematic outline were all to be included within the scope of
the topic." ' But by the next year he was questioning the appropriateness
of having a violation of the obligation to inform not give rise to a cause of
at 42.
Prosser and Keaton, writing in a domestic law context about strict liability norms were
also sensitive to the cultural relevancies that make agreement on "shared expectations" dif-
ficult, if not impossible to achieve:
The place where all this occurs, the customs of the community, and the natural
fitness or adaptation of the premises for the purpose are all highly important
in determining whether the rule [i.e., the strict liability rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher] applies. In Burma an elephant is not a non-natural creature, but a
domestic animal, no more a subject of strict liability than a horse; but the same
elephant, transported to England in a circus, becomes an abnormal danger to
that community.
PROSSER, supra note 214 at § 78.
Professor Magraw, while criticizing strict liability for what he perceives to be its inflexi-
bility and lack of sensitivity to varying conditions, nevertheless, when comparing it to the
regime of the schematic outline, found that it has several merits:
[Sitrict liability is relatively straightforward to apply and avoids the need to
try to balance such numerous and amorphous interests as those found in the
schematic outline - a process whose uncertainty is increased by the need to
consider the undefined "shared expectations" of the states involved. One re-
sponse is that it may be useful to know which standard is to applied, regardless
of how marshy that standard is. But that argument does not eliminate the
defects of balancing tests - i.e., they allow easy manipulation by decision
makers and do not lead to predictability of outcome. The content of the bal-
ance-of-interests test - i.e., the criteria to be considered and their order of
priority, if any - will determine how workable the test is. That content is
expected to be further developed (and, one hopes to become more certain) as
the Commission continues its study.
Magraw I, supra note 5, at 327.
259. Professor Magraw has noted that shared expectations "may not exist between a
developed state and a developing state in the same sense, or to the same degree, that such
expectations exist between two developed states (or, possibly, two developing states)."
Magraw II, supra note 222, at 1058. He also reports that he was not able, in any of Special
Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's Reports, to find any instance "of shared expectations or a lack
thereof, between developed and developing states." Id. at note 109.
Professor Rest attributes the lack of effective international law on liability for environ-
mental damage "to the inhomogeneity of national environmental policies that often lack the
insight that they are tied together by particular environmental media, and fail to exercise
solidarity." Rest, supra note 152, at 335.
260. Preliminary Report, supra note 3, at 8.
261. Id. at 9.
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action, 6 2 and referring to the "soft-law" obligation to negotiate not as an
"incomplete obligation" but rather as "one whose violation is not always
easy to determine." '263 He proposed deleting Special Rapporteur Quentin-
Baxter's specific pronouncements that violation of the duty to inform and
negotiate do not "give rise to any right of action. ' 264 He stated that, in his
opinion, "the obligations to inform and to negotiate are sufficiently well-
established in international law, and any breach of these obligations thus
gives rise to wrongfulness,"26 but declared "that does not mean they can-
not be included in our draft."2 6 He finessed this apparent contradiction
by referring to an earlier discussion of the scope of the topic in which he
took the position that the French title of the topic, which refers to "activ-
ities," is more accurate than the English version, which speaks of
"acts."26 In Special Rapporteur Barboza's view
[a]ctivities are shaped by complex and varied components which are
so interrelated that they are almost indistinguishable from one an-
other. Around a given activity there are countless individual acts
which are intimately related to the activity. Some of these acts may
well be wrongful, but that does not make the activity itself
wrongful.268
In his Fourth Report, Special Rapporteur Barboza repeated his belief
that these obligations are "autonomous precisely because they appear to
have an established place in general international law."'269 He then pro-
ceeded to back away from this, and adopted virtually the same approach
as Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter, by stating that the " 'pure' obliga-
tion of prevention . . . appears to be not autonomous, but directly linked
with the injury."27 He also acknowledged that allowing for a finding of
wrongfulness based upon a violation of the obligations to inform and ne-
gotiate, raises fears about (1) "superimposing a regime of wrongfulness on
a regime of causal responsibility," (2) attaching too much importance to
262. First Report, supra note 6, at 39.
263. Id. at T 40.
264. Id. at 41(c).
265. Id. at 67.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 68. Ambassador Barboza returns to this distinction in his Fifth Report,
where he notes that use of "the concept of 'activity' as opposed to 'act' " . . . is important
for limiting the scope of the draft because, in one of its meanings, liability refers to the
consequences of certain conducts. According to this meaning
"liability" refers only to acts, to which legal consequences can be attributed,
and not to activities, because causality originates in specific acts, not activi-
ties .... In order for the regime of our articles to apply to certain acts, these
acts must be inseperably linked to an activity which ... has to involve risk or
have harmful effects .... Injury caused by isolated acts is not covered ...
and so we avoid the dreaded absolute liability.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 12-14.
268. Id.
269. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 107.
270. Id. at 108.
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prevention rather than reparation, and (3) placing "unacceptable limits
on freedom of initiative in the territory of the source State," to the extent
that "the territorial sovereignty of the affected State would thus take pre-
cedence over that of the source State, with the establishment of a virtual
veto against the conduct of useful activities of its territory." '' He ac-
knowledged that his draft, as it stood at that point, contained no safe-
guards against these possibilities. In his Fourth Report, he merely stated
that the link of liability for violation of the obligation of prevention with
occurrence of injury "should be expressed in a later article. 27 2
With his Fifth Report, however, Ambassador Barboza again moves
back toward the Quentin-Baxter position. As we have seen, he states that
his approach is one of a continuum of residual obligations. 7 3 He has sig-
nificantly expanded and refined the article on co-operation, 7 and has
strengthened the prevention article.2 7 5 Prevention seems to be in the pro-
cess of being restored to its rightful place, even though that proper place
might be hard to locate precisely under the absolute but poorly articu-
271. Id. at 110. The problems with this approach are similar to those Professor Handl
saw with a risk-based analysis in general: that they "open the door to injunctive relief"-for
the "risk of future accidents or for the failure to inform or negotiate." Handl II, supra note
45, at 65.
272. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 111.
273. Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 1 15.
274. Compare:
States shall co-operate in good faith in preventing or minimizing the risk of
transboundary injury or, if injury has occurred, in minimizing its effects both
in affected States and in source States.
In accordance with the above provision, the duty to co-operate applies to
source States in relation to affected States, and vice versa.
Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 17, with:
States shall co-operate in good faith among themselves, and request the assis-
tance of any international organizations that might be able to help them, in
trying to prevent any activities referred to in article 1 carried out in their terri-
tory or in other places under their jurisdiction or control from causing trans-
boundary injury. If such injury occurs, the State of origin shall co-operate with
the affected State in minimizing its effects. In the event of injury caused by an
accident, the affected State shall, if possible, also co-operate with the State of
origin with regard to any harmful effects which may have arisen in the terri-
tory of the State of origin or in other places under its jurisdiction or control.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 16.
275. He has removed the limitation imposed by use of the word "presumably" in the
prevention article proposed in his Fourth Report ("Source States shall take all reasonable
preventive measures to prevent or minimize injury that may result from an activity which
presumably involves risk and for which no regime has been established"), Fourth Report,
supra note 8, at 17, and substituted the phrase "appropriate measures" for the unquantifi-
able "reasonable measures," and altered the language so as to indicate that tolerating risk of
transboundary harm can be understood not be a readily acceptable alternative:
States of origin shall take appropriate measures to prevent, or, where neces-
sary, minimize the risk of transboundary injury. To that end they shall, in so
far as they are able, use the best practicable, available means with regard to
activities referred to in article 1.
Fifth Report, supra note 14, at 16.
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lated standards Ambassador Barboza set forth in his Fourth Report.
C. The "Appreciable Risk" Issue
Related to and intertwined with his modifications on the wrongful-
ness and prevention issues, Ambassador Barboza has also, with his Fifth
Report, significantly modified his definition of the "appreciable risk" that
must be present to bring activities within the scope of the draft
articles.2 71
From the beginning of the Commission's work on this topic, the focus
has been on injury or harm as the predicate for liability. In his Fourth
Report Special Rapporteur Barboza stated that "[o]bviously, the basis of
the obligation to make reparation in the matter before us is injury, 2 77
but did not explore how that obligation might be effected by the change
he had proposed for the scope of the topic, which, under the draft articles
he was then proposing, dealt with activities that "create an appreciable
risk . . . of transboundary injury" rather than activities that "give rise or
may give rise to an adverse "physical consequence. "278
The "appreciable risk" standard Special Rapporteur Barboza's pro-
posed with draft article 1 of his Fourth Report could not be quantified.2 79
His standard seemed to be risk "appreciable to any normal person." The
complexity of existing technology and the constant advances in the ability
of technology to define, detect and measure "risk" as well as the technolo-
gies for activities that will certainly, likely or possibly create new risks,
are in constant flux.2 s0 How Special Rapporteur Barboza reached the con-
276. See Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 17, art. 1.
277. Id. at 41, 44.
278. Special Rapporteur Barboza insisted on adding "adverse" to describe the conse-
quences of the lawful acts in question in this topic. See Third Report, supra note 206, at 1
42-43. This seems to be as straightforward an improvement as the earlier modification that
made it clear that only "physical" consequences were intended to be covered. See Quentin-
Baxter Fourth Report, supra note 50, at 63. See also McCaffrey, The Work of the Inter-
national Law Commission Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 189, 206-09
(1983).
279. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 84.
280. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has published a study detail-
ing what is involved in "risk assessment," which it referred to as "the emerging core of the
law of chemical regulation." According to the Association's Committee on Environmental
Law:
During the past two decades, toxicological research has begun to reveal the
hidden costs of chemical dispersion in the general and workplace environ-
ments. In the difficult process of adapting to this new information, producers
and regulators must identify and reduce the latent health and environmental
costs of chemicals in the economy.
Risk assessment is an interdisciplinary method of calculating the health
risks of a particular activity, product, or waste dispersion. It draws on the ex-
pertise of engineers, meteorologists, hydrogeologists, demographers, and health
scientists - such as toxicologists, epidemiologists, and medical doctors - to
provide public policy makers with a means of estimating the risks of exposure
to chemicals.
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clusion that a panel of international law experts who meet once a year for
only a few weeks could create a standard for such a complex issue with a
simple formula of virtually undefined words is a mystery. An even greater
mystery was how Special Rapporteur Barboza expected sovereign States
with varying degrees of sophistication and expertise in the many and va-
ried technological areas of the known (much less the unknown) potential
sources of transboundary harm to agree to bind themselves internation-
ally and accept international imposition of liability for such activities.
According to the explanation Special Rapporteur Barboza offered in
his Fourth Report, "[a]ppreciable risk" is "risk which may be identified
through a simple examination of the activity and the substances in-
volved. 2 8 1 Ambassador Barboza alleged that this standard "does not ex-
clude risks which are not easily seen but which, for one reason or another,
are already known to exist; nor does it exclude from future consideration
risks which are hidden and become evident at a later stage," ' 2 but how
A risk estimate is essentially an equation. It incorporates a series of sec-
ondary estimates: the amount and type of pollutant that will be dispersed by
the activity under study, the numbers of people who will be exposed, the
length and dose of exposure, the chemical characteristics of the substance, any
known human health effects of exposure to the substance, and the results of
laboratory experiments in which animals have been subjected to high levels of
exposure. The results of studies in each of these dimensions are combined into
a composite risk estimate, a final range of numbers, or single number with an
uncertainty factor.
Although its use is not mandated or authorized by any particular law, risk
assessment is becoming a central tool of public and private planners. Some
courts have also allowed the introduction of risk assessments as evidence. Risk
assessment is unfolding as a dominant approach to regulation of chemicals,
perhaps because it seems to provide the law with some underlying consistency.
In fact, the course of the evolution of the methodology has itself become a
major controversy and an arena for debate over the future of chemical
regulation.
Committee on Environmental Law, Toxic Chemicals and Health Risk Assessments in
Regulation and Litigation, 44 THE RECORD OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF CITY OF NEW
YORK, No. 4, 391, 391-92 (1989). For an environmentalist's point of view on the quantifica-
tion of risk, see Mathews, Is There More Risk in the World? Washington Post, March 29,
1989 at A25. Another 'lay' discussion of risk assessment is contained in Assessing Risk: A
Risky Business, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1989, at C3. Balanced against these complex
analyses is Special Rapporteur Barboza's statement that: "[tihe risk must be appreciable
according to the normal criteria or standards for the use of the substances which are the
object or the product of the activity, or the result of the situations." Fourth Report, supra
note 8, at 26.
For additional assessments of the problems of risk management, see, e.g., Starr, Risk
Management is the Goal, RISK ASSESSMENT ABSTRACTS, 41 (1984); Wilson & Crouch, Risk
Assessment & Comparisons: An Introduction, 236 SCIENCE 267 (1987); and Kasperson &
Kasperson, Priorities in Profile: Managing Risks in Developing Countries, RISK ASSESS-
MENT ABSTRACTS 113 (1988).
281. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 17, Article 2(a).
282. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 1 24. It is for precisely this sort of defining by
"legislative history" rather than competent drafting that Ambassador Barboza has bitterly
criticized Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter. See, e.g., Third Report, supra note 206, at
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liability that is applicable to, as he stated it later, risks that are "visible
on first examination,"' 5 could be said to encompass hidden risks was
simply not understandable.28 Moreover, Special Rapportuer Barboza, in
another virtually meaningless phrase, announced that "the risk must be
general."' 85
Another of Special Rapporteur Barboza's quiet changes in his Fifth
Report seems to sweep away many of these problems, and to reintroduce
the approach of Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter. Now he states that
"in activities involving risk, the 'appreciable risk' mentioned must be that
of causing 'appreciable injury' if prevention is to be demanded.""2 '
41, where he discusses how Mr. Quentin-Baxter dealt with the issue of "adverse" conse-
quences in Commission discussions, putting his views on the record in that fashion rather
than including them in his article that defined the scope of the topic.
283. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 30.
284. Ambassador Barboza's emphasis on risk, and immediately discernable risk, as the
key to liability is apparent yet again when he states that the scope of the topic relates only
to "liability for risk" and that "injury is not compensable merely because it has occurred,
but because it corresponds to a certain general prediction that it was going to occur, since
the activity which eventually caused it creates a risk, is dangerous." Id. at 45. Hidden
risks, and those that develop or manifest themselves only after a long period are clearly not
susceptible to a "general prediction" that they will occur.
285. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 26. Equally confusing was Special Rapporteur
Barboza's discussion, in his Third Report, of activities that do "not call for diagnosis of the
risk involved," which would, it seems, involve situations where neither the source State nor
the victim "created the general risk." He concluded that the topic would not encompass
such activities, because to do so would involve "absolute risk." Third Report, supra note
206, at T 16. He also stated that if such liability were to be imposed "no new activity would
be lawful until such time as it had been monitored by an international agency which would
declare that its lowest possible risks had been accepted by any States which might be af-
fected." Id. This raised several questions: if this was how he intended the usual analysis for
appreciable risk to proceed, how was this to relate to the "immediately discernable" risk
standard; how can one ever be sure that all States that may be affected by an activity have
been identified; and would a State be presumed to fall without the "appreciable risk" stan-
dard if all other States that might be affected by the activity in question accepted the risks
involved as the "lowest possible." Special Rapporteur Barboza's articles as proposed in his
Fourth Report actually anticipate uncompensated victims. Ambassador Barboza has himself
stated that "not all injury is compensable under international law," because there is no
"norm of international law" that so requires. Fourth Report, supra note 8, at 11 38-40. See
discussion of wrongfulness vs. strict liability at notes 218-242 and accompanying text, supra.
Where, in this, was there any consideration of Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, of
Special Rapporteur's Quentin-Baxter's principle, in his Schematic Outline, that "an inno-
cent victim should not be left to bear his loss of injury," Quentin-Baxter Third Report,
supra note 5, at 53 (Schematic Outline, Section 5, 1 3), and of "[t]he common thread of all
the discourse" and perhaps the customary law on the topic that "in principle the innocent
victims of an activity that entails some danger should not be left to bear their loss, even if
the actor's conduct is without taint of wrongfulness." Quentin-Baxter Preliminary Report,
supra note 42, at $ 28. Even if Ambassador Barboza was correct that these principles do not
amount to a "norm" of international law, what was he allowing to happen to the Commis-
sion's commitment to developing international law in this area?
286. Fifth Report, supra note 14 at 24. Sounding more and more like an advocate of a
soft-law continuum, he goes on to state that "[w]hile we cannot be overly strict in dealing
with the question of 'appreciable' risk and injury, the limits of which are somewhat blurred,
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In the three areas outlined above, Special Rapporteur Barboza's ap-
proaches to his work on the International Liability topic, have, in his
most recent Report, been somewhat modified from the extreme and un-
workable proposals he made earlier. These changes indicate that Special
Rapporteur Barboza is, in a practical sense, moving the contours of the
topic back closer to where they were with Special Rapporteur Quentin-
Baxter's proposals. He is thus also probably, finally, moving the interna-
tional community somewhat closer to a consensus on this important
topic.
CONCLUSION
Strict liability has an ominous sound. It sounds automatic, absolute
and final even though it is none of these. The legislatures and judicial
bodies around the world that have adopted strict liability standards in
various fields have done so as a matter of public policy, and have found it
to be a flexible tool, one that provides compensation for injuries suffered
and one that serves as a effective incentive for prevention. Despite the
fact that States are, in many cases, resistant to the idea of strict liability,
and might hesitate to agree to such a standard because they view it as a
potential infringement on their sovereignty, it is the standard most likely
to serve the purpose of the International Liability topic - creation of
residual rules to apply in situations, especially those involving trans-
boundary pollution, where States are not yet able to reach agreement on
internationally enforcible standards.
On the issue of prevention, it is important to note that strict liability
is only imposed upon the occurrence of injury that public policy has de-
termined must be compensated and/or repaired. It does not attach merely
for the creation of the risk of such injury. Reaction to Special Rapporteur
Barboza's risk-based proposal as the standard for liability confirmed that
such an approach is unworkable. Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's
work on prevention, and the continuum of duties and obligations he pro-
jected for States, while unconventional and innovative, was workable and
would have created a regime to which States would be much more likely
to agree. As Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter said (in commenting on
the reputation of the Trail Smelter decision), an unjustified "eclipse...
in principle this adjective must be applied to both concepts .... The word 'appreciable' is
used to describe both the risk and the injury because it seems to denote an appropriate
threshold of tolerance, although one obviously cannot be certain as to its exact limits." Id.
at I 24-25. He acknowledges he is conforming his approach to that of Special Rapporteur
McCaffrey (see notes 236-38 and accompanying text, supra): "The word 'appreciable' is also
used to qualify the term 'harm' in the draft on international watercourses and, while uni-
formity is not obligatory, we believe that the similarities between two topics justify the view
that the terms used in both should be harmonized." Id. at 26. In his Fifth Report, he also
modified the poorly expressed definitional article on "appreciable risk," elaborating on the
simple examination of the activity" that is supposed to be determinative of the existence of
appreciable risk. Compare Fourth Report, supra note 8, at V 16 with Fifth Report, supra
note 14, at 17.
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attends the work of some artists of good reputation in the period after
their deaths."28 7 Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's work needs to be
rescued from its unjustified eclipse and reconsidered. Special Rapporteur
Barboza seems to have begun this process of necessity, based on the nega-
tive reaction to his Fourth Report. He should acknowledge that this is
what he has done and afford Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter's mem-
ory the credit due it by reincorporating even more of his work in the cur-
rent proposals on this topic.
Special Rapporteur Barboza should also guide the Commission, the
Sixth Committee and the international community as a whole in a rea-
soned consideration of the issue of strict liability for transnational envi-
ronmental damage. To enable such a debate to take place, he should offer
coherent explanations of the parameters and implications of strict liabil-
ity. He should also encourage development of a workable (which almost
certainly means a Quentin-Baxter-type "soft law" regime) framework for
prevention of transboundary pollution. The obligation to do so is not just
Special Rapporteur Barboza's - it is all of ours, and it is an obligation
we owe to the environment itself as well as all those who live off its
bounty now and all those who should have that bounty available to them
in the future.
287. Quentin-Baxter Second Report, supra note 85, at 22.
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Creating a Nuclear Free Zone Treaty That
Is True to Its Name: The Nuclear Free
Zone Concept and a Model Treaty*
ARTHUR M. RIEMAN**
August 6, 1985 was the fortieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiro-
shima. That date also hailed another milestone in nuclear history. It was
then that the thirteen states of the South Pacific Forum' became the first
nation-group to declare their region a "nuclear free zone"2 as they con-
cluded the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty' (Treaty of Raro-
tonga). In so doing, these island states purported to create a "comprehen-
sive prohibition on all nuclear explosive devices" in their region of the
world.4 Eighteen years earlier, the entire block of Latin America nations
made history by creating a more limited "nuclear weapon free zone" of
their continent with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
in Latin America5 (Treaty of Tlatelolco), prohibiting nuclear weapons
* (c) Copyright by Arthur M. Reiman, 1989.
** Associate, Christensen, White, Miller, Fink & Jacobs, Los Angeles. B.A., UCLA,
1977; M.B.A., Graduate School of Management, UCLA, 1979; J.D., UCLA School of Law,
1988.
I would like to express my deep gratitude to the dozens of foreign service officers of
several nations, as well as the other defense and nuclear affairs experts, who afforded me the
opportunity to question them about an ofttimes very sensitive subject. Most of the ambassa-
dors and other officers of embassies and United Nations missions spoke candidly about their
countries' interests in return for a promise of confidentiality. Particular thanks must go to
Washington attorney Eldon Greenberg and to Dr. Jiri Pulz, formerly of the United Nations
Security Council. I would also like to acknowledge Greenpeace U.S.A. and its Pacific Cam-
paign Director, Sebia Hawkins, for their support.
I dedicate this article to my parents, Arnold and Sylvia Rieman, who gave life to five
children with the hope that they would live in a world of peace. May their hopes, and those
of all parents, be realized.
1. The South Pacific Forum consists of the nations of Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji,
Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu,
Vanuatu and Western Samoa.
2. Fyfe & Beeby, The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 17 VIcT. U. WELLING-
TON L. REV. 33, 40 (1987).
3. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, August 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440 [hereinafter
"Treaty of Rarotonga"]. The treaty is also known by its initials, SPNFZ.
4. Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 40. See infra § II.B.
5. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634
U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter "Treaty of Tlatelolco"].
The treaty contains a provision whereby it comes into force for a signatory upon its
ratification if it waives unanimous ratification otherwise called for. Treaty of Tlatelolco, art.
28(2), at 354. All but two ratifiers (Chile and Brazil) have adopted the waiver, see infra note
279 and accompanying text. So although Cuba and Guyana have yet to ratify the treaty, see
infra note 283 and accompanying text, it has entered into force for the remaining countries
of Latin America. See generally infra notes 279-83 and accompanying text.
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though not so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The intent of this article is to analyze the concept of the nuclear free
zone as a vehicle for enhancing the protection from the dangers of nuclear
weapons, and radioactive contamination and pollution. Though no part of
the world can be totally free from a plague released by a nuclear war,
those statesmen who have crafted extant nuclear-free and nuclear-
weapon-free zone treaties believe that their efforts provide a bit more dis-
tance between the threat and the reality of nuclear war, as well as add a
shield for their countries from localized nuclear mishaps. The bench mark
for this analysis is the South Pacific Forum's South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty, or Treaty of Rarotonga, due to its status as the most current
example of a nuclear free zone, as well as the new ground it has forged
compared to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and other proposed examples. Sec-
tion II introduces the concept of the nuclear free zone through a brief
discussion of the Treaty of Rarotonga as well as a history of the develop-
ment of nuclear free zones, from the earliest proposals made at the
United Nations to the present. The focus in Section III is an examination
of the strengths and shortcomings of the Rarotonga model and an explo-
ration of the additional protections future nuclear free zone drafters will
have to deal with in order to negotiate a more effective and truly nuclear
free treaty. Particular attention is given to the Law of the Sea as it may
bear on such a regime.
The Appendix consists of this author's Model Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty ("Model Treaty"). This document incorporates into a viable
framework the issues generated by the shortcomings of extant treaties.
The Model Treaty, admittedly, is idealistic. Some may view it as extrem-
ist. These views should not detract from the purpose of the Model
Treaty: it has been created to contribute to the international dialogue,
and possibly serve as a foundation for the negotiators of future nuclear
free zone treaties.6
Section IV of the article escorts the reader through each article of the
Model Treaty, directing attention to its key features and requirements.
The article concludes with a comparison of the substantive articles of the
Model Treaty with those of the Treaty of Rarotonga and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
6. See Fry, The South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, BULL. OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOL-
ARs 61 (Apr.- June 1986).
ASEAN member states (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand) have been among the leaders in the effort to force the large naval powers to ac-
cept accommodation of the environmental and sovereign concerns of the smaller coastal
states in the negotiations of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
See infra notes 20, 156-61, 168, 179, 187, 189 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CONCEPT OF THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
A. Early Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Proposals
The concept of a nuclear free or nuclear weapon free zone has been
with us for over thirty years. The first proposal for a nuclear weapon free
zone, known as the "Rapacki Plan," came in 1957 in the form of a Polish
statement to the United Nations General Assembly calling for the crea-
tion of a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Europe.7 Since then dozens
of similar resolutions covering Africa,8 South Asia,9 various regions of Eu-
rope,10 the Indian Ocean,' the Middle East 2 and Latin America,' have
been proposed and adopted by the General Assembly.
The primary objectives of the various nuclear weapon free zone pro-
posals, of which the Treaty of Tlatelolco is an example, have been the
"desire to secure the complete absence of nuclear weapons from various
areas of the globe [and] ... to spare nations concerned from the threat of
nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war."' 4 These objectives theoret-
ically are attainable through several alternative routes. A prohibition on
7. Comprehensive Study of the Question of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in All Its
Aspects 19, U.N. Doc. A/10027/Add. 1, U.N. Sales No. E.76.I.7 (1976) [hereinafter "Compre-
hensive Study"]. An even earlier proposal by the Soviet Union (in 1956) called for a ban on
"the stationing of atomic military formations and the location of atomic and hydrogen
weapons of any kind in" Central Europe. Official Records of the Disarmament Commission,
Supplement for January to December 1956, U.N. Doc. DC/83 Annex 5 (DC/SC.1/41)
(1957). In 1959, Ireland first proposed an area-by-area approach to nuclear non-prolifera-
tion. Comprehensive Study, at 19.
An attempt at a similar study was abandoned in the early 1980's, reportedly due to the
failure of consulting countries to agree on the language of a final report.
8. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 23-25; A Synthesis of the Arguments Ad-
duced For and Against Each of the Four Proposals For the Creation of Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zones That Have Been Included in the Agenda of the General Assembly (Africa,
South Asia, the Middle East and the South Pacific) and For and Against the Proposal For
the Establishment of a Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean, Including a Subject and Coun-
try Index 3, U.N. Doc. A/AC.206/7 (1981) [hereinafter "Synthesis"]. The first proposals for
an African nuclear weapon free zone were in response to French nuclear testing in the Sa-
hara in the 1960's. Id. at 23.
9. See Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 27-28; Synthesis, supra note 8, at 11; A
Comprehensive Study of the Origin, Development and Present Status of the Various Al-
ternatives Proposed for the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons 19, U.N. Doc A/
AC.2061/5 (1981) [hereinafter "Comprehensive Study 2"]; supra note 32.
The People's Republic of China, though not a member of the United Nations at the
time, made the first calls for nuclear weapon free zones in both Asia and the South Pacific
in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Peking Review, Aug. 2, 1963.
10. See Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 20-23; Comprehensive Study 2, supra
note 9, at 17; infra note 32, infra note 104.
11. See Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 27-28; Synthesis, supra note 8, at 15;
infra note 32. The proposals for the Indian Ocean area have often been presented as plans
for an Indian Ocean "Zone of Peace." See, e.g., Synthesis, supra note 8, at 15.
12. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 26-27; Synthesis, supra note 8, at 7; Com-
prehensive Study 2, supra note 9, at 18; infra note 32.
13. Comprehensive Study 2, supra note 9, at 16; infra notes 33-37.
14. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 29.
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the possession or control of nuclear weapons by parties to a nuclear
weapon free zone treaty relies on the mutual assurance that no treaty
Party could launch a nuclear attack against another." Protocols signed by
the nuclear powers1 6 located outside of the zone of application" of a pro-
posed treaty provide that they will not use nuclear weapons against any
party to the treaty, nor deploy nuclear weapons on territory within the
zone which may be under their de jure or de facto jurisdiction. 8 How-
ever, each nuclear state has placed conditions on these declarations."
15. In banning the possession of nuclear weapons among all their number, the leaders
of the various Latin American states, among other reasons, sought to prevent any one Latin
American state from using nuclear weapons as a means to enforce their will among the
others. Robinson, The Treaty of Tlatelolco and the United States: A Latin American Nu-
clear Free Zone, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 282, 282-84 (1970).
16. For purposes herein, "nuclear power" means any nation which has nuclear weapons.
Generally, this term refers to those states which acknowledge their nuclear capability, i.e.,
China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States. Other nations, com-
monly known as near-nuclear states, are believed to have nuclear weapons or the capability
to produce them, but will not publicly acknowledge this even though some have exploded
such weapons. Their inclusion in the discussion of nuclear powers is little more than aca-
demic. The near-nuclear states include Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya,
Pakistan and South Africa. L. SPECTOR, GOING NUCLEAR (1987). Most, if not all, of the near-
nuclear states are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, infra note 47. Schwartz, Con-
trolling Nuclear Proliferation: Legal Strategies of the United States, 20 LAW & POL'Y IN
INT'L Bus. 1, 15 (1988).
The term "nuclear state" used herein should be distinguished from the term "nuclear-
weapon state" as used in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, infra note 47, where it means those
states having tested nuclear explosive devices prior to January 1, 1967. Id. art. IX, para. 3.
17. "Zone of application" means the geographic area comprised by the treaty in
question.
18. The parties to both the Treaty of Rarotonga and the Treaty of Tlatelolco recog-
nized that their efforts would have limited effect without the cooperation of the nuclear
powers. This limitation was solved by the use of protocols to be signed by the nuclear pow-
ers whereby they would agree not to violate terms of the treaty (a so-called "negative decla-
ration"), whether by: transporting or stationing (on territories controlled by the nuclear
power within the zone of application of the treaty) nuclear weapons in the applicable zone
of application, Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 1, at 1459-60, Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocols I, II, at 360, 366; threatening use of nuclear weapons
against party states, Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 2, at 1461-62, Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol II, art. 3, at 364; contributing to a party state's violation of
the treaty, Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol II, art. 2, at 364; or testing nuclear
weapons within the zone of application, Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 3, at
1463.
The United Nations General Assembly has also passed a number of resolutions calling
for such negative assurances, including a call for an international convention providing such
a guarantee. Disarmament Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.2061/3, at 41-48. See also infra note 19.
19. For example, most nuclear powers acceded to the Tlatelolco protocols on the basis
that their obligations would in no way hinder self-defense. See J. GOLDBLAT, AGREEMENTS
FOR ARMS CONTROL 336-339 (1982). In the Rarotonga context, the U.S. and Soviet Union
hold differing views regarding port visitation rights. Whereas the United States has decried
New Zealand's ban on port visitations by nuclear warships and aircraft, see Glover, Is a
Nuclear-Free ANZUS Possible?, 2 CANTA. L. REV. 324 (1986), see also infra note 99 and
accompanying text, the U.S.S.R. has interpreted the Treaty of Rarotonga to hold that:
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Assuming that such "negative assurances" are ironclad, non-nuclear
states are not fully protected from nuclear attack. A nuclear power's mili-
tary base on third party soil which either services nuclear capable ships or
aircraft, or which stores, stations or deploys nuclear weapons, makes that
base vulnerable to nuclear attack should a conflagration arise between an-
other nuclear power and the one which maintains the base. The third
party state itself may not be the actual target of the attack but the dis-
tinction is moot once a nuclear strike is made against a base located
within its territory.2" This irony lies at the heart of the present nuclear
debate in Europe, and is articulated in the anti-nuclear thoughts of peo-
ple in Australia,"' New Zealand,2 2 Melanesia and Micronesia,2 3 the Philip-
pines,24 Latin America, 25 the Soviet Union2" and elsewhere in the Pacific.
[T]he admission of transit of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive de-
vices by any means, as well as of visits by foreign military ships and aircraft
within the nuclear free zone would ... contradict the aims of the treaty and be
inconsistent with the nuclear free states of the zone.
Statement of the Soviet Government on the occasion of signing Protocols 2 and 3 to the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, Dec. 18, 1986.
The official United States position on negative assurances was articulated in 1978 by
President Carter:
The United States will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons
state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment
not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the
United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied
to a nuclear weapons state, or associated with a nuclear weapons state in carry-
ing out or sustaining the attack.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements 87 (1982).
20. The specter of such an event has not gone without concern. During the course of
negotiations of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, "Indonesia and
Malaysia were particularly worried about the risk of U.S. and Soviet submarines clashing in
their waters." C. SANGER, ORDERING THE OCEANS: THE MAKING OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 88
(1987).
For a Philippine professor's study detailing the effects of a nuclear attack on the Subic
and Clark bases leased to the United States, see Talisayon, Consequences of a Nuclear
Attack on the Military Bases, 1 FOREIGN REL. J. 90, (Manila) (1986).
See infra notes 220-26.
21. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 54-57, 99 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 67, 100 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
26. Growing concern among Soviet citizens about radiation leakage and other nuclear
dangers led to the recent banning of a nuclear-powered container ship from all major Soviet
Pacific ports early in 1989. Local mayors refused to grant permission for a ship, the
Sevmorput, to berth, and dockworkers said they would refuse to unload or handle the ship.
The Soviet newspaper Soviet Russia reported that "[a] huge wave of public indignation has
been set in motion by the lack of information, by [uncertainty about] the safety of the ship
itself, by an invisible shadow of the Chernobyl tragedy and by the complex ecological situa-
tion in the Soviet Far East." The official press agency, Novosti, described the dockworkers'
action as the "first ecologically inspired labor protest" in the Soviet Union. Parks, Four
Soviet Ports Bar Ship in Protest Over Nuclear Safety, L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 1989, § 1, at 1,
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With modern technology, ships and aircraft presumed to be carrying
nuclear weapons are targets of attack by enemy states wherever they may
be located. Thus, if a warship capable of carrying nuclear weapons cruis-
ing in the territorial sea of a third party state were attacked, the result
would be the virtual equivalent of an attack on that state. This scenario
isn't addressed in any of the many nuclear weapon free zone proposals
proferred by the General Assembly.
The most likely reason for this omission is that the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea2 7 (UNCLOS III) and customary inter-
national law2 8 assure innocent passage through territorial seas. For a state
or treaty to prohibit transit of warships with nuclear capability through
territorial waters might appear to be in direct conflict with the Law of the
Sea which seeks to assure that, among other things, no foreign ship be
denied "innocent passage"29 though a coastal state's territorial sea. 0 In-
deed, a United Nations report expressed the view that parties to a nu-
clear free zone treaty "must respect international law, including those
principles relating to the high seas, to straits used for international navi-
gation and ... the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea."'"
col.1.
27. Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
1245 [hereinafter "UNCLOS III"].
28. "Customary international law" refers to the regime of international order which
finds its source in custom and usage. It is generally considered binding on the entire inter-
national community. K. BOOTH, LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AT SEA (1985) [hereinafter
"LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY"]. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
29. The "right of innocent passage," as enunciated in UNCLOS III, is granted to all
ships passing through the territorial sea. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 17. The relevant
articles of UNCLOS III state as follows:
Article 18
Meaning of passage
1. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of:
(a)traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a road-
stead or port facility outside internal waters; or
(b)proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port
facility.
2. Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes
stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordi-
nary navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for
the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger of
distress.
Article 19
Meaning of innocent passage
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order
or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity
with this Convention and other rules of international law. ...
Id. (emphasis added). See id. arts. 19(2)-(3).
30. See infra § III.A.1.
31. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 49. Interestingly, the same body of interna-
tional law also holds that "[plollution of the marine environment is contrary to ... freedom
of the seas." N. Rusina, International Legal Principles of Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment Against Pollution, in THE LAW OF THE SEA AND INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING: ANGLO-
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Though there have been several proposals for nuclear weapon free
zones debated and approved by the General Assembly, 2 the first and
only such proposal to grow out of the United Nations which has seen
fruition is the Treaty of Tlatelolco.3 3 Since the signing of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, not one of the many U.N. resolutions calling for a nuclear
weapon free zone has come to fruition. 4
The Treaty of Tlatelolco arose out of a 1963 Joint Declaration of five
Latin American presidents calling for the denuclearization of Latin
America.35 Denuclearization was seen as a means to keep that region free
from the economic and political pressure which would bear if their states
became entangled in the cold war or the development of nuclear weapons,
including the possibility that such weapons could be used against each
other.3 Mexico initiated a treaty preparatory commission the next year.
Three years of discussions culminated in the treaty. It addressed most of
the concerns raised in the General Assembly and, until the Treaty of Ra-
rotonga, was considered the prototypical nuclear free zone treaty. It also
served as a symbolic statement to the effect that a large region of the
world can make a distinguished and valuable contribution to universal
nuclear disarmament by declaring itself to be a nuclear weapon free
SOVIET POST-UNCLOS PERSPECTIVES 261, 262 (W.E. Butler ed. 1985). Rusina goes on to
argue that the anti-pollution regime found in the law of the sea is actually founded on basic
human rights. Quoting Professor M. Lazarev, she allows that "the protecting of nature,
flora, fauna, and man by international law is nothing other than the realisation [sic] of im-
portant human rights to life, health, normal conditions of existence, labor and leisure." Id.
at 268-269.
32. For example, in 1985 there were votes at the United Nations General Assembly for
denuclearization or nuclear weapon free zones in Africa, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) (A/
90/92), the Middle East, 40 U.N. GAOR at 82, South Asia (G.A. Res. 40/83), and a Zone of
Peace in the Indian Ocean (G.A. Res. 40/153). In 1986, the General Assembly adopted reso-
lutions calling for nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East (G.A. Res. 41/48), and
South Asia (G.A. Res. 41/49), and Zones of Peace in the Indian Ocean (G.A. Res. 41/87), and
the South Atlantic Ocean (G.A. Res. 41/11). Such resolutions are not new, however. Between
1961 and 1981 the General Assembly adopted 17 resolutions on an African nuclear free zone
and 14 on South Asia. Repeated proposals have also frequented the General Assembly for
the Middle East since 1974 and various parts of Europe (since 1957), including the Nordic
countries, the Balkans and Central Europe. See Delcoigne, An Overview of Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones, 24 IAEA BULL. 50 (1982); infra note 104; see, e.g., NUCLEAR DiSEN-
GAGEMENT IN EUROPE (S. Lodegaard & H. Thee eds. 1985); NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NORTH-
ERN EUROPE (1983) (proposals for a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone).
33. The earliest call for a nuclear weapon free zone in Latin America came from the
United Nations delegate from Brazil shortly before the Cuban missile crisis. 17 U.N. GAOR
at 19, para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1125, (1962). As Robinson points out, "[t]he danger of
bringing the nuclear arms race between the super Powers [sic] into Latin America was no
longer hypothetical." Robinson, supra note 15, at 283.
34. Though there have been U.N. resolutions calling for a South Pacific nuclear free
zone, the Treaty of Rarotonga was negotiated by the South Pacific Forum in a mere seven
months, completely apart from any United Nations entities.
35. 18 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 74) U.N. Doc. A/5415/Rev.1 (1963). The five
nations issuing the joint resolution were Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico.
36. Joint Declaration of 29 April 1963 on the Denuclearization of Latin America, G.A.
Res. 1911 (xviii), 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/5618 (1963).
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zone.
37
That treaty's stated objective is to prohibit "[tihe testing, use, manu-
facture, production[,] acquisition ... receipt, storage, installation, deploy-
ment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons" by or on behalf
of any party to the treaty.3 s Protocols to the treaty seek the assurances of
the nuclear powers that they will comport with the treaty as it relates to
their activities in Latin America 9 as well as not assist any contracting
party in violating treaty provisions.40 The Treaty of Tlatelolco does not
ban the development, testing or explosion of nuclear devices for "peaceful
purposes."
4 1
In actuality, the Treaty of Tlatelolco was not the first international
agreement to set aside a multinational region as a haven from nuclear
weapons. Rather, it was the first such agreement to cover a populated
region and the first to be imposed upon the territory of the treaty parties.
The first treaty prohibiting nuclear emplacement was the Antarctic
Treaty of 1959." Among its provisions, the treaty prohibits the stationing
of nuclear weapons, nuclear explosions and radioactive waste dumping
south of Latitude 600 South and on the Antarctic continent.4 3 The
Antarctic Treaty arose out of the 1957/1958 International Geophysical
Year, which had as one of its objectives the establishment of international
cooperation for the scientific research and preservation of Antarctica.4"
Two other treaties call for nuclear weapon prohibitions in outer and
inner space. Signed in the same year as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the
Outer Space Treaty45 prohibits the stationing or deployment of nuclear
weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial
bodies. The 1971 Seabed Treaty bans the emplacement of nuclear weap-
ons on the seabed outside a coastal state's territorial sea.46 Furthermore,
37. Speech by Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles Delivered at the 133rd Meeting of
the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Nov. 11, 1963), re-
printed in A. GARCIA ROBLES, THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA 3-7 (1967).
38. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, art. 1(1), at 330. The treaty also "undertake[s] to
refrain [any contracting party] from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing... [or] partici-
pating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear
weapon." Id. art. 1(2), at 330.
39. Id. protocol I, at 360, 362.
40. Id. protocol II, art. 2, at 364. A third provision of the protocols calls on the nuclear
powers to agree to not use nuclear weapons against contracting parties to the treaty. Id.
protocol II, art. 1, at 364.
41. Id. arts. 17, 18, at 346, 348.
42. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
43. Id. art. IV.
44. J. GOLDBLAT, supra note 19, at 60-63.
45. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
46. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,
Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, 955 U.N.T.S. 115.
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the Non-Proliferation Treaty 7 ("NPT") explicitly supports the formation
of nuclear free zones: "Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any
group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total
absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories."'
B. The Treaty of Rarotonga
Eighteen years after Tlatelolco, the members of the South Pacific Fo-
rum surpassed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and extant United Nations pro-
posals by creating the world's first nuclear free zone, as opposed to sim-
ply a nuclear weapon free zone.'" The Treaty of Rarotonga sets forth a
comprehensive ban on the manufacture, acquisition, possession, deploy-
ment, stationing, emplacement or testing of nuclear explosive devices."' It
is also distinguishable in its prohibition on all nuclear explosive devices as
well as the dumping of radioactive wastes, 51 and its support for the pro-
tection of the environment of the South Pacific.52
It is significant that the Rarotonga Treaty was not negotiated inside
a United Nations-sponsored forum, nor was its development connected
with any U.N. resolution." The initial impetus for the South Pacific
47. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
48. Id. art. VII.
49. Indeed, because of its broader prohibitions, the states of the South Pacific Forum
purposefully describe the region created by the treaty as a nuclear free zone as opposed to a
nuclear weapon free zone. Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 40. From a slightly broadened
perspective, New Zealand Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Christopher Beeby, ex-
pressed that:
[Ilf you add the two together, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
which deals principally with nuclear weapons - but makes some reference to
dumping - and the Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources
and Environment of the South Pacific Region [see infra note 52 and accompa-
nying text], I think you can characterize the package as a nuclear free South
Pacific.
Interview with Christopher Beeby in Radio New Zealand "Morning Report" (Nov. 28, 1986).
Some critics have been quick to point out that the Treaty of Rarotonga, despite its
official title, does not create either a true nuclear weapon free or nuclear free zone. See Fry,
supra note 6, at 61, 67-68.
It is of interest to note that there is now a call for a "nuclear free" zone in Central
America. The proposal, recently announced by the University of Costa Rica, would, among
other things, prohibit the transport of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc-
tion within 300 miles of the Central American coast. Central American Nuclear-Free Zone
Proposed, Xinua General Overseas News Service, Feb. 13, 1990.
50. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, arts. 3-6, at 1444-46.
51. Id. art. 7 at 1447.
52. At the time the Treaty of Rarotonga was concluded, the nations of the South Pa-
cific were negotiating the now-concluded Convention for the Protection of the Natural Re-
sources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, [hereinafter SPREP]. The Treaty of
Rarotonga calls for "conclusion as soon as possible of the proposed Convention .... " id. art.
7(1)(d) at 1447, and holds for the supersession of the Convention over subsections of the
Treaty dealing with radioactive dumping. Id. art. 7(2).
53. However, the United Nations recently adopted a resolution endorsing the Treaty of
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treaty is found in the local reactions to American, British and, later,
French nuclear weapons testing in the South Pacific."' The destruction
inflicted upon many of the islands and peoples in that region and the
continuing threat of nuclear poisoning due to the on-going French nuclear
weapon testing program was part of the motivation to create the Treaty
of Rarotonga,5 and has since become a major rallying cry throughout the
region.5 6 Indeed, the first indigenous call for a nuclear free zone in the
South Pacific sounded shortly after New Zealand and Australia sought
condemnation before the International Court of Justice of France's nu-
clear weapons testing policy. 7
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty is a major step in the
non-nuclear states' struggle against the dangers of nuclear weapons and
radioactivity. Of course, it breaks new ground in the arena of multilateral
nuclear prohibitions. But, at a most powerful symbolic level, the Treaty
of Rarotonga, along with the contiguous Treaty of Tlatelolco and the
Antarctic Treaty, carves out a nuclear weapon free zone of more than
one-third of the Earth's surface."'
Though it stands as a significant advancement over its predecessors,
the Treaty of Rarotonga does not absolutely prohibit the presence of nu-
clear weapons nor radioactive substances other than those used for medi-
cal and non-military scientific purposes from within the zone of applica-
tion of the treaty. Despite its comprehensive array of prohibitions, it does
not prohibit the transit of nuclear devices through territorial seas, al-
though it does allow any country to establish its own policy on whether to
permit port visits by nuclear powered or nuclear capable warships or air-
craft.5 9 There are no provisions regarding nuclear transit through interna-
tional straits, 0 exclusive economic zones" or other ocean areas encom-
Rarotonga. Australia Welcomes U.N. Resolution on Rarotonga Treaty, Xinhua General
Overseas News Service, Dec. 19, 1989.
54. See Lippman, The SPNFZ Treaty: Regional Autonomy Versus International Law
and Politics, 10 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 110-115 (1987); R. Dalrymple (former Austra-
lian Ambassador to the United States), Australia and the South Pacific - The Treaty of
Rarotonga, speech to The World Affairs Council (Nov. 12, 1986) [hereinafter "Dalrymple
Speech"]; Fry, supra note 6; see also infra note 57 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
57. Nuclear Test Cases (Austl. v. Fr.; N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Interim Protection
Order); 1973 I.C.J. 135 (Interim Protection Order); 1974 I.C.J. Judgement 253; 1974 I.C.J.
Judgement 457.
58. The contiguous zone runs from Longitude 1150 East to Longitude 200 West, and
from the South Pole to the Equator and even as far north as Latitude 350 North in North
America.
59. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 5(2), at 1446.
60. "Strait transit" or "transit passage" is the UNCLOS III regime which supplies rules
for transit through "straits which are used for international navigation between one part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclu-
sive economic zone." UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 37. See infra § III.A.l(b). The right
of transit passage is enjoyed by every ship or aircraft transitting a strait so long as it shall:
(a)proceed without delay through or over the strait;
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passed within the treaty's zone of application. It does not prevent a treaty
Party from contributing to a nuclear power's nuclear capability through
such indirect means as taking part in nuclear research or participating in
the control, operation or management of so-called "1CSI'62 installations
which are designed, in part, to assist in the fighting of a nuclear war.3
Although there is a ban on the dumping of radioactive wastes within the
Treaty of Rarotonga, 4 there is no prohibition on nuclear activities which
could produce such wastes, or any other non-essential uses of radioactive
substances.
Such abolitions may be practically, politically or economically diffi-
cult. Indeed, these factors limited the treaty from being a more stridently
nuclear-prohibitory document.6 5 Still, some champions of an absolute ab-
olition remain vocal.
In the wake of the Treaty of Rarotonga, local groups within (and
without) the South Pacific Forum criticized the treaty as being insuffi-
ciently restrictive." Though supportive of the concept during the Raro-
tonga Treaty negotiations, Vanuatu, a South Pacific nation, refused to
sign the treaty because it does not ban port visits by nuclear ships.67 Cit-
ing a history of anti-nuclear sentiment in the South Pacific, the Fiji Anti-
Nuclear Group ("FANG") proposed a draft Treaty for a Comprehensive
Nuclear Free Zone in the South Pacific with an aim toward eliminating
the "deficiencies" of the Rarotonga Treaty and creating a complete and
comprehensive, as opposed to "partial," nuclear free zone."
(b)refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territo-
rial integrity or political independence of States bordering the strait, or in any
other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations;
(c)refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by
force majeure or by distress....
Id. art. 39(1).
61. See infra § III.A.l.(c).
62. I.e., "Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence." See generally infra §
III.B.
63. See infra § III.B.
64. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 7, at 1447.
65. See Report by the Chair of the Working Group on a South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone (SPNFZ) 7-8 (1985) [hereinafter "Working Group Report"]; see supra note 9 and
accompanying text. Despite its decision not to sign the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga,
U.S. State Department spokesperson Charles Redman did acknowledge that "[tihe United
States is appreciative of the role of the Government of Australia and other parties to the
treaty in this matter, including their efforts to keep our and allied interests in mind as they
managed the composition of the treaty and protocols." St. Dep't Statement, Feb. 5, 1987.
66. See M. Hamel-Green, Draft Treaty for a Comprehensive Nuclear Free Zone in the
South Pacific (1986) (unpublished manuscript).
67. P. Powers, Nuclear Free Zones: The South Pacific Case, at 4, paper prepared for
the Round Table on the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Apr. 15-18, 1987.
68. M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66, at 1-2. The draft treaty proposed therein is herein-
after cited as "FANG Treaty."
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Criticism of the Treaty of Rarotonga has not only come from those
calling for stronger nuclear prohibitions. The United States, the United
Kingdom and France have refused to sign protocols to the treaty" which
would guarantee their acknowledgement of and respect for the zone. De-
spite an official U.S. policy supporting nuclear free zones which satisfy
specific criteria7" - criteria which the Rarotonga Treaty satisfies accord-
ing to State Department officials7" - the United States refuses to ratify
the protocols.7 ' The reason given by U.S. officials for this refusal is that
69. Both the Treaties of Rarotonga and Tlatelolco contain protocols whereby the nu-
clear powers and states having international responsibility for territories within the zone
would comply with the restrictions imposed by the respective treaty. All the nuclear powers
have signed the latter protocol to the Tlatelolco Treaty (Protocol II), though France has
refused to sign the protocol which would require it to apply the nuclear weapon restrictions
of the treaty for which France is "de jure or de facto ... internationally responsible." (Pro-
tocol I). Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 38.
France, the United Kingdom and the United States have refused to sign any of the two
similar protocols of the Rarotonga Treaty, as well as a third protocol calling for the prohibi-
tion of the testing of nuclear explosive devices within the region. See infra notes 9-11 and
accompanying text. These refusals came despite consultation with, and an attempt to reflect
the concerns of these nuclear powers, in the negotiation of the protocols. See infra note 9.
Nonetheless, Great Britain and the United States "have given assurances that they are not
currently acting in a manner inconsistent with the protocols," according to New Zealand
Disarmament and Arms Control Minister Fran Wilde. Solomon Islands Ratifies Nuclear
Free Zone Treaty, Xinhua General Overseas News Service, Feb. 28, 1989. See also, Austra-
lia Welcomes Solomons' Ratification of a Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Xinhua General Over-
seas News Service, Mar. 6, 1989; House Urges Bush to Sign Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty, Reuter Library Report, Nov. 7, 1989 [hereinafter "House Urges Bush"]. France,
however, continues to test nuclear wepons in the South Pacific. See, e.g., France Resumes
Nuclear Tests in Pacific Despite Opposition, Reuter Library Report, May 12, 1989.
70. The United States has enunciated four criteria for accepting the validity of a nu-
clear weapon free zone: (1) the initiative must be taken by the states of the proposed zone
and the zone should preferably include all states within the area whose participation is
deemed important; (2) the creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security ar-
rangements; (3) the zone agreement must allow a nuclear nation the opportunity to move
through the zone with nuclear weapons (e.g., U.S. submarines carrying nuclear weapons
moving through Panama Canal to another area); and (4) provisions for adequate verification
are required.
71. Confidential interviews with officials of the United States Department of State and
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Anonymity was promised all United States and
foreign government and United Nations officials with whom the author spoke in preparing
this article.
72. The official U.S. position was read to the news media by U.S. State Department
spokesperson Charles Redman: "The United States ... has decided that in view of our
global security interests and responsibilities, we are not, under current circumstances, in a
position to sign the protocols [to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty]." St. Dep't
Statement, Feb. 5, 1987.
South Pacific Forum states were particularly upset with the decision by the Reagan
Administration not to sign the Rarontonga protocols. The Forum
had sent a mission to the nuclear club capitals to discuss the protocols before
writing the final text. It had gone to great lengths to accommodate the views of
the U.S., so much so that it included a section which allows signatories to with-
draw from the protocols even though it raised criticism from those Forum
members who wanted a stronger treaty.
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the U.S. does not want to do anything to encourage other regions from
creating their own nuclear free or nuclear weapon free zones.7 s Moreover,
though President Reagan expressed his support for the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons, 74 officials of his administration felt proliferation of
such regions would make it difficult for the U.S. to maintain its strategy
of nuclear deterrence, and a treaty which permits treaty Parties to pro-
hibit port visits would run contrary to U.S. strategic interests .7 Unoffi-
cially, the Reagan administration felt that there was little danger of nu-
clear proliferation in the South Pacific, so little was lost in the battle
against proliferation by not signing the protocols.70
The U.K. disfavors the Rarotonga Treaty for similar reasons.7 7 Addi-
'That decision was taken with some reservation but it was generally agreed
that if such a provision would facilitate endorsement of the protocols by the
major nuclear powers, it was worth doing,' [Fiji Prime Minister, Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara] said. The South Pacific countries had on several occasions
supported the U.S. on matters that were important to it and had hoped there
would be 'some measure of reciprocity.'
We Won't Sign, Says America, ISLANDS Bus. 21 (Feb. 1987) [hereinafter "We Won't Sign").
In a press statement released the day of the U.S. announcement, New Zealand Prime
Minister David Lange echoed Mara's comments: "The United States response is... disap-
pointing in that intensive consultation took place with the United States authorities over
the Treaty and the protocols and considerable efforts were made to heed U.S. concerns."
Press Statement by the Prime Minister of New Zealand on Feb. 5, 1987.
The Reagan Administration's position was under fire within the Congress. As reported
by the Christian Science Monitor, the "House of Representatives recently passed a resolu-
tion in support of the treaty, and a chief treaty opponent, former United States Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger, has retired." Pacific Anti-Nuclear Movement: Growing Force
for U.S. to Reckon With, Christian Sci. Monitor, Nov. 30, 1987, Int'l §, at 8, col. 1. Adhering
to his predecessor's position, President Bush has also refused to accede to the Treaty of
Rarontonga's protocols, despite a resolution passed by the House of Representatives calling
on the President to sign the treaty. House Urges Bush, supra note 69.
73. House Urges Bush, supra note 69.
74. During his first year in the White House, President Reagan stated that United
States policy was to "seek to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries
as a fundamental national security and foreign policy objective .... " President's Statement
on Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 17 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 768, 769 (July 20, 1981).
75. House Urges Bush, supra note 69. The U.S. position was expressed by then-Secre-
tary of State Geroge Shultz: "I would hate to see the New Zealand policy in place, because it
would basically undermine the ability of the United States and its allies to defend the val-
ues that we and New Zealand and others share .... Joint News Conference, Manila, June
27, 1986, DEP'T ST. BuLL. 36, 37 (Sept. 1986). A contrary view has been expressed privately:
that the real reason is the "need[] to counter public pressure in foreign countries to ban
American vessels that carry nuclear weapons." Gordon, Denmark Agrees on Nuclear Policy,
N.Y. Times, June 8, 1988, § A, at 14, col. 1.
The Treaty of Rarontonga does not require its ratifiers to ban port visits. Rather, this is
an option reserved for each state to determine as it sees fit. Treaty of Rarontonga, supra
note 3, art. 5(2). This provision seems to reserve a right which would exist regardless of its
specification in the treaty.
76. Confidential interviews with officials of the United States Department of State, see
supra note 71.
77. Britain Rejects Pacific Nuclear-Free Treaty, Reuters (London), Mar. 20, 1987
[hereinafter "Reuters"].
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tionally, it believes that in this matter, support of its European Commu-
nity economic partner, France, is of superior interest to those of its Com-
monwealth partners and former colonies in the South Pacific."8 France,
too, elected to not sign the Rarotonga accord.7 9 France was also the lone
nuclear power which refused to ratify all of the Tlatelolco Treaty proto-
cols."0 Despite loud and persistent protests by South Pacific nations in-
cluding Australia and New Zealand,"' France persisted in testing nuclear
weapons in the atmosphere through 1974,82 and still tests its nuclear de-
vices underground in the South Pacific at Mururoa. a It is just such in-
transigence which helped give rise to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty.""
C. Unilateral Nuclear Prohibitions
Several nations 5 have taken unilateral steps toward protecting their
citizens from nuclear dangers. In 1979, the west Pacific island state of
Palau (Belau) adopted a constitution" which imposed a complete ban on
nuclear substances and weapons.8 ' That ban could only be overturned on
the three-fourths vote of the electorate.8 8 In 1986, Palau's President
78. Confidential interview with official of the British Foreign Ministry, see supra note
71. In the words of a Reuters story, "Western diplomats said the decision would be seen as
Britain falling in line with its fellow NATO nuclear powers rather than taking heed of the
wishes of traditional allies Australia and New Zealand." Reuters, supra note 75.
79. We Won't Sign, supra note 72.
80. France is the only eligible party not to ratify Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 38.
France long has maintained an independent nuclear policy in the era of nuclear history.
Among the Western nuclear powers it is the only one not a party to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. Schwartz, supra note 16, at 16. (China, too, has not ratified the NPT,
id., though it has acceded to the Rarotonga protocols.)
81. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
82. Recent activities suggest France's willingness to resort to violations of international
law to prevent activities it feels may interfere with its testing program. The French sinking
of the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbor occurred just prior to its
scheduled departure to lead a flotilla to Mururoa to protest French nuclear testing.
83. Describing France's recalcitrance, one nuclear affairs scholar has written that
"[u]nlike the U.S. and Britain which have underground metropolitan sites in which to con-
duct nuclear explosions, France has been unwilling or unable to use its metropolitan terri-
tory to carry out its subsurface tests." The result of this policy is ironic: "The only military-
related nuclear activity in the huge area [the South Pacific] other than the passage of nu-
clear-armed craft, French testing has enabled regional states to try to lift themselves onto
the world nuclear disarmament stage by means of SPNFZ." P. Powers, supra note 67, at 4.
84. Lippman, supra note 54, at 113; K. Graham, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones as an
Arms Control Measure 201 (1983) (dissertation, Vict. U. of Wellington) [hereinafter "Gra-
ham"]; P. Powers, supra note 67, at 4; R. PURVER, ARMS CONTROL: THE REGIONAL APPROACH
24 (1981).
85. See infra notes 86-112 and accompanying text.
86. CONST. OF THE REPUB. OF PALAU, adopted Apr. 2, 1979.
87. Id. art. XIII, § 6.
88. The Palau Constitution requires that
[h]armful substances such as nuclear, chemical, gas or biological weapons in-
tended for use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials therefrom
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signed a Compact of Free Association with the United States.8 9 It pro-
vided Palau with greater autonomy while the U.S. was to provide for its
defense. The Compact of Free Association, allowing the United States to
bring into Palau nuclear weapons, nuclear propelled ships and other nu-
clear substances, was approved without the Constitutionally required
three-fourths vote.90 Litigation ensued9 challenging the validity of the
Compact. The conflict eventually reached the Supreme Court of Palau,
which ruled that the Compact of Free Association was not lawfully ap-
proved and therefore was invalid.2 Subsequent attempts to sidestep the
Palau constitution have met strong opposition in the Palau legislature
and courts.' 3
shall not be used, tested, stored or disposed of within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of Palau without express approval of not less than three-fourths the votes
cast in a referendum of this specific question.
Id. art. XIII, § 6. Another provision stipulates that any "agreement which authorizes the
use, testing, storage or disposal of nuclear, toxic, chemical, gas or biological weapons in-
tended for use in warfare shall require the approval of not less than three-fourths the votes
cast in such referendum." Id. art. II, § 3.
89. Palau was formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. For a discussion of the problems affecting the eventual completion of the Compacts
of Free Association of the United States with several of its former Micronesian Trust Terri-
tories, see Comment, Reconciling Independence and Security: The Long Term Status of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 4 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 210 (1985).
Some argue that the U.S. wants Palau as a "back-up" in case Clark Air Force Base and
Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines are closed. Iveren, Vote to End Pacific Islands'
Atom-Arms Ban is Challenged, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1987, §A, at 19, col. 1; Dibblin, Vote
Again Until You Get It Right, U.S. Tells Islanders, New Statesman, Mar. 14, 1986, at 86.
Cf. note 94 and accompanying text. See infra notes 94-96.
90. Gibbons v. Salii, No. 8-86, slip op. at 2 n.1 (Palau 1986). The United States' other
"vital" link to the Indian Ocean, its base on the island of Diego Garcia, is also under fire.
The government of Mauritius is challenging the U.S. base there, claiming the island as part
of its sovereign territory. Mauritius: Angry Over U.S. Stand on Diego Garcia, Inter Press
Service, Nov. 14, 1989.
91. Gibbons v. Salii, Civ. No. 101-86 (Tr. Div., July 10, 1986).
92. Gibbons v. Salii, No. 8-86, slip op. (Palau 1986).
93. In spite of, or perhaps because of, the Palau Supreme Court's decision in Gibbons v.
Salii, supra note 90, pro-Compact parties, including President Lazarus Salii, persisted, em-
ploying ever more pressure on the Constitutionalists. In June 1987, the fifth plebiscite to
approve the Compact was held. But the week before the vote, President Salii laid off two-
thirds of all government employees. Salii took the action "because [the] prospective Com-
pact of Free Association with the United States, which would have brought in [$1 billion of
U.S. aid over 40 years, $141 million in the first year] if approved, apparently was headed for
defeat." Palau Going Broke, Laying Off Workers, L.A. Times, July 3, 1987, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
The June 30 vote nonetheless was the same as the previous four, turning down the Compact.
L.A. Times, July 6, 1987, § 1, at 2, col. 2.
A new tactic was employed early in August of that year, when a vote was held to amend
the constitution to allow a modification of the its anti-nuclear provisions - and thus ap-
proval of the Compact - with a simple majority vote instead of three-quarters. It passed on
August 4. Less than three weeks later, a sixth vote was held on the Compact. It received the
same percentage of votes as in previous elections, but this time it was enough to pass. L.A.
Times, Aug. 7, 1987, § 1, at 2, col. 1; Palau Drops Nuclear Stand, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1987,
§ A, at 24, col. 1. The August votes were immediately challenged in a lawsuit and in the
Palau legislature. However, a death threat against the Chief Justice of the Palau Supreme
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The new Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines also pro-
vides for the possible prohibition of nuclear weapons. One provision
reads: "[t]he Philippines, consistent with its national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.""' Leg-
islation passed by the Philippine Senate "bars the development, manu-
facture, acquisition, testing, use, introduction, installation or storage" of
nuclear arms and components. It bans nuclear-powered ships and planes
unless their entry is authorized by a Philippine commission. 5 The bill
awaits action by the Philippine House of Representatives in its next
term. 96 Even prior to the drafting of the new constitution, the Aquino
government permanently closed a recently completed nuclear power
plant, prohibiting it from being fueled up, despite the billions of dollars
(U.S.) poured into its construction cost by the former government.9 7
Some South Pacific Forum states have also taken actions which pro-
vide greater restrictions on nuclear weapons than those afforded by the
Rarotonga Treaty. In addition to Vanuatu's strong stand,9 s New Zealand
has a port visit policy which bans any warship or military aircraft con-
taining nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear powered vessels, from visiting
its ports and airfields. All military craft must provide sufficient informa-
tion to allow the Prime Minister to determine that they are free from
such weapons before being allowed permission to enter New Zealand fa-
cilities.9 Fiji formerly had a similar policy, and a new government was
Court caused him to halt hearings on the lawsuit. Iveren, supra note 89. Nearly a year later
in May, 1988, the Palau Supreme Court ruled that the referendum suspending the constitu-
tion and the subsequent plebescite on the Compact were invalid, returning the situation to
square one. Osmond, Starting Over Again: Court Rules Referendums on Future Invalid,
FAR E. EcON. REV., May 18, 1988, at 38.
In August of 1988, President Lazarus Salii was found dead in his home. Osmond, Death
in the Afternoon: Salii May Be Gone, But Palau is the Likely Victim, FAR E. EcON. REV.,
Sept. 1, 1988, at 26.
In the most recent election, pro-Compact forces again failed to muster the necessary
votes to approve the Compact. In contrast to previous elections, which saw as much as 72%
support for the Compact, February's vote only achieved a 60.5% showing for the Compact.
Roundup: Palau - Independence Remains Uncertain, Xinhua General Overseas News Ser-
vice, Mar. 18, 1990.
94. CONST. OF THE REPUB. OF THE PHIL., art. II, § 8 (1986).
95. Philippine Senate OKs Bill Opposed by U.S. That Would Bar Nuclear Weapons,
L.A. Times, June 7, 1988, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
96. Id.
97. Senoren, Philippine Nuclear Plant to Make Way for Coal Power, Fin. Times, Sept.
25, 1986, at 4; see also Dumaine, The $2.2 Billion Nuclear Fiasco, FORTUNE, Sep. 1, 1986, at
38.
98. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
99. New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation contains the following provisions:
When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the
entry of foreign warships into the internal waters of New Zealand, the Prime
Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be
available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning
the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.
The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the inter-
VOL. 18:2
CREATING A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
voted into office in 1987 on a platform which included a pledge to rein-
state the port visit ban."'
nal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satis-
fied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon
their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.
When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the
landing in New Zealand of foreign aircraft, the Prime Minister shall have re-
gard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime
Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and secur-
ity interests of New Zealand.
The Prime Minister may only grant approval to the landing in New Zea-
land by any foreign military aircraft if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the
foreign military aircraft will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device when
it lands in New Zealand.
Entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propul-
sion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power is prohibited.
New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control, Bill enacted June 4,
1987 by the New Zealand House of Representatives, Oct. 16, 1986, 11 9-11.
Prime Minister Lange's position is widely supported by the New Zealand people. De-
spite serious economic problems, Lange's party was overwhelmingly re-elected in August,
1987 elections. Even the conservative opposition has adopted an anti-nuclear platform. Bar-
ber, New Zealand Premier Vows Anti-Nuclear Activity in 2nd Term, Christian Sci. Moni-
tor, Aug. 17, 1987, Int'l §, at 11, col. 1; Lange Wins a 2nd Term in New Zealand, L.A.
Times, Aug. 16, 1987, § 1, at 6, col. 4; Evans, Labor is Winner in New Zealand Vote, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 16, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 1. A 1988 poll revealed 84% of New Zealand's population
in support of Lange's anti-nuclear policy. New Leader Says Nuke Ban 'Will Not Change',
United Press Int'l, Aug. 8, 1989. David Lange's successor as Prime Minister, Geoffrey
Palmer, vowed to uphold Lange's nuclear policy immediately upon being sworn in. Id.
Australia, New Zealand and the United States were partners in the ANZUS alliance,
Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, Sept. 1, 1951, 3
U.S.T. 3420, T.I.A.S. No. 2493, 131 U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter "ANZUS"], until the U.S. sus-
pended its defense obligations to New Zealand following that country's decision to ban port
visits by nuclear capable warships. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1986, at 86. See S. MCMILLAN,
NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY: THE NUCLEAR SHIPS DISPUTE BETWEEN NEW ZEALAND AND THE
UNITED STATES (1987). New Zealand claims that ANZUS is a conventional, not nuclear alli-
ance. Glover, supra note 19. Nonetheless, New Zealand has called the alliance "dead." New
Zealand Leader Says Security Alliance with U.S. Dead, Reuters, Apr. 24, 1989.
On one hand ANZUS has always been a loose confederation and was eventually con-
cluded primarily over concerns about future Japanese aggression. See generally Glover, id.;
3 Documents on New Zealand External Relations: The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of
Peace With Japan (1985). On the other hand, the United States policy of defense for its
allies (and, thus, meeting its treaty obligations) through deterrence depends upon using
whatever capabilities it believes necessary. As former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz
expressed: "I would hate to see the New Zealand policy in place, because it would basically
undermine the ability of the United States and its allies to defend the values that we and
New Zealand and others share .... " Joint News Conference, Manila, June 27, 1986, DEP'T
ST. BULL., Sept. 1986, at 36, 37. However, "American officials say privately that the rule [by
which the U.S. refuses to confirm a nuclear presence and thus the incompatibility with the
New Zealand policy] is needed to counter public pressure in foreign countries to ban Ameri-
can vessels that carry nuclear weapons." Gordon, supra note 75. See Note, The Incompati-
bility of ANZUS and Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 455, 464-466 (1987).
100. On April 11, 1987 Fiji voters elected a coalition government on a platform which
promised the banning of port visits by nuclear warships. The leaders of a coup the following
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Concern over the dangers associated with nuclear weapons and radio-
activity is not limited to the Pacific. Sweden, one of the most heavily
nuclear dependent states in the world (forty-seven percent of the Scandi-
navian nation's power is nuclear' 1 ), voted in a 1980 referendum to phase
out all nuclear power plants in operation or under construction by 2010
and to prohibit the construction of any new nuclear power plants.0 2 In
the wake of the near-total meltdown of a nuclear power plant at
Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in 1986, the Swedes reaffirmed their 1980
vote and undertook to begin the phase-out process by 1995.103
Sweden's Nordic neighbors also have relatively tough anti-nuclear
positions.104 Though a member of NATO and strategically located along
the Soviet Union's northwest flank, Norway prohibits the emplacement of
nuclear weapons on its territory, except in case of an attack or threat of
attack. 0 5 In addition, Norway bans nuclear power plants.0 6 Norway is
now leading the movement for a Nordic Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.0
NATO member Iceland has an official policy 08 of not permitting nuclear
weapons anywhere within its territory except at time of war, including its
territorial sea. Denmark, also a NATO country, has a thirty year ban on
nuclear powered ships and those carrying nuclear weapons'019 which has
never been actively enforced. Last year Danish voters approved a referen-
dum calling for Denmark to enforce this policy,"0 sending shock waves
month and a subsequent coup later in the year vowed to not enforce a port visits ban. Coup
Plus Coup Makes Three, TIME, Oct. 12, 1987, at 46; No Medals: Fiji Gets a Government at
Last, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1987, at 19.
101. Winder, Letter from Sweden, Christian Sci. Monitor, Sept. 18, 1986, at 9.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The Nordic countries have been leading proponents of the concept of a nuclear
weapon free zone and have a relatively long and constant history of debating such for their
region. The first inquiry was made by Sweden in 1961. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7,
at 20, 25; Nuclear Weapons and Northern Europe (1983). Two years later the President of
Finland proposed a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. Id., at 25. Several additional propos-
als have been made by the various Scandinavian countries and the Soviet Union. Id. Most
recently, at the Nordic foreign ministers meeting in 1987, attending members decided to
"investigate the conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area as a part of
the endeavours to lessen tensions and reduce armaments in Europe." Statement from The
Nordic Foreign Ministers Meeting, Reykjavik, Mar. 25-26, 1987.
105. 20 CURRENT NOTES ON INT'L AFF. 441 (1949).
106. However, Norway does operate a small (20 megawatts) heavy water research reac-
tor used by the Western scientific community.
107. In 1984 the Norwegian Stortinget (Parliament) voted to pursue a nuclear weapon
free zone with its Nordic Pact allies. See KGL, Utenriksdepartement, Sprsmalet om en
Kjernevapenfri Sone i Norden 7-10 (1985).
108. A. Carsten Damsgaard, The Nordic Area As a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone? 9-10
(unpublished manuscript) (1985). It expects the superpowers, however, to respect this policy
in good faith and does not ask foreign states if their vessels and aircraft deploy such weap-
ons. Id.
109. Slicing NATO Too Thin in Denmark, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1988, § A, at 18, col. 1.
110. Raines, Danish Voting Tuesday Centers on Military Issues, N.Y. Times, May 9,
1988, § A, at 9, col. 1.
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through the United States State Department."'
On a more localized level, communities and provinces throughout the
world have declared themselves nuclear free zones.12
III. REDEFINING THE BREADTH OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES
Bold as it may be, the Treaty of Rarotonga represents only one step
toward complete "nuclear freedom" for treaty states and toward world-
wide nuclear disarmament. There is a great deal that a nation or group of
nations can do to achieve a truly "complete and comprehensive" nuclear
free zone.
Just as the South Pacific Forum states enhanced and expanded upon
the prohibitions contained in the Latin American treaty,"' forthcoming
treaties can and likely will further the nuclear proscriptions established
by the 1985 accord. Such an undertaking will require careful scrutiny of
the workability and effectiveness of the extant treaties from both theoret-
ical and pragmatic viewpoints. The drafters and negotiators of future nu-
clear free zone treaties will want to look at what they hope to achieve,
what the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties set out to achieve and what
in fact those treaties have achieved.
Though a milestone at the time, from the perspective of the modern
nuclear prohibitory movement, the intended scope of the Tlatelolco
Treaty is decidedly limited. Compare, for example, the primary objectives
of the Treaty of Tlatelolco with those of the Treaty of Rarotonga. The
former, entitled a "treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons," only
prohibits "[tihe testing, use, manufacture, production, acquisition ... re-
ceipt, storage, installation, deployment and ... possession of any nuclear
weapons . . . . " It expressly allows contracting states "to use . . . for
peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under
111. U.S. Concerns Over Danish Parliamentary Resolution, DEP'T ST. BULL., June,
1988, at 31. American and NATO concern over the impact of the resolution was resolved by
a Danish government assumption that foreign military ships will be "in compliance with the
rules laid down by the Danish Government." Gordon, supra note 75, quoting Danish Prime
Minister Poul Schluter.
112. For example, as of December, 1988, there were 4,407 nuclear free zones in 23 coun-
tries. Nuclear Free Zones in the World, THE NEW ABOLITIONIST, Mar. 1990, at 9, col. 3. One
hundred and sixty-eight nuclear free zones with a total population of more than 16.8 million
citizens have been declared by voters in the United States. Nuclear Free Zones in the
United States, THE NEw ABOLITIONIST, Mar. 1990, at 12 , col. 1.
It has been argued that nuclear free zone ordinances in the United States may not be
legally binding if the federal government invokes the supremacy clause or other powers
granted by the U.S. Constitution. See Weaver, et al., The Legality of the Chicago Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Ordinance, 17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 553 (1986).
In a recent development, the Justice Department has brought suit to block a "second
generation" nuclear free zone ordinance adopted by Oakland, California. Stein, Effort to
Derail Nuclear-Free Zones Reported, L.A. Times, Mar. 22, 1990, § A, at 3, col. 1.
113. See infra notes 38-41, 50-52 and accompanying text.
114. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, art. l(1)(a)-(b), at 330.
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their jurisdiction."11 The later Rarotonga Treaty renounces all nuclear
explosive devices, 16 much exploitation of fissionable material," the
dumping of radioactive wastes at sea,"18 as well as the manufacture, pos-
session, control over," 9 stationing1 2 0 and testing12 1 of all nuclear explosive
devices.
It is readily conceivable that any future nuclear free zone treaty will
consider the principal provisions of the Treaty of Rarotonga as its mini-
mum standard or starting point. The difficult issues for future negotiators
will be those which expand the scope of such treaties beyond that of the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, including:
1) A ban on the transit of nuclear weapon carrying vessels through
treaty Parties' territorial seas and exclusive economic zones;
2) Participation in intelligence systems designed to aid nuclear war
fighting capabilities;
3) Military alliances with nuclear powers;
4) Civilian nuclear programs, including nuclear power plants, non-
essential consumer and industrial uses of radioactive materials;
5) Radioactive waste disposal; and, last but not least,
6) How to effect compliance of the nuclear powers with a nuclear free
zone treaty.
The remainder of this Section will explore these topics.
A. Nuclear Transit
One striking limitation of virtually all nuclear free and nuclear
weapon free zone treaty proposals tendered by international bodies is
their failure to prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through territorial
seas and exclusive economic zones ("EEZ") of treaty parties. As has al-
ready been demonstrated herein, 22 the presence of a warship or military
aircraft which is believed to be carrying nuclear weapons exposes any
land or sea territory within several or even dozens of kilometers of that
vessel or plane to the potential effects of nuclear attack or explosion. Ob-
viously, the most effective way to guarantee against this risk, absent a
worldwide ban on nuclear weapons, is to enforce a ban of such craft from
anywhere within the territorial sea, EEZ or the treaty's zone of
application.
115. Id. art. 1(1), at 330.
116. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 3, at 1444-45.
117. Id. art. 4 at 1445.
118. Id. art. 7 at 1447.
119. Id. art. 3(a) at 1444-45.
120. Id. art. 5(1) at 1446.
121. Id. art. 6.
122. See supra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
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1. The Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III): An Overview
A prohibition on nuclear transit " is all but guaranteed to spark con-
troversy. On the surface, such a ban would appear to violate the rule of
the law of the sea""' which provides for innocent passage of non-hostile
ships within a coastal state's territorial sea and disavows any attempt to
ban passage on the high seas.""
Similar objections would be raised if the ban also affected the newly
created right of "transit passage. '"26 Transit passage, or "strait transit" as
it is called by UNCLOS III, purports to guarantee the right of passage
through "straits which are used for international navigation between one
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.11 7 This provision operates
much in the same way as those protecting the right of innocent passage,
but without many of the rights afforded the strait state by the innocent
passage regime,' s including the proscription on passage which is "preju-
dicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State .... . ",
Additional concerns would be raised over any plan to ban nuclear transit
through exclusive economic zones.
Historically,'30 the major naval powers 8' have asserted their "right"
to unrestrained transit upon the high seas.'32 Similarly, the naval powers
123. For purposes herein, "nuclear transit" means the transit or passage of any aircraft
or seagoing vessel which either carries nuclear weapons (including nuclear explosive devices
not classified as "weapons") or is capable of carrying nuclear weapons but which refuses to
confirm whether or not it is carrying such weapons.
124. UNCLOS III, supra note. 27, arts. 17-19, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1273-74. See infra §
III.A.2.(a).
125. "High seas" is defined as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclu-
sive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the
archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State." UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 86, 21 I.L.M.
1245, at 1286. "Territorial sea" refers to that portion of coastal waters lying within a coastal
state's sovereign jurisdiction. Id. art. 2, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1272. The currently accepted limit
of a state's territorial sea is twelve miles. Id. art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1272.
126. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, arts. 37-39, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1276-77. See infra §
III.A.2.(b) for a detailed discussion of transit passage as it relates to a ban on nuclear
transit.
127. Id. art. 37, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1276. Another UNCLOS III article states that,
"[s]tates bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage.... There shall be no suspen-
sion of transit passage." Id. art. 44, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1278.
See generally UNCLOS III, supra note 27, arts. 34-45, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1276-78.
128. See id. arts. 17-26, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274.
129. See id. art. 19, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274.
130. "Historically, naval mobility had been served by the doctrine of freedom of the
seas .... " LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 63.
131. In turn, the Greeks and the Romans controlled the sea lanes. Id. at 14. In the 17th
century, the British were the dominant naval power. Id. at 14. In the late 20th century, the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. are the major naval powers. See generally J. SaENIus, NEGOTIATING THE
LAW OF THE SEA 75 (1984).
132. In more recent times, an important "aspect of Britain's ability to use the sea was
the doctrine of belligerent's rights .... The doctrine of freedom of the sea was merely a
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have attempted to exercise ever greater sovereignty over the seas while
denying this same "creeping jurisdiction" to lesser powers. 3' The modern
invocation of the law of the sea, as reflected in the third United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea T13 reflects the will of the naval pow-
ers,' 3 5 and includes certain rights'3" of coastal states over their territorial
seas (not including the right to block innocent passage'3 7). Though the
Law of the Sea negotiation process has been resistant to attempts by the
non-nuclear coastal states to extend their jurisdiction over the seas,'3 " the
zone of sovereignty (total or otherwise) exercised by coastal states has
gradually expanded.'3 9
As early as 1702, the limit of the territorial sea was agreed to be
about three nautical miles - the maximum range of a cannon."" But
there has been "an almost irresistible tendency for national jurisdiction to
creep beyond the existing" limits."" In the years following World War II,
many states claimed a twelve mile territorial sea."" Today the territorial
sea is acknowledged by UNCLOS III to reach to twelve miles. '" Simi-
larly, some states claimed rights out to 200 miles. In addition, UNCLOS
III recognizes a zone of economic dominion (the so-called "exclusive eco-
nomic zone") of up to 200 miles.1 4 '
Although the cartographer's lines of claimed and universally recog-
nized rights of sovereignty over the seas have expanded, the inviolability
of these perimeters continues to evade universal acceptance. So too have
the rules regarding the rights of transitting ships - or coastal states -
been unevenly applied by all states. Many states, including the U.S. and
the U.S.S.R., proclaim rights beyond those generally accepted by UN-
symptom of the fact that nations attempt to further their interests by whatever instruments
they have at their disposal, be they military or economic, diplomatic or legal." LAW, FORCE
AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 13-14.
133. K. Booth, The Military Implications of the Changing Law of the Sea, in THE LAW
OF'THE SEA: NEGLECTED ISsUES 343-354 (1979) [hereinafter "K. Booth"].
134. See generally UNCLOS III, supra note 27.
135. See generally J. SEBENIUS, supra note 131.
136. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, arts. 19-22, 24-25, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274-75.
137. Id. arts. 17-19, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1273-74.
138. J. SEBENIUS, supra note 131, at 71-109.
139. See infra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
140. After a half century or so of early attempts to define the concept we now know as
"territorial sea," Cornelius van Bynkersheim "suggested that a state's dominion over the sea
should be restricted to the range over which its power extended from the adjacent land.
This was taken to be the maximum range of a canon . . .the distance agreed was three
miles." LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 15.
141. Id. at 38.
142. In 1945, the Truman Doctrine was announced whereby the United States claimed
certain rights over its entire continental shelf. Following that initiative, many countries uni-
laterally claimed a territorial sea of anywhere from 12 to 200 miles. Id. at 16. By 1972, of 111
coastal states, only 25 still accepted the traditional three mile limit. Id. at 36.
143. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1272.
144. Id. art. 57, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1280.
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CLOS III.' 4 5 At least ten states1 46 invoke some regulation of foreign vessel
transit through their exclusive economic zones. More than two dozen
states require notification and/or approval before foreign warships may
pass into their territorial sea.147 Others claim special security zones.,4 4 Ca-
nada's claimed rights extend 600 miles north of its mainland coast, hav-
ing "closed" the entire Northwest Passage and the Arctic Archipelago.149
Among the nuclear powers, the Soviet Union claims full sovereignty over
the Sea of Okhotsh,'5 ° having declared it closed to foreign vessels, and the
United States has established over 100 danger zones, primarily used for
test firing, within and without its territorial sea, often completely banning
transit by all but U.S. naval ships.'5 1
Many of the exceptions to full compliance with these provisions of
the law of the sea are not based exclusively on military grounds. Preven-
tion of pollution has been the justification for restrictions on unhindered
transit. Canada has invoked some of the toughest regulation based on en-
vironmental concerns. "Under the Eastern Canadian Traffic Regulation
System (ECAREG) all ships over 500 g.r.t. entering the ECAREG traffic
zone are required to request clearance twenty-four hours in advance. The
145. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. The United States first claimed
sovereignty beyond the three mile limit in 1945. The Truman Doctrine claimed a right over
the continental shelf. LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 16. The U.S.S.R. claims
complete sovereignty over the Sea of Okhotsh.
146. Guyana, India, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan and the Seychelles regulate passage of
foreign vessels in their EEZs, and the Maldives, Mauritania, Portugal and the U.S.S.R. regu-
late navigation in special zones of their EEZs. Alexander, Geographical Perspectives on In-
ternational Navigation, Paper Presented at the East-West Center/ Law of the Sea Institute
Conference on International Navigation (Jan. 1986). Additionally, Brazil exercises control
over military maneuvers in its EEZ. CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 302-305 (J. Van Dyke ed. 1985).
147. TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEARING VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT: THE RAROTONGA
TREATY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 5 (1986) [hereinafter "TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEAR-
ING VESSELS"]. Among these states are China, Denmark, Egypt, Indonesia (except for pas-
sage in designated sea lanes), Norway, Papau New Guinea and Turkey.
148. See TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEARING VESSELS, supra note 147:
Burma [sic], India and Vietnam prohibit alien warships and aircraft from mili-
tary warning zones 24 kilometers wide while Cambodia and Indonesia have
such zones 12 kilometers wide. China has a Military Warning Zone extending
at some points to 50 miles, North Korea has one out to 50 miles, South Korea.
. . one extending 150 miles in the Sea of Japan and 100 miles in the Yellow
Sea, and Nicaragua one extending 25 miles requiring 15 days advance notice by
foreign warships and planes. (citations ommitted).
Id. at 6.
149. Alexander, supra note 146, at 23.
150. Id. The Soviet Union doesn't recognize the principle of innocent passage for war-
ships at all. Butler, Soviet Concepts of Innocent Passage, 7 HARv. INT'L L.J. 113, 127 (1965);
Butler, The USSR and the Limits to National Jurisdiction over the Sea 1970-72, in LIMITS
TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SEA 177, 179, 189 (G. Yates & J. Young eds. 1974).
151. Sohn, International Navigation Interests Related to Security, Paper Presented at
the East-West Center/Law of the Sea Institute Conference on International Navigation
(Jan. 1986).
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
stated objective of the regulations is to reduce the danger of pollution."' 5 2
Canada's requirements are especially significant in that Canada's exertion
of control could reach beyond the 200 mile EEZ limit. Canada also was
successful in including an article in UNCLOS III that allows states with
control over ice-covered territory to invoke special controls. 5 '
Clearly the law of the sea is not a singular and static paradigm of
law, either as customary international law or as codified in multilateral
treaties or conventions. Rather, it is constantly changing. Some suggest
the change may be dramatic. "We are living in a transitional period of
maritime affairs,"'' one commentator recently wrote. "We are seeing a
shift from a regime entirely dominated by the traditional maritime pow-
ers to one in which all coastal states (and even non-coastal states) de-
mand a bigger say in ocean affairs and claim greater rights .. .
The fact that transit passage became a part of UNCLOS III, though
not as the freedom of transit doctrine envisioned by its sponsors,'"8 the
United States and the Soviet Union, is evidence enough of that. Whereas
the United States and Soviet Union were pushing for virtually complete
freedom of navigation through international straits, 57 Indonesia, Malay-
sia and Singapore5 8 were ready to "de-internationalize' 1 59 the Malacca
152. LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 38-39 (citing E. Gold & D. John-
ston, Ship-generated Maritime Pollution: The Creator of Regulated Navigation, Paper
Presented at the 13th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute (Oct. 1979)).
153. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 234, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1315. The full text of the
article reads as follows:
Coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from
vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone,
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering
such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to
navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm
to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regula-
tions shall have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation
of the marine environment on the best available scientific evidence.
154. LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 38.
155. Id.
156. P. TANGSUBKUL, ASEAN AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 29 (1982).
157. Id. China, on the other hand, took the position that
straits lying within the territorial waters of a coastal state still come under the
national sovereignty of that state, even if they are often used for international
navigation .... China is of the view that the demand for freedom of transit
and freedom of overflight would allow the superpowers to treat the territorial
waters of other countries as the high seas purely because the aforesaid waters
are straits used for international navigation.
Id.
158. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore border the Strait of Malacca and the nearby
Strait of Singapore.
159. The position of the three governments was stated in the Joint Statement on
"Straits of Malacca and Singapore," issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia
on November 16, 1971. Among its provisions, it stated that:
(i) the three governments agreed that the safety of navigation in the
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Strait, a principle passage between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The
result is the compromise transit provisions now found in UNCLOS III,160
which provide for strait transit while allowing limited control by the
coastal state.'6 1
Reliance on UNCLOS III as the definitive "restatement" of the law
of the sea is troubling for another reason: it is not yet the law. The Con-
vention has not been ratified by the requisite sixty nations for it to enter
into force.16 The validity of UNCLOS III as international law will be
open to question so long as it has not yet formally entered into force, and
perhaps even after that point if major players refuse to ratify. Several key
nations have refused to sign or ratify the convention, most notably the
United States and the United Kingdom. Still, these states claim UN-
CLOS III to be customary international law except for the provisions
which they do not approve.'6 s Further, they claim the right to enforce
provisions of UNCLOS III against all other states, despite the fact that
they do not feel themselves compelled to honor all of its provisions.'
This posture may be seen as undermining the entire convention, at least
so far as it was designed to be an "all or nothing" package.'6 5
Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the responsibility of the coastal states
concerned;
(ii) the three governments agreed on the need for tripartite co-operation
on the safety of navigation in the two straits;
(iv) the three governments also agreed that the problem of the safety of
navigation and the question of internationalization of the Straits are two sepa-
rate issues;
(v) the governments of the Republic of Indonesia and of Malaysia agreed
that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not international straits, while
fully recognizing the principle of innocent passage. The Government of Singa-
pore takes note of the position of the governments of the Republic of Indonesia
and of Malaysia on this point ....
P. TANGSUBKUL, supra note 156, at 27.
The Philippines has also been a proponent of more restrictive rights of transit passage.
See e.g., Manansala, The Philippines and the Law of the Sea, 8 L. SEA INST. WORKSHOP
430, 430-41 (1987).
160. C. SANGER, supra note 20, at 88. Certain events had raised the level of concern
over this important link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. During the war leading to
the formation of Bangladesh as a separate state, both the U.S. and Soviet Union sent war-
ships through the strait without the required notification. Id. at 86. Indonesia and Malaysia
were also very concerned about the possibility of a clash between nuclear submarines in the
strait. They and Singapore were also distressed at the growing pollution problem in their
waters, which was playing havoc with their fishing industries. Id. at 88.
161. See id.
162. As of July, 1988, only 35 states of the required 60 had ratified UNCLOS III, L. oF
THE SEA BULL., July 1988. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 308(1), 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1327.
163. TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEARING VESSELS, supra note 147, at 10.
164. Id.
165. Article 309 does not permit a ratification with reservation or exceptions unless
specifically provided for in the Convention. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 309, 21 I.L.M.
1245, at 1327.
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To date, most states have not seen it in their best interest to evade or
spurn the provisions of UNCLOS III. In fact, many small coastal states"'
are heavily dependent on the seas and receive significant benefits from
UNCLOS III. These states may feel a compulsion to adhere to all provi-
sions of UNCLOS III as a matter of principle or practicality. As such,
they would be adhering to the spirit and intent of the convention negotia-
tions which took place under the premise that states would adopt the
complete treaty as a single, packaged unit.
In theory the unwillingness of the U.S. and U.K. to ratify UNCLOS
III provides signatory states with a basis to deny them and other non-
signatories the rights guaranteed by UNCLOS III. It appears that a state
is within its authority to prohibit "passage and overflight along sealanes
[sic] in archipelagoes and transit passage through straits within territorial
seas, arguing that these rights are not customary law and do not accrue to
non-signatories of UNCLOS. '1 6 7 Indonesia has expressed the position
that it has the right to "deny transit passage to those nations that have
not signed and adhered to [UNCLOS III]." 168 Nonetheless, most states
which have either ratified the convention or intend to honor it fully ex-
pect all other states to do similarly.
2. Specific Regimes of UNCLOS III and Nuclear Transit
Following the general discussion of the Law of the Sea above, it is
important to note that we review three specific regimes of UNCLOS III
which would be directly challenged by prohibition of nuclear transit. The
regimes implicated are innocent passage, transit passage and exclusive ec-
onomic zones. A subpart of this section will deal with each of these in
turn. A fourth subpart of this section looks at the future of UNCLOS.
(a) Innocent Passage
UNCLOS III provides that:
Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State .... Passage of a foreign ship
shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or secur-
ity of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in . . . any
threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the coastal State .... '69
Though this language might at first indicate to the contrary, the defini-
tion itself provides the vehicle for a state to prevent nuclear transit
166. J. SEBENIUS, supra note 131.
167. TRANSIT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON BEARING VESSELS, supra note 145, at 3; see Surace-
Smith, United States Activity Outside of the Law of the Sea Convention: Deep Seabed
Mining and Transit Passage, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1032, 1058 (1984).
168. Wisnomoert, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea, 8 L. SEA INST. WORKSHOP 392, 406
(1987).
169. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 19(1)-(2)(a), 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274.
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within its territorial sea yet remain within the letter of the Law of the
Sea. That vehicle would be to declare, ipso facto, that the transit of nu-
clear weapon carrying or nuclear powered ships is "prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security" of the coastal state or parties to a nuclear
free zone treaty. Such a declaration would constitute recognition that
such transit could not be "innocent" by its very nature.7 0 Any nuclear
weapon carrying warship or aircraft (or, indeed, any warship or warplane
capable of carrying nuclear weapons) is a nuclear target regardless of its
locale. An attack on such a plane or ship would unleash the destructive
potential of a nuclear weapon against the state within whose territory the
ship or plane was transitting. Such an attack would obviously violate "the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal
State," even if the involved territory were not the intended target of the
attack.
This argument is not foreign to the international arena. As two Law
of the Sea chroniclers pointed out, "[s]ome states regard [nuclear pow-
ered] vessels as inherently threatening to their peace and good order.', 7'
As early as 1964 Spain passed legislation declaring "that the passage of
nuclear ships through territorial waters was to be considered an exception
to the right of innocent passage." ' More recently, the New Zealand For-
eign Ministry considered taking the position that the transit of nuclear
vessels can be inimical to a coastal state's "sovereignty, territorial integ-
rity or political independence" in its preparatory sessions for the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty negotiations."a
Perhaps surprisingly, UNCLOS III does afford some recognition of
the dangers posed by nuclear fueled ships and those with nuclear cargo.
Such vessels are required to "observe special precautionary measures es-
tablished for such ships by international agreements""74 and may be
asked, when "exercising the right of innocent passage through [a coastal
state's] territorial sea[,] to use such sea lanes . . . as it may designate or
prescribe for the regulation of the passage of such ships. 1 "7 The question
for those ultimately concerned with the illegality of nuclear transit under
any condition is: Will future interpretations or revisions of the relevant
provisions of the Law of the Sea encompass that broader viewpoint? The
answer might be found in international fora that have convened in order
to study the problem of large-scale pollution.
170. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
171. R. CHURCHILL & A. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 70 (1983) [hereinafter "CHURCHILL
& LowE"].
172. Act No. 25/64, 29 April 1964, art. 7, UN Leg. Ser. B/16, p. 45 (reported in CHUR-
CHILL & LOWE, supra note 171, at 70).
173. The New Zealand Foreign Ministry ordered a legal study of this question prior to
concluding negotiations on the Treaty of Rarotonga. It apparently decided against taking
this position in order to conclude a treaty sufficiently favorable to the United States so as to
gain U.S. ratification of treaty protocols. See.supra note 72.
174. UNCLOS 11, supra note 27, art. 23, 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274-75.
175. Id. art. 22(1). See id. art. 22(2), 21 I.L.M. 1245, at 1274.
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One of six developments that the U.S. believes will be a near-future
addition to a revised UNCLOS III is an anti-pollution measure calling for
the "imposi[tion of] greater controls on navigation" within exclusive eco-
nomic zones.17 Such thinking is easily traced to the UNCLOS III negoti-
ations. It was in that forum that Indonesia and Malaysia decried severe
damage to the their fishing industries from massive oil tanker mishaps.
Due to that experience they have taken the position that "passage of su-
pertankers was non-innocent because the 'peace, good order and security
of the coastal state' were being prejudiced by environmental risks ....
The United States and other states considered the seriousness of this in-
terpretation to be sufficient to warrant modifying their demand for unfet-
tered strait transit.17 8
If states can effectively argue that the high risk to the environment
by potential polluters is a breach of the "peace, good order or security" of
a coastal state, as Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have contended, it
is certainly valid for a state to take the position that the cataclysmal life
and society-threatening risk posed by nuclear transit is such a breach.
Indeed, this possibility was acknowledged in a United Nations study on
nuclear weapon free zones, which posited that the "question of innocent
passage" might be reconsidered "in light of the requirements necessary to
the effectiveness of [a nuclear weapon free] zone."'19
Restrictions upon the right of innocent passage are not without pre-
cedent. Over two dozen countries' require some sort of notification or
approval of the passage of foreign warships within their territorial sea,
including China and the Nordic countries. Despite the definition of inno-
cent passage found in UNCLOS III, the actions of these states may make
it "ieasonable to concede to a State the right to enact regulations regard-
ing the passage of foreign warships through its territorial waters, if con-
siderations based on its safety and protection justify it,"''8 particularly
176. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect, 20 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 561, 588-90 (1983).
177. C. SANGER, supra note 20, at 88. In statements made after the Joint Statement on
"Straits of Malacca and Singapore" was issued, supra note 159, the governments of Indone-
sia and Malaysia expressed specific concern about the problem of pollution. Indonesia took
the view that "[elvery nation has the right to protect the territorial waters from use by
other countries which could endanger the interest of its people, as by causing water pollu-
tion and damaging off-shore exploration and fishing industries." Statement of the Chief of
Staff of the Navy, May 19, 1972, quoted in P. TANGSUBKUL, supra note 156, at 27-28. The
Malaysian Prime Minister expressed a similar sentiment: "Indonesia and Malaysia have to
control the Straits of Malacca so that it will not be polluted by oil spills from tankers which
can and will destroy the fish and the shore of both countries." Opening Statement of the
23d UMNO (Government Party) Conference, May 1972, in id. at 28.
178. C. SANGER, supra note 20, at 88.
179. Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 49.
180. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
181. Janis, Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea Convention: The Military Activi-
ties Exception, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 51, 54 (1977), (quoting C.J. COLOMBos, THE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 223 (4th ed. 1961).
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when that state takes the legal position that the presence of nuclear
weapons cannot be "innocent."
(b) Transit Passage
The rationale for imposing restrictions on nuclear transit through the
territorial sea are equally applicable to international straits. Whatever the
potential dangers to a coastal state from an incident in its territorial sea,
they are magnified in a strait. For example, a strait's narrowness and
shallowness leave less room for error. These factors combined with the
often heavy traffic passing through a strait' bring vessels closer to land
and increase the chance for collision or grounding. Further, the impor-
tance of international straits to the nuclear powers' 83 - and the frequent
crossings their vessels make - presents a considerable risk of nuclear
confrontation within straits.'
The concept of strait transit as a doctrine of international law was
originally promoted as a regime of free passage through international
straits.'85 Pressure by states bordering straits 88 ("straits states") such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Spain resulted in some weakening of
the free passage proposal. Still, the strait transit provisions of UNCLOS
III, as enacted, served to prevent straits states from exercising complete
sovereignty over what would otherwise be their territorial seas when that
territorial sea comprised an international strait. Under UNCLOS III, any
ship or aircraft is permitted unfettered passage when exercising continu-
ous and expedient transit. 187 This is a weaker standard (from the point of
view of straits states) than innocent passage.' 8 Objecting to the severe
restraints on their rights, several key straits states, among them Spain
and Morocco (Strait of Gibraltar), Oman (Strait of Hormuz) and Indone-
182. E.g., 5000 vessels per month through the Strait of Malacca. P. TANGSUBKUL, supra
note 156, at 25 (citing P. TANGSUBKUL, AN ASIAN VIEWPOINT ON THE STATUS OF STRAITS IN
EAST ASIA (1974)).
183. "The United States is especially dependent upon these archipelagic waters and
international straits [of Indonesia and Malaysia] for the transit of its submarines to and
from Guam and Subic Bay [the Philippines] to Diego Garcia [the U.S. naval base on an
island in the central Indian Ocean]." Larson, Innocent, Transit, and Archipelagic Sea
Lanes Passage, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 411, 417 (1987). See infra note 191.
184. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. For detailed descriptions of the ad-
vance of the transit passage concept, many sources can be cited, including CHURCHILL &
LOWE, supra note 171, at 81-89; LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 97-113;
Kuribayashi, The New Law of the Sea and the Straits of Malacca, in INTERNATIONAL SYM-
POSIUM ON THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS AND RE-
GIONAL APPROACHES 146 (D.M. Johnson, E. Gold & P. Tangsubkul eds. 1983).
The journal Ocean Development and International Law recently published an entire
issue devoted to the subject of transit passage. 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 391-496 (1987).
186. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
187. Id. at 125-27. See UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 37-38.
188. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
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sia (Straits of Malacca and Lombok) '" have declared that they will em-
ploy the innocent passage regime, not recognizing transit passage. This
issue is of particular interest to an ASEAN nuclear free zone190 where the
straits providing the most expeditious and traveled access between the
Pacific and Indian Oceans are located. 91
The right of transit passage is similar to the right of innocent passage
found in the territorial sea regime. Ships and aircraft exercising the right
of transit passage are required to "refrain from any threat or use of force
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
States bordering the strait . . . .'"' However, the strait state is not re-
served the express right to expel a ship whose passage is non-innocent
(i.e., prejudices the "peace, good order or security" of the coastal state).91
The transit passage regime contains another provision which could
be invoked against nuclear-powered vessels and those with nuclear car-
goes. In cases in which the environment is threatened, Article 233 of UN-
CLOS III allows coastal states to "take appropriate enforcement mea-
sures" against vessels "causing or threatening major damage to the
189. Surace-Smith, supra note 167, at 1033.
190. The ASEAN states may well be among the next nation groups to promulgate a
nuclear free zone. See Fry, supra note 6, at 69-71. During the December 1987 ASEAN sum-
mit in Manila, Indonesian President Suharto called for an ASEAN nuclear free zone. In the
end a paragraph in the final declaration of the summit stated that "ASEAN would intensify
its efforts toward the early establishment of a Southeast Asian nuclear weapon free zone...
." Vatikiotis, Zone of Discord: Nuclear-Free Proposal Likely to Split Allies, FAR E. EcON.
REv., Jan. 14, 1988, at 12.
More recently the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organisation, while calling for its mem-
bers to work for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, stressed the need to complete drafting of
its own nuclear free zone treaty as soon as possible. Other Reports: ASEAN Parliamentari-
ans Call for Nuclear Free Zone, Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC), Aug. 26, 1989.
ASEAN leaders have also called upon the removal of all military bases and nuclear weapons
from their region. ASEAN Legislators Want Orderly Withdrawl of Foreign Bases, Reuters,
Aug. 25, 1989.
191. The United States perceives strait transit to be of critical strategic concern to its
national defense:
If straits states such as . . . Indonesia and Malaysia were able to restrict the
movement of U.S. carrier forces for reasons of their own determinations of na-
tional security, the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear commitment could be
threatened especially in times of crisis, [at] precisely the time when straits
states would be under the most pressure, internal and external, to limit
passage.
Janis, supra note 181, at 58.
The sincerity of such claims by the U.S. is doubted by some. For example, it has been
suggested that "the advent of the Ohio class SSBNs (submarines with ballistic missiles) and
the Trident I/C4 SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), with an estimated range
from 4,500-6,500 nautical miles . . . 'would virtually eliminate the dependence of the U.S.
underwater nuclear force on passage through international straits.'" Larson, supra note 183,
at 424 (quoting R. OSGOOD, TOWARD A NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY, 1976 AND BEYOND 47-48
(1976)).
192. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 39(1)(b).
193. See Wisnomoert, supra note 168, at 404.
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marine environment of the straits . ". . ."10 This explicit recognition of the
straits (and other coastal) states' valid environmental concerns'" should
provide straits states with the means to enforce the same kinds of anti-
pollution/anti-nuclear mechanisms, and with at least the same justifica-
tion, as with cases involving innocent passage.'"
(c) Exclusive Economic Zones
On the surface, a solution to the question of how to prohibit nuclear
transit through exclusive economic zones is not straightforward. Coastal
states do not have any explicit rights over the movement of foreign ships
and aircraft through the 200 mile exclusive economic zone which is de-
clared197 to be part of the high seas. Moreover, there is no obligation on
the part of foreign vessels or aircraft to refrain from activities which
might "prejudice the peace, good order or security" of the coastal state or
to refrain from "causing or threatening major damage to the environ-
ment."'"" However, UNCLOS III does specify that the "coastal State has
sovereign rights for the purpose of... conserving and managing the natu-
ral resources" in the exclusive economic zone 99 and has "jurisdiction ...
with regard to ... the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment."200 Furthermore, UNCLOS III calls for "compl[iance] with the laws
and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with" these
provisions. 20 1 This set of rules provides a potentially effective means to
prohibit nuclear transit through the EEZ while remaining within the
framework of UNCLOS III.
The dangers to the environment of radioactive pollution are well
known.20 2 It is not an indefensible position that the transit of any radio-
active materials through the exclusive economic zone creates an unaccept-
able risk to the conservation, management, protection and preservation of
the marine environment. There are inherent dangers in the transporta-
tion of radioactive substances including the potential for accidents at
sea203 or in the air 204 that could result in the exposure to the marine envi-
194. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 233
195. See supra notes 152-53, 160 and accompanying text.
196. See infra § III.A.
197. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 135.
198. See id. art. 56.
199. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 56(1)(a).
200. Id. art. 56(1)(b)(iii).
201. Id. art. 58(3).
202. See, e.g., E. COLGLAZIER, JR., THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WASTE (1982).
203. To date seven nuclear-powered submarines have sunk, releasing radiation into the
sea, and the crew of another nuclear submarine died of radiation poisoning following an
accident. Broder & Healy, Soviet Submarine Sinks Off Norway: Nuclear-Driven Craft Goes
Down After Fire; 'Major Loss of Life' Reported, L.A. Times, Apr. 8, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5. It
has been argued that the radiation released from those sinkings was not enough to "produce
a big effect." Id. quoting J. Holdren, professor of energy and resources at Univ. Calif. at
Berkeley. But the sinking of an experimental Soviet nuclear submarine in April 1989 off
Norway is "basically . . . big trouble," according to the same expert. Ybarra, Experimental
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ronment of radioactive substances. The lax attitude of the maritime in-
dustry toward disposing of and illegally dumping radioactive wastes at
sea205 is an existing source of serious radioactive pollution.
The possibility of sealing off EEZs to nuclear transit is not an ab-
stract vision. As the Law of the Sea now stands,
[t]he coastal State has the right, within its EEZ, to adopt non-dis-
criminatory rules and standards against vessel-source pollution and to
enforce these when necessary .... [A] number of coastal States have
already adopted domestic legislation with regard to vessel-source pol-
lution which is more severe than the rules and regulations of the In-
ternational Maritime Organization Convention. The passage of "po-
tential polluters," such as nuclear-powered vessels, vessels carrying
nuclear of other "hazardous" cargoes, and ammunition ships, through
the EEZs of some coastal States, may in time be jeopardized, treaty or
no treaty."°6
System on Sunken Sub May Pose Radiation Threat, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, § 1, at 11,
col. 1, quoting J. Holdren. The submarine's metallic sodium-cooler, which cools the reactors,
is highly explosive when it comes into contact with water, an event which would lead to
massive release of the reactors' radioactive fuel.
Altogether, over half of the worlds' nuclear reactors are aboard submarines and nuclear-
powered surface craft, "which is the most dangerous place for them to be." Tuohy & Parks,
No Sub Radiation Peril Soviets Say: Gorbachev Reassures World Leaders; More than 60
Feared Lost in Sinking, L.A. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 5, quoting Darnian Durrant
of the environmental group Greenpeace. The other concern posed by these vessels are their
nuclear weapons, which can also leach their radioactivity into the water following an acci-
dent at sea.
204. The dangers of a crash of a plane carrying nuclear weapons might be exemplified
by the return to earth of nuclear-powered satellites. In 1979, Cosmos 924 crashed over a
wide area of Canada, contaminating 40,000 square miles. When Cosmos 1900 was expected
to burn up on re-entry in 1988, officials blithely admitted that "everyone in the world will
be exposed to the radioactivity." Treen, Nuclear Crash, THE NATION, Oct. 3. 1988, at 261.
Of greater concern is the radioactivity which would be released if a space shuttle carry-
ing a plutonium-powered satellite exploded, as did the Challenger in 1986. Nuclear Debris
Could Be Released in Shuttle/Centaur Explosion, AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
Mar. 10, 1986, at 288. Plutonium is the deadliest substance known. See infra notes 239-40
and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Boehmer-Christiansen, An End to Radioactive Disposal at Sea?, J.
MARINE POL'Y 119 (Apr. 1986); Van Dyke, Ocean Disposal of Nuclear Wastes, J. MARINE
POL'Y 82 (Apr. 1988).
206. Alexander, supra note 176, at 585-86 (quoting Burke, National Legislation on
Ocean Authority Zones and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.
289, 289-322 (1981)). This United States government officer's argument relies, in part on
two sections of art. 211 of UNCLOS III, supra note 27. Art. 211(4) allows that:
Coastal States may, in the exercise of their sovereignty within their territorial
sea, adopt laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of
marine pollution from foreign vessels, including vessels exercising the right of
innocent passage. Such laws and regulations shall, in accordance with Part II,
section 3, not hamper innocent passage of foreign vessels.
Art. 211(5) provides that:
Coastal States, for the purpose of enforcement as provided for in section 6,
may in respect of their exclusive economic zones adopt laws and regulations for
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to
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As long as the law is evolving, maritime parties can expect coastal
states to attempt to enforce new provisions to protect their resources. A
Soviet participant in law of the sea negotiations has reasoned that
the practical and legal evolution of the EEZ concept will not be with-
out dispute .... It is likely, for example, that some coastal states will
undertake actions and enact legislation which will interfere with the
rights expected by naval powers in EEZs; they will claim that they are
acting in the interests of good order at sea and in accordance with
their developing rights in a zone which is unique in the law of the
sea.
20 7
(d) UNCLOS IV?
It is impossible to predict whether future Law of the Sea Conven-
tions will incorporate any of the proposals suggested above and in the
Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. What is evident, however, is that "[t]he
system of norms and principles of international law is in constant move-
ment. Some norms and principles are just being born, others have been
formed, and yet others are dying out."20 8 Like the recognition of the EEZ
by the Third Convention on the Law of the Sea, those developing norms
will eventually find their way into international acceptance.
The stage is being set for the expansion of environmental controls
and protective rights by coastal states within their territorial seas,2", in-
ternational straits21 0 and EEZs.21 ' Even at this early date it has been pos-
ited that
[t]he problem of ecological security is closely linked with the human
right to a healthy environment and the respective obligations of
states. The concept of ecological security has begun to be filled with
real substance with the internationalization of the problem of the en-
vironment in international relations as an objective process, that is,
the aspiration of every country to guard its natural environment and
the health of its people against damage which might be caused as a
result of the "anti-ecological" activities of other countries." '
Another development in this evolutionary process is the effort by
anti-nuclear forces to advance the claim of the Spanish legislature "that
the passage of nuclear ships through territorial waters [is] to be consid-
ered an exception to the right of innocent passage."'2 13 This approach can
and giving effect to generally accepted international rules and standards estab-
lished through the competent international organization or general diplomatic
conference.
207. N. Rusina, supra note 31, at 262.
208. LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY, supra note 28, at 43.
209. See supra subpart (a) of this section.
210. See supra subpart (b) of this section.
211. See supra subpart (c) of this section.
212. N. RUSINA, supra note 31, at 269.
213. Act No. 25/64, Apr. 29, 1964, art. 7, UN Leg. Ser. B/16, p. 45, reported in id. at 70.
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be most effective within the framework of the territorial sea, where inno-
cent passage is the current regime.214 It would also be easily workable
among the several straits states which employ innocent passage instead of
the regime of transit passage recently adopted by the yet-to-be activated
UNCLOS 111.215 Some countries have already adopted such a stand, most
notably New Zealand, which has banned port visits by nuclear capable
vessels.21
6
The movement of norms and principles may play a large role in the
strait transit area, as well. The transit passage regime, though weaker
than they originally sought, favors the strongest naval powers.2"7 As the
strength and determination of the less powerful coastal states increases,
the resistance to the nuclear powers' attempt to install a regime of free-
dom of the sea through international straits will grow. The advancement
of the Law of the Sea may also, one day, affect the transit passage re-
gime's requirement that shipping and aircraft passing through or over an
international strait "refrain from any threat or use of force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bor-
dering the strait .... -"28 Is it not conceivable that nuclear transit could
be viewed as a violation of this provision?
3. Voluntary Compliance
In the final analysis, compliance with new Law of the Sea provisions,
or nuclear prohibitory interpretations of the current Law of the Sea, will
most likely be voluntary. Treaties are substantially honored through in-
ternational pressure and self-interest.2 9 Where a nuclear free zone treaty
is the vehicle by which nuclear transit is prohibited, there is an institu-
tional form of voluntary compliance: each nuclear power would be asked
to sign a protocol. Such protocols attempt to assure that the nuclear pow-
ers would honor the respective nuclear free zone treaty's prohibition on
nuclear transit throughout the zone, whether it included just the territo-
rial sea, EEZ, or an entire region of the open ocean. This is the theory of
the protocols to the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties.
See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
214. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, arts. 17-32. One commentator posits that change will
come as cultural norms change. "If States believe that nuclear weapons are illegal, and that
NFZs (nuclear weapons free zones) present a hope for world peace, cultural norms will grad-
ually develop into legal norms against nuclear armaments." McFadden, Nuclear Weapon
Free Zones: Toward an International Framework, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 217, 249 (1986).
215. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
216. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
218. UNCLOS III, supra note 27, art. 39(1)(b).
219. The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (treaties are to be observed) arose out of the
Peace of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War in 1648. T. BUERGENTHAL & H. MAIER,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 16 (1985). Despite machinery designed to enforce
treaty obligations included in most treaties since then, no nation will honor a treaty if to do
so would result in its own detriment.
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In the case of a nuclear prohibitory treaty or protocol, compliance
does not have to rely on good faith alone. Instead, it may well be assumed
that the nuclear powers would monitor compliance by one another pro-
viding an indirect method of verification. A ban on port or airfield visits
included in such a treaty or protocol would, if honored, create de facto
compliance.
B. Nuclear Weapons, Alliances with Nuclear Powers and C3I
Assuming the Treaty of Rarotonga to be a minimum standard to
which future nuclear free zone treaties will adhere, the manufacture, pos-
session, testing, storage, deployment and use of nuclear explosive devices
of any type will be prohibited by such treaties.2 20 The Rarotonga prohibi-
tions do not, however, apply to activities of assistance, cooperation and
participation in support systems for nuclear weapons. Australia, a party
to the South Pacific accord, cooperates and co-manages 2 with the
United States several so-called C3 1,2 2 or Command, Control, Communica-
tion and Intelligence installations, which are part of the U.S. defense net-
work, helping to monitor and manage the location and activities of Amer-
ican and other forces throughout the Indian Ocean, East Asia and South
Pacific regions.22 As Michael Hamel-Green points out in the commentary
to his treaty for FANG, such facilities are "integral parts of nuclear-
warfighting [sic] systems and are generally considered to be prime nuclear
targets in any nuclear hostilities, "224 an irony acknowledged by Australian
officials.22
5
Such systems might also serve as part of the conventional defense of
the "host" state.22 Nonetheless, if an objective of a nuclear free zone is to
220. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, arts. 3-6, at 1444-46.
221. U.S. Reaffirms Military Role in Pacific, Reuters, Nov. 4, 1989; R. BABBAGE, RE-
THINKING AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE 40, 92-99, 241, 244 (1980); C. Bell, ANZUS in Australia's
Foreign and Security Policies, in AUSTRALIA'S FOREIGN & SECURITY POLICIES 136 (J.
Bercovith ed. 1988). America's major C3I installations in Australia are located at North-
West Cape, Nurrungar and Pine Gap. Id. at 154.
222. M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66, at 3. See Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence, Sci. AM., January 1985, at 32 [hereinafter "Sci. AM."].
223. See R. BABBAGE, supra note 221; M. O'CONNOR, To LIVE IN PEACE: AUSTRALIA'S
DEFENCE POLICY (1985); ScI. AM., supra note 222.
224. M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66, at 3. Michael Hamel-Green is not the only com-
mentator to suggest this irony. Coral Bell notes that "the most vital of all Australia's vital
national interests is the preservation of peace between the central balance powers. And this
is also the most endangered of Australia's vital interests ...." C. Bell, supra note 221, at
152 (emphasis in original). Thus, while Australia's greatest threat is from nuclear war, it
believes it must also be a participant in that same risk in order to help preserve the balance
of power.
225. Confidential interviews with officials of the Foreign Ministry of Australia, see
supra note 71.
226. C. Bell, supra note 221, at 150. However, Bell asserts that "[t]he American connec-
tion is useful but not essential to Australia in low-level threats. It would be vital in coping
with internal level threats, but the help required would be more in the field of diplomacy,
backing, supplies and intelligence than in combat forces .... Id.
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insure that the region not be a nuclear target, then one must ask, How
can the maintenance of such installations comport?
Of course, if Australia or any other state in a similar position were to
disband C2I facilities, the U.S. (or any other nuclear power in a similar
position) would almost certainly object, 27 claiming that it cannot main-
tain its nuclear deterrent or its defense obligations to the host nation if
the installation were to be removed. Such a claim puts a state desirous of
being non-nuclear in a dilemma of sorts as long as there is tension be-
tween nuclear powers. If it rids itself of the danger of attack to the C2 I
facilities located on its soil, it also risks losing the protections of its de-
fense alliance with the Western or Soviet bloc.
A second question inseparable from the C2I issue must also be con-
sidered. Should a nuclear free zone treaty prohibit treaty Parties from
joining alliances with nuclear powers?229 There are several questions the
non-nuclear state may want to attempt to answer. What protection is ac-
tually provided by that alliance? Is the danger of nuclear attack, if nu-
clear free provisions are not enforced, greater than the danger of external
attack should that alliance disband? Is there a strong non-nuclear state
within the nuclear free zone that can aid in the defense of the smaller or
weaker states against outside conventional forces, and at what cost? Is
this defensive aid desirable? Can the strength of the new alliance created
by the nuclear free zone treaty serve as a deterrent from outside attack?
Is a conventional deterrent more effective for defense purposes than reli-
ance on a nuclear state for protection?
The treaty proposed by the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group.2 9 would pro-
hibit "entering into military alliance arrangements with nuclear weapon
states under which nuclear weapons would be used in defense of or with
the cooperation of any Contracting Party."'2 30 A more radical approach
would be to ban all defense alliances with nuclear states. Such an ap-
proach might well be unnecessary if the parties to an alliance involving
one or more nuclear powers made it explicit that nuclear weapons would
not be used in the defense of the non-nuclear state. This agreement
would presumably provide greater assurance of freedom from nuclear at-
tack by the opposing nuclear state, due to the diminished threat of attack
from that region, though such an agreement has speculative effect at best.
The nearest thing to a precedent may be "negative assurances" '231
227. In an analogous situation, the United States suspended the ANZUS alliance as
regards New Zealand following New Zealand's ban on port visits by nuclear capable vessels.
See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
228. Michael Hamel-Green's Draft Treaty for a Comprehensive Nuclear Free Zone in
the South Pacific, prepared for the Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group, calls for the prohibition of any
"military arrangements with nuclear weapon states under which nuclear weapons would be
used in defense of or with the cooperation of any Contracting Party." Art. 1(f). Text can be
found in M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66.
229. FANG Treaty, supra note 68.
230. Id. art. 1(f).
231. Kennedy Graham, a disarmament ambassador for New Zealand, spells out three
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whereby nuclear powers have declared not to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states, as is the case with a protocol to the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. 82 However, the United States has made it clear that it could
not abide by such a proviso,23 thereby withdrawing its defense obliga-
tions to New Zealand following that country's nuclear port ban. 234
For negotiators of future nuclear free zone treaties this may be one of
the most difficult issues. The pragmatist might say that the nuclear pow-
ers cannot be ignored. Even truly neutral countries may feel threatened
by one or the other of the nuclear states or their proxy. Defense alliances
may at worst be a "necessary evil." But as New Zealand 23" and the draft-
ers of Palau's Constitution 230 have asserted, there may be no need for
such alliances to rely on nuclear weapons.
Still there exists the question of what should future negotiators do
regarding CM1 and similar facilities? Their use and value for non-nuclear,
weapons-related defense and mobility purposes can be great, if not vital.
Similarly, even the most basic of such systems, intended and normally
used for non-nuclear purposes, could be utilized for monitoring and com-
municating with nuclear weapons.
Thus, any approach which did not completely ban electronic surveil-
forms that negative assurances can take:
1. A 'total non-use' pledge never to use nuclear weapons against any state at
any time or under any circumstances.
2. A 'non-first strike' and a 'non-first use' pledge between nuclear powers in
which one undertakes never to be the first to 'use nuclear weapons against an-
other. A non-first strike pledge excludes the use of nuclear weapons in the
form of the first offensive move of war. A non-first use pledge excludes their
initial employment in response to aggression by conventional forces. Either of
these pledges can be of two kinds:
(a) a total pledge, in which the nuclear power applies the pledge to all
other nuclear powers; or
(b) a partial pledge, in which the nuclear power extends the pledge to cer-
tain other nuclear powers but not to all.
3. The more general 'non-use' understanding extended to non-nuclear weapon
states. This can similarly be of two kinds:
(a) a total undertaking, in which the nuclear power forswears the use of
nuclear weapons to all non-nuclear weapon states under any circumstances;
(b) a partial (or conditional) undertaking, in which the nuclear power
agrees not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states under
certain circumstances, or on certain conditions. There are a number of varia-
tions of condition 'non-use' undertakings, depending on the circumstances and
the conditions stipulated.
Graham, supra note 84, at 281. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
232. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol II, art. 3, at 364. The Treaty of Raro-
tonga contains a similar protocol, Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 2, art. 2, at
1461, but only China and the U.S.S.R have signed protocol instruments. See supra notes 69-
82 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
234. See infra note 99.
235. See Glover, supra note 19; see also infra, note 99.
236. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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lance, monitoring and command facilities would almost certainly be unen-
forceable. A better, though not completely satisfactory, approach would
be to prevent such facilities located within the zone from being used for
any activity in relation to nuclear weapons. Instead of banning such facil-
ities altogether, it would rely on the good faith of the states to uphold the
intent of the treaty. And it does, at least, acknowledge the dilemma posed
by such facilities. In a nuclear episode the net result just might be the
sparing of the facility - and the "host" state - from nuclear attack.
C. Peaceful Nuclear Activities
It is both impossible to assure that any nuclear explosive device will
only be used for peaceful purposes and to guarantee that the use of such
a device will not result in any risk to life or property. The Rarotonga
Treaty simply bans all nuclear explosive devices.28 7 But what of other al-
legedly peaceful nuclear purposes?
Virtually no one denies that the use of radioactive materials for med-
ical and limited non-military research purposes is valid and acceptable.
However, at what point does non-military scientific nuclear research cross
the line to become military research? This is a distinction which authori-
ties and watchdogs may want to watch closely, yet these may be beneficial
uses even the most ardent foes of nuclear activity would not prohibit.2"'
Nuclear power plants present a possible problem for some states
wishing to go nuclear free. Huge amounts of foreign exchange may have
been invested in the reactors.289 Yet many states which do have nuclear
power plants have publicly acknowledged the extraordinarily heavy finan-
cial, environmental and social burden which they impose on their people.
Such an acknowledgement may have led to the closing down of the brand
new reactor in the Philippines24 and the phase-out of nuclear power
plants undertaken in Sweden as early as 1980.241
Nuclear power plants also pose nuclear proliferation dangers. Waste
material from reactors contains weapons-usable plutonium which, 24 2 if
reprocessed, could be utilized in nuclear weapons.248 Moreover, fissionable
wastes from nuclear power plants are known to be susceptible to diver-
sion.2 " Nuclear power plants are also subject to terrorist attack and could
237. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 3, at 1444-45.
238. See, e.g., M. Hamel-Green, supra note 66, at 3-4.
239. For example, the Philippine nuclear reactor which President Aquino shut down
prior to its launching cost her country more than $2 billion in hard currency. Dumaine,
supra note 97.
240. Id.
241. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
242. R. NADER & J. ABBOTrs, THE MENACE OF ATOMIC ENERGY 78-81.
243. Id.
244. E.g., Pakistan and India have avoided or bypassed international nuclear safe-
guards and supervision, resulting in both countries having the facilities and nuclear material
to construct significant quantities of nuclear weapons. L. SPECTOR, supra note 16, at 73-124.
Similar allegations involving Israel have been commonplace for several years. Id. at 130-45.
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be held for political ransom.2 45 In 1990 the justification for new nuclear
power plant construction in most, if not all situations, and even the oper-
ation of many existing nuclear power plants, is nil.
Recent years have seen a growth in consumer and industrial uses of
radioactive substances. Examples include smoke detectors, food irradia-
tion and sterilization by irradiation.24 6 Of course, there is a risk of radio-
active contamination with these products, as with all nuclear products.
That risk is magnified by the greater dissemination of radioactive materi-
als which will necessarily occur as food irradiation plants are built and
operated,24 7 not to mention the radioactive waste materials produced by
these irradiation facilities.2 48 Furthermore, the material used by food irra-
diation plants, for example, is a direct by-product of weapons-grade nu-
clear fuel production. 4 9 A risk completely different in nature is intimated
by medical research which links irradiated foods to increased incidence of
cancer and other diseases in humans.2 50 A truly comprehensive nuclear
free zone should at least consider restrictions on the great many of these
activities and products. A reasonable approach would be to ban all nu-
clear activities except those for which there is both a minimal societal
benefit and no non-nuclear substitute.
D. Radioactive Waste Disposal
The London Convention 25 1 prohibits the disposal of high level radio-
active wastes at sea,2 5 2 and since 1983 there has been an international
moratorium"' on the dumping of all radioactive wastes at sea. In no way
should this be seen as a permanent device for ocean protection. The 1983
245. See generally, P. LEVENTHAL & Y. ALEXANDER, PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM
(1987).
246. Among non-food items which are irradiated presumably for sterilization purposes
are "blood agar and plasma, blankets and towels, bottles, cosmetics, needles, infant wear,
peat moss, sanitary napkins and tampons, lubricating jelly, scalpel blades, and water ......
Gibbs, Zap, Crackle, Pop, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1987, at 22, 24. Labels are not required
for any irradiated products. Irradiation Business Gears Up, UTNE READER, May - June
1987, at 29-30 [hereinafter "UTNE"]. A former federal law requiring labeling of unprocessed
whole foods, Gibbs, supra, expired in 1988. See also UTNE, supra.
247. Terry, Why Is D.O.E. for Food Irradiation?, THE NATION, Feb. 7, 1987, at 142.
Although irradiation is a young business, there have already been significant radioactive
spills, sloppy record keeping and other willful violations of safety regulations. Id.; UTNE,
supra note 246.
248. Terry, supra note 247, at 142.
249. Id.
250. One study found an 80% incidence of a white blood cell anomaly, polyploidy, re-
lated to immune system disorders among children who ate products made from irradiated
wheat. Gibbs, supra note 246, at 22-23. Animal studies have demonstrated genetic muta-
tions among flies and mice fed irradiated food. Id. at 23.
251. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.
252. Id.
253. Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 205; Van Dyke, supra note 205.
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moratorium is currently under review254 in the hope (by the nuclear ex-
porting and waste producing countries) that its protections will be
weakened.
South Pacific Forum states have chosen not to permit such a slacken-
ing to occur in their seas. The Treaty of Rarotonga institutionalized the
1983 moratorium's ban for the South Pacific.2 5 A year later it was en-
hanced with the conclusion of the Convention for the Protection of the
Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region, signed
in 1986.25' The seas of the South Pacific may now be free from radioactive
pollution, but what of the rest of the world? Certainly any nuclear free
zone should incorporate similar prohibitions.
Likewise, the disposal or storage of nuclear wastes anywhere in the
vicinity of a watershed, or proximate to an alluvial deposit, should be
strictly prohibited. Currently there is no known safe method of radioac-
tive disposal. Until a safe method of storage or disposal is discovered,
such products should be kept to a minimum, and where they do exist, the
surest and safest alternative is to require users of such materials to store
them in a nearby facility affording the maximum possible containment,
monitorability and retrievability. Ideally, such facilities would be located
near the largest sources of high level radioactive wastes in order to mini-
mize the chance of spillage or loss when wastes are transported to storage
facilities.
The net result is that future nuclear free zone treaties would be best
to ban all storage or disposal except in monitored, retrievable storage fa-
cilities until an acknowledged safe method of disposal is discovered and
in use. In the meantime, the world (or a nuclear free zone) would do best
to bring the production of such materials to absolutely minimal levels
(i.e., necessary medical and scientific uses only).
E. Nuclear State Compliance
The extant nuclear free zone treaties have sought to obtain explicit
nuclear powers accession to the relevant parts of these treaties through
protocols. This device has been accepted by the nuclear powers, given the
requirement that nuclear free zones be regional undertakings.2 57 The first
of the two common protocols to the two extant treaties calls for adher-
ence to the relevant principles of the treaties by extra-regional states
which have iriternational responsibility for territory within the region.2 8
254. Id.
255. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 7, at 1447.
256. SPREP, supra note 52.
257. One of eight guidelines for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone, agreed
upon by the parties to the United Nations study on the subject, is that "[tihe initiative for
the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region con-
cerned, and participation must be voluntary." Comprehensive Study, supra note 7, at 31.
258. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocols 1, II, art. 2, at 360, 364; Treaty of
Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 1, art. 1, at 1459, and protocol 2, art. 2, at 1461.
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The second seeks assurance that the nuclear states will not assist any
treaty party in violating a provision of the treaty as well a promise not to
use nuclear weapons against treaty parties. 59 The Rarotonga Treaty in-
cludes a unique third protocol which asks nuclear states to refrain from
testing nuclear explosive devices throughout the region.
260
Additional protocols could be devised to obtain nuclear state acces-
sion to a broader range of treaty provisions. For example, being that the
nuclear transit questions are likely to be among the most difficult to en-
force, a pragmatic solution would be to attempt to secure a nuclear power
agreement to honor any such provisions contained in the treaty, as pro-
posed in Section III(A)(5) hereof.
Another possible protocol could seek nuclear power assurances that
they would not test nuclear capable delivery vehicles anywhere within the
zone. The working group to the SPNFZ expressed concern over the in-
creasing frequency of missile tests throughout the Pacific. " ' Such a pro-
tocol, however, raises two difficulties. It could be validly argued that the
same missiles which propel nuclear warheads can also be used to deliver
conventional warheads and satellites. Thus, perhaps intention is the only
way to distinguish acceptable versus unacceptable delivery systems. As to
the raison d'etre of such a protocol, it is not beyond the ken for a nuclear
free zone treaty to take whatever actions it can which may slow down the
growth in the global nuclear arms race. Certainly such a goal might fall
within the treaty's scope.
IV. THE MODEL NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
The Model Treaty (which appears in full in the Appendix to this
article) is one possible ideal approach. Its individual provisions will ap-
pear to some as reasonable objectives and to others as anti-nuclear ex-
tremes. If considered by any given nation-group somewhere in the world,
it may or may not find them pragmatic. Regardless, it is hoped the Model
Treaty will promote discussion, both in a general (or even academic)
sense and within the specific case or cases of regional groups contemplat-
ing the creation of nuclear free zone treaties.
The objective of this article is to contribute to and help foster dia-
logue, and in so doing and simultaneous thereto, expand the framework
and possibilities for these dialogues. If the result is that this analysis and
the Model Treaty provide nuclear free zone negotiators with just the
smallest bit of fodder, then this effort will have been a resounding
success.
What follows is an article-by-article discussion of the Model Treaty's
provisions with an emphasis on the objectives each would attempt to ac-
259. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol II, art. 3, at 364; Treaty of Rarotonga,
supra note 3, protocol 2, arts. 1-2, at 1461.
260. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 3, at 1463.
261. Working Group Report, supra note 65, at 27.
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complish should the Model Treaty be adopted. The discussion of the sub-
stantive articles of the Model Treaty will compare it to the Treaty of
Rarotonga. The complete Model Treaty is found at the Appendix.
Article 1. Renunciation of Nuclear Explosive Devices.
Article 1 is similar to Article 3262 of the Treaty of Rarotonga. Slightly
more expansive in its breadth, it prohibits the presence and use, in any
form, of nuclear explosive devices by anyone, anywhere within the zone.
Its scope is intended to be all inclusive.
Article 2. Prohibition of Nuclear Transit.
This article incorporates a total ban on the transit of nuclear pow-
ered ships and of any warship or military aircraft containing nuclear ex-
plosive devices anywhere through, over or upon any territory in the zone,
including that territory over which a treaty Party has jurisdiction, includ-
ing its territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. It adopts the language
suggested by the discussion in section III(A) above.
As well as prohibiting such transit, paragraph (c) of the article im-
poses a control system requirement on treaty parties in order to assure
their compliance with these provisions. These requirements are designed
to force foreign state compliance with the control system.
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty does not prohibit nu-
clear transit, though it does restrict the presence of nuclear explosive de-
vices and similar items from the zone of application.263 In addition, Arti-
cle 5(2)264 of the Treaty of Rarotonga allows each party to "decide for
itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and
airfields, [and] . . . territorial sea," so long as it is "in a manner not cov-
ered by the rights of innocent passage ... or transit passage of straits. 2 65
Article 3. Prevention of Dumping of Radioactive Wastes.
Unfortunately, even with the 1983 moratorium2 6 on the dumping of
radioactive wastes at sea (now under review26 7), the question of such
dumping is not academic. Article 3 treats the question of radioactive
waste dumping at sea, and goes far beyond. It prohibits dumping or stor-
age at any location which could contaminate water supplies or soil. It fur-
ther requires that radioactive wastes be stored in monitored, retrievable
and secure waste management facilities on or in land or structures built
thereon or therein. This provision goes well beyond the language of the
262. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 3, at 1444-45, is entitled "Renunciation of
Nuclear Explosive Devices."
263. Id. arts. 3-6 at 1444-46.
264. Id. art. 5(2) at 1446.
265. Id. (emphasis added).
266. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
267. Id.
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Treaty of Rarotonga limited solely to dumping.
One of the stickier questions confronting radioactive waste experts
today is what constitutes a sufficiently safe and secure waste management
facility. Some would defer to International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) standards, but these have proven relatively weak. One reason may
be that Article II of the Charter of the IAEA states that a main interest
and responsibility of the IAEA is the promotion of the expansion of the
nuclear industry.2 6 As long as this is one of the primary objectives of the
IAEA, it will continue to incorporate considerations of nuclear expansion
into its recommendations on waste disposal techniques. Thus, IAEA regu-
lations and standards cannot be credible as effective tools for the enforce-
ment of any effective nuclear free zone. Paragraph (d) of the article in
fact calls upon party states to support the development of more responsi-
ble nuclear-safeguard standards on the part of the IAEA.
The Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties require party states to con-
clude nuclear safeguard agreements with the IAEA.269 The Model Nuclear
Free Zone Treaty takes a more restrictive stand, calling on party states to
provide for "maximum" containment, safety and security (which should
be read to include a demonstration that sites selected for radioactive
waste storage will be afforded sufficiently restrictive access to eliminate,
as much as possible, the threat of terrorist attack or sabotage). Admit-
tedly, the standards contained in Article 3 are non-specific. If specific,
effective, workable standards existed, they would be included. As the
state of the art of radioactive waste disposal (not to mention other toxic
waste disposal) does not afford such standards, the best that can be
hoped for at the present time is for party states to police themselves and
one another in the spirit of the treaty in order to effectuate such maxi-
mum protections.
Nothing in this article would prevent any treaty party from availing
itself of the complaint and investigation procedures of Article 12 (Com-
plaints and Special Investigations) if it believed another treaty party to
be employing standards so weak as to be inconsistent with the Treaty.
This device would act as a further assurance of meaningful and maximal
protections and safeguards.
The article avoids any distinction between high and low level wastes.
Both present long-term and highly hazardous dangers. For practical pur-
poses it is felt that all radioactive wastes must be stored in maximally
safe conditions. To allow a lesser standard for low level wastes would tend
to minimize their perceived danger and, perhaps, have the effect of en-
couraging processes and products which generate such wastes.
268. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093,
T.I.A.S. 3873.
269. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, art. 13, at 340; Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note
3, art. 8(2)(c) at 1448, and annex 2 at 1455.
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Article 4. Peaceful Nuclear Activities.
While acknowledging the necessity of medical and non-military uses
of radioactive substances,7 5 Article 4 disallows the necessity of other
uses, including nuclear power. Its provisions would also prohibit the use
of nuclear isotope irradiation plants as food irradiators. (On the other
hand, hospital irradiators used exclusively for sterilizing food for medical
and sanitation purposes would be permitted)."' Protocol "A" takes a
slightly different approach with regard to the banning of specific uses and
products derived from or utilizing radioactive substances, such as fertiliz-
ers with high concentrations of phosphate, by providing a mechanism for
recognizing socially beneficial uses of some radioactive materials. But un-
less the protocol is adopted, the language of Article 4 will prohibit all
such uses.
This requirement goes far beyond that of the Rarotonga Treaty,
which is limited to support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and prevents
the provisions of source fissionable materials to non-nuclear states except
under IAEA safeguards.
Article 4 must be read in connection with the definition of radioac-
tive substance found in Article 6.
Article 5. Nuclear Weapons Systems.
This is the last substantive article of the Model Treaty, and is a con-
cept not included in the extant treaties. This article starts off with some
general language proclaiming the parties' seriousness and intent to en-
courage the eventual denuclearization of the entire planet. Except for the
last two paragraphs (h)-(i), the remaining paragraphs (d)-(g) explicitly
address and prohibit indirect ways in which treaty parties might partici-
pate in nuclear weapon development.
Paragraph (h) prohibits the use by any state of electronic surveil-
lance and command facilities (i.e., C3I) if used in connection with the
"performance, operation, targeting, testing, or efficiency of nuclear explo-
sive devices." As discussed in section III(B), this paragraph relies on the
good faith of the parties. As demonstrated in the cited section, seemingly
tougher language would likely result in less compliance with the spirit of
the Model Treaty than this more moderate wording.
Paragraph (i) essentially adopts the FANG Treaty272 principle on
military alliances, which prohibits defense alliances in which nuclear
270. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
271. Indeed, if it is determined that certain models or types of radioactive or scientific
reactors are particularly prone to abuse of the terms of the treaty, it would not be beyond
the scope of the treaty for the Parties to ban these reactors, either in the body of the treaty
itself or in a protocol or amendment. Such a preclusion might include, for example, the
Norwegian research reactor in Halden. See supra note 106.
272. FANG Treaty, supra note 68, art. l(f). See supra notes 221-28 and accompanying
text.
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weapons would be employed.
Article 6. Definitions and Terms.
"Nuclear explosive device" '73 and "stationing ' 274 are similar to those
definitions in the Treaty of Rarotonga. "Nuclear explosive device" is
designed to be all inclusive, banning all nuclear explosive devices of any
type, anywhere within the zone. Likewise, "stationing" is defined so as to
be equally inclusive of all methods of transporting or basing nuclear ex-
plosive devices. "Territory" is meant to be all inclusive of any land, sea,
subterranean and airspace territory over which a treaty Party has any
legal or juridical claims or right of claim. The nature of the whole treaty
is intended to be all inclusive, so such a definition of territory is good
shorthand if not a pragmatic necessity. "Radioactive substance" is like-
wise intended to be all inclusive. Its breadth includes any and all sub-
stances which are radioactive or contaminated with radioactivity.
Article 7. Zone of Application.
Paragraph (1) refers to Annex 1. Annex 1, which would be tailor-
made for the nation group considering the treaty, would contain the geo-
graphic definition and boundary of the zone covered by any treaty
adopted from this Model Treaty. Paragraph (2), along with Article 20,
would allow the expansion of the treaty zone to include adjacent states
not included in the original treaty boundary, when the conditions therein
specified are met or the broadening of the treaty zone by mutual incorpo-
ration with an adjoining nuclear free zone. (Article 20(2) would ensure
that the new treaty zone would have standards no less than those incor-
porated by the present treaty). This, of course, would further the goals of
global nuclear disarmament or a global or near-global nuclear free zone.
Recall that the two extant nuclear weapon free zones, plus the Antarctic
Treaty, form a single contiguous nuclear free zone comprising two-thirds
of the South Hemisphere as well as some territory in north-of-the-equa-
tor Central America. 275
Articles 8-10. Consultative Committee; Organization; Annual Meeting.
Articles 8-10 establish the organization of the Model Treaty. The
Consultative Committee is the main body of the treaty organization. It
consists of a representative of each treaty party. It makes virtually all
policy, investigative and remedial actions of the treaty organization. An
annual meeting is called for (Article 10), as well as non-scheduled meet-
ings as provided by Article 12.
The Organization (Article 9) is the housekeeping and central clearing
house of the treaty organization. The article calls for a Director and nec-
273. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 1(c), at 1444.
274. Id. art. 1(d).
275. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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essary (presumably small) staff. The Organization is responsible for coor-
dination and communication among the treaty Parties.
Article 11. Reports, Exchanges of Information and Freedom of
Information.
The concept of a nuclear free zone, as most international accords,
relies on the good faith of the parties. In order to facilitate the trust re-
quired to ensure the compliance with and reverence for a treaty of this
type, it is believed that maximal information sharing is essential. The
sharing of various reports and information, as called for by the article as
well as "ad hoc" documents, will also provide the confidence needed to
assure that not only are treaty parties adhering to the letter of the law,
but to its spirit as well, particularly in regard to their adherence to moni-
toring requirements of Article 2 (Transit). The article additionally calls
for the disclosure of all reports to the public at large except for those
documents explicitly made confidential under paragraph (5). An auto-
matic "sunset" provision allows for continuance of the confidential status
only on an annually renewable basis.
Article 12. Complaints and Special Investigations.
Another important element of the control system is a means of inves-
tigating alleged violations or breaches of the Model Treaty. Article 12
provides a mechanism to insure that complaints are heard and investiga-
tions carried out without interference and with the promise of the utmost
integrity.
It is felt that these provisions should be part of the main body of the
treaty, not an annex as they are in the Treaty of Rarotonga.2" 6 The South
Pacific Forum exhibited great apparent harmony among its members,2 7 7
probably accounting for the location of these provisions in the treaty's
annex. Though desirable, it is doubtful that few other regions can make
such a claim. Thus, positioning these provisions in the body of the treaty
is appropriate.
Articles 13-14. Corrective Actions; Settlement of Disputes.
Article 13 is an adjunct to Article 12 in that it provides the device for
corrective action to be taken should a complaint made under the provi-
sions of Article 12 prove true. Sanctions of a group of states against an-
other state are difficult to arrive at or enforce. Creativity may help those
in the future to arrive at equitable solutions. Paragraph (3) allows for
such solutions. It also lists as a possible action, which could be used
should the circumstances warrant, economic sanctions. Such sanctions
would likely be most effective where a trade relationship or mechanism is
276. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, annex 4, at 1456-59.
277. Fyfe & Beeby, supra note 2, at 35-37.
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already in place which would allow concerted effort against the aggrieving
party.
Article 14 provides for arbitration or, in the alternative, the adjudica-
tion of the International Court of Justice, should the aggrieving party fail
to comply with decisions reached under the provisions of Article 13.
Article 15. Amendment.
A two-thirds vote is required for amendments. The Treaty of Raro-
tonga calls for a unanimous vote before an amendment can be adopted2 7 8
Such an approach prevents tyranny of the majority, but so does a two-
thirds vote while still retaining some flexibility.
Article 16. Signature, Ratification and Deposit.
These are standard treaty provisions. Paragraph 1 holds the treaty
open for signature indefinitely. Paragraph 2 requires the treaty be ratified
by the treaty parties. Paragraph 3 specifies the Director of the Organiza-
tion as the Depositary of the Model Treaty once the treaty enters into
force. Until that time, the state archivist of the state in which the treaty
is signed shall serve as the depository.
Articles 17-18. Reservations; Duration and Withdrawal.
Such a treaty as this cannot permit reservations, nor should it termi-
nate after a period of time. It is hoped by the Model Treaty that such an
instrument would not be needed at some time in the future. No one
knows when or if that time will come. The permanency of this agreement
demonstrates the commitment and determination of the treaty parties to
a nuclear free world. To say that after so many years we will reconsider
our decision to refrain from building or using nuclear weapons does little
to build confidence in one's treaty partners.
Permitting reservations, or a provision allowing states to be free from
formally being bound until all possible treaty parties have ratified the
treaty as is the case with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 27 9 leads to inconsistent
results and the denigration of the treaty's credibility. Indeed, both Brazil
and Argentina 280 are believed to have been undertaking substantial re-
search and development in nuclear energy and nuclear explosions. How-
ever, the two Latin American states have been engaged in a confidence
building dialogue to open each other's nuclear facilities to one another.
28 1
278. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 11, at 1449.
279. Article 28(2) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, at 354, provides that the
treaty does not enter into force until all states eligible have ratified the treaty or its proto-
cols. It also allows states to waive this requirement. Id. art. 28(2). Chile and Brazil are the
only Latin American states to have not exercised this waiver. Martinez Cobo, The Tlatelolco
Treaty: An Update, 26 INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY BULL. 25, 26 (Sept. 1984).
280. L. Spector, supra note 16, at 179-214.
281. Id. at 183-186.
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Article 19. Entry Into Force.
The Treaty of Tlatelolco enters into force when all states within the
region ratify the treaty.2 2 This may never happen. In eighteen years Ar-
gentina has not ratified the treaty, Cuba and Guyana have not signed
it,2" 3 and France has not ratified Protocol I. In order to facilitate entry
into force, the Model Treaty requires ratification by only two-thirds of
the signatories.
Article 20. Extension of the Nuclear Free Zone.
Article 20 contains unique provisions designed to accommodate the
growth of nuclear free zones. At some future point it may be more appro-
priate for individual states to join with neighboring nuclear free zones.
For example, a hypothetical, future independent New Caledonia (by
whatever name it may be known if and when it obtains independence
from France), which lies within the region encompassed by the SPNFZ,
might want to join that treaty. The Treaty of Rarotonga allows for this
possibility if that non-treaty state is a member of the South Pacific Fo-
rum.2"4 Perhaps not even this kind of condition should be required of a
state which seeks to join a nuclear free zone.
Similarly, it is conceivable that neighboring nuclear free zones would
find it desirable to "join forces," as it were. Article 20(2) allows for that
possibility while insuring the standards of the treaty are not diminished
by such a union. For example, a single, truly nuclear free entity compris-
ing the South Pacific and Latin America zones, spanning two-thirds of
the Southern Hemisphere's oceans, would be an extraordinary political
presence. Article 20 works in conjunction with Article 7.
Article 21. Authentic Text.
Here would be stated the language(s) of the authentic or official texts
of the treaty.
282. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, art. 28, at 352, 356.
283. A territorial dispute between Venezuela, the United Kingdom and Guyana, cou-
pled with Article 25(2) of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which prohibits a political entity from
admission to treaty when its territory is subject to dispute involving and "extra-continental"
entity, prevents Guyana's participation.
284. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, art. 12(3):
If a member of the South Pacific Forum whose territory is outside the South
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone becomes a Party to this Treaty, Annex 1 [describing
the area encompassing the treaty] shall be deemed to be amended so far as
required to enclose at least the territory of that Party within the boundaries of
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The delineation of any area added pursu-
ant to this paragraph shall be approved by the South Pacific Forum.
Id. at 1450.
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Annex 1.
Here would be the geographical definition of the zone of application
of the treaty.
Protocol A.
This protocol is a little unusual. First of all, unlike the numbered
protocols which follow and those of the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Trea-
ties, it applies to states party to the main treaty. Second, it modifies a
provision of the treaty: unless the protocol has entered into force, the
more restrictive language of Article 4 will be in full force.
The hardened nuclear opponent would oppose any non-medical and
non-scientific use of radioactive substances. But there are scores of prod-
ucts utilizing radioactive substances and the list is growing monthly.
Some of those products may be of great value. A blanket prohibition is
thus too restrictive for many. Protocol A provides for a case-by-case re-
view, replacing the virtual prohibition of Article 4 if it stood by itself. The
Protocol will require the parties to vote on every product to be permitted
(or prohibited). (This in no way would prohibit an individual state from
imposing stricter domestic rules.) Every non-approved item would thus
be considered specifically excluded.
Protocols 1-3.
These protocols are essentially identical to those of the Treaty of Ra-
rotonga with two exceptions. Whereas Protocol 2 of the extant treaties
does not apply to all of the treaty's prohibitions and obligations (which
could be applicable) to the Protocol, the Model Treaty does. If a nuclear
power is asked to give its assurance of respect for the Treaty, it should be
asked to do so for all treaty obligations. Otherwise there would be "loop-
holes" which would render the treaty less effective and the protocols less
meaningful.
The Treaty of Rarotonga permits a protocol-ratifying party to with-
draw from the protocol "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to
the subject matter of [the] protocol, have jeopardised [sic] its supreme
interests."2 ' This language allows the nuclear powers a sizable loophole
by giving them the ability to opt-out of protocol compliance virtually at
will. It was included in the Rarotonga protocols in order to insure their
ratification by the United States and the other Western nuclear powers.
They refused to sign the protocols anyway.2 6 If the intent of a nuclear
free zone treaty is to maintain the nuclear freedom of the region, a nu-
clear power which ratifies the protocol should not be given the assurance
that it can back out of compliance on the mere declaration that its "su-
preme interests" are jeopardized. The Model Treaty eliminates this loop-
285. Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 1, art. 5, passim.
286. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
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hole in each extra-zonal state protocol by simply stating that the "...
Protocol is permanent in nature and shall remain in force indefinitely."
Protocols -5 would apply to all nuclear powers. While the Model
Treaty specifies that the protocols are open to France, China, the Soviet
Union, Great Britain and the United States, there is no reason they could
include the near-nuclear and "unofficial" nuclear powers. Like the Raro-
tonga and Tlatelolco protocols, the Model Treaty calls for entry into force
of the protocols for each nuclear power upon deposit of their instrument
of ratification2
87
The protocols do not require protocol parties to automatically accede
to Amendments to the Model Treaty.
Protocols 4-5.
The Model Treaty contains the two additional protocols discussed in
Section I(E). Being that the law of the sea-related proposals of Section
III(A) most likely will be among the most difficult to enforce, it makes
sense to attempt to secure nuclear power agreement to honor those provi-
sions. Protocol 4 would accomplish this objective. To avoid perceived su-
perpower imbalance and to facilitate their accession to the protocol it
would not come into force for any nuclear power until all have deposited
their instruments of ratification, unlike the other protocols which come
into force for each state upon deposit of their instrument of ratification.
The last protocol, Protocol 5, seeks another nuclear power assurance:
that they will not test nuclear capable delivery vehicles anywhere through
or within the zone.
V. CONCLUSION
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty are courageous and pow-
erful statements. Not only do they warrant to prohibit nuclear weapons
(and more, in the case of the South Pacific treaty) from the regions in
question, but they also sent - and continue to send - a message to the
nuclear-weapon-states that their nuclear weapons policies are a threat to
the security and existence of the treaty parties, as well as of the whole
world.
Our planet is far from being nuclear-free. Even in this post-Cold War
era, many feel that it is doubtful that Earth will ever see such a day
again. But it is also certain that greater steps can be taken to reduce the
dangers of nuclear war and radioactive poisoning from befalling those
states so desiring. Many countries around the world have expressed this
desire, including the parties to the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties.
The realities of international politics, of course, have prevented more
287. See, e.g., Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 5, protocol I, art. 3, at 362; Treaty of
Rarotonga, supra note 3, protocol 1, art. 5, at 1460.
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nations from forming nuclear-free zones, as well as unilaterally declaring
themselves to be nuclear free. The history of debate in the United Na-
tions attests to this. 88 Still, two such treaties are in force.
The debate over nuclear free zones is growing constantly stronger.289
The ASEAN states are already considering the formation of a nuclear
free zone. 29" Future nuclear free zones will surely provide greater protec-
tions than the Treaty of Rarotonga, just as that treaty provided signifi-
cant protections not found in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The new provi-
sions that these new treaties will include are impossible to predict. But
leaders in this movement have an obligation to propel the debate forward
by analyzing the existing treaties in order to identify their strengths as
well as areas where improved security can be had. That role involves sug-
gesting goals which national leaders may aim for, including discussion to
shape future treaties. It also requires helping to provide arguments for
propelling these proposals forward. That is the province of this essay and
the Model Treaty.
The Model Treaty was written with the objective of producing a
workable framework, both for the principals in future negotiations, as
well as other, more "distant" contributors to the discussion. That the pro-
posals may seem extreme to some is, in part, due to idealism. It also dem-
onstrates how far a group of states have to go to achieve comprehensive
nuclear freedom.
The purpose here is not to suggest that such a result can be easily
achieved. Or that the process will be relatively pain-free. Or that the end
product will be readily accepted by the world political order. The con-
trary is the far more likely result, at least initially. We already know that
some world powers have not smiled favorably upon the relatively mild
Treaty of Rarotonga.29 ' There will be fallout with regard to the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III, IV, V or whatever). And some geographically dis-
tant allies may feel compelled to reconsider the status of alliances.
Whether consideration of or entry into a nuclear free zone treaty is
the right course for a given state is beyond the scope of this article. For
the state that does venture down that path, this article has attempted to
make clear that, despite these concerns, such a course is fully justified
and wholly defensible. In the context of international law, adopting and
adhering to a nuclear free zone treaty, such as the Model Treaty herein, is
legally supportable.
288. See infra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., infra notes 69-84, 99 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 6.
291. See infra notes 69-82 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
MODEL NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY
PREAMBLE
In the name of their peoples and faithfully interpreting their desires
and aspirations, the Governments of the States which sign this Model
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,
Recalling Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which holds
that it is the "right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories,"
Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly, in its Resolu-
tion 808(ix), adopted unanimously, as one of the three points of a co-
ordinated program of disarmament; "the total prohibition of the use and
manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of
every type,"
Recalling that the United Nations First Special Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly on Disarmament, in its unanimously-adopted Final Docu-
ment, declared that "the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones on
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region
concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure," that "the
process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should
be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely
free of nuclear weapons," that "the States participating in such zones
should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and
principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus
ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons," and that
"with respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called
upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated
with the competent authority of each zone, in particular: (a) to strictly
respect the status of the nuclear-weapon-free-zone; (b) to refrain from the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone,"
Recalling the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America, the first regional treaty creating a zone free from the dan-
gers of nuclear weapons,
Recalling the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, declaring that
region to be free of all nuclear explosive devices and radioactive waste
dumping, and
Convinced that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is a threat to
life and civilization as we know it and that the presence of such weapons
on, in or near any sovereign territory, places that territory under direct
risk of suffering a nuclear attack,
Convinced that the existence of any nuclear explosive device, or ships
or aircraft carrying any nuclear explosive device, or support facilities for
such weapons, ships or aircraft, within the territory, territorial sea or
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ocean straits of any State, makes that State, and the region, a potential
target for nuclear attack, and thus such devices, ships and aircraft are
prejudicial to the peace, good order and security, and a threat to the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of that state,
Convinced that any aircraft or ship containing any radioactive sub-
stance is fully capable of inadvertently leaking or otherwise discharging
that material through some accident, design flaw, human carelessness or
attack, and is thus an unnecessary and potentially life-threatening danger
to all life through which it passes and transits, and is thus an unconscion-
able and an unacceptable risk to the protection and preservation of the
marine environment,
Convinced that any aircraft or ship containing any radioactive sub-
stance is not immune from intentionally discharging that material,
whether arising from an emergency situation or otherwise,
Convinced that there is no justifiable purpose for any kind of nuclear
explosive device, that there is no acceptable basis for the continued test-
ing of nuclear explosive devices and that they are a source of needless
radioactive contamination,
Convinced that radioactive substances are extremely hazardous and
pose a substantial danger to all life, that there is a grave, substantial risk
of contamination associated with the storage of such materials and in par-
ticular radioactive wastes, and that the risks of exposure to such dangers
must be minimized to the greatest extent practicable,
Convinced that nuclear power is an uneconomical and potentially
dangerous source of electricity which rarely, if ever, provides benefits
which are outweighed by the costs, risks and hardships nuclear power fa-
cilities create,
Convinced that a nuclear free zone is an appropriate and desirable
way for non-nuclear States to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons
as well as protect their inhabitants from the scourge of nuclear weapons
and nuclear pollution,
Convinced, as were the signers to the first Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
in Tlatelolco that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is inevitable unless
States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions, on
themselves in order to prevent it,
Finally,
Determined to support the creation of nuclear free zones wherever in
the world States come together to protect their interests and insure their
survival and vitality,
Determined that it is in the interests of the people of this world, and
of all mankind, that this region shall forever be free from armed conflict,
and
Determined, in light of the risks detailed above, that the establish-
ment of a nuclear free zone is the best way to reduce the risks associated
with nuclear weapons, nuclear pollution and nuclear contamination, as
1990
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
well as provide for the secure and healthy future of this people of this
region,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
Each Party undertakes:
(a) not to manufacture, acquire, possess, test, use, or have any con-
trol whatsoever over any nuclear explosive device, directly or indirectly,
anywhere in the world;
(b) not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture, acquisi-
tion, possession, testing, or use of any nuclear explosive device;
(c) to prevent the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere in
its territory, territorial sea or Exclusive Economic Zone;
(d) not to encourage, authorize, or otherwise assist, directly or indi-
rectly, in any way, in the manufacture, acquisition, possession, testing,
use or control of any nuclear explosive device whatsoever by any State,
whether or not a Party to this Treaty; and
(e) to prohibit and prevent the storage, use, installation, deployment,
stationing or possession of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within
their territory, as defined in Article 6, paragraph 3 of this Treaty, inside
or outside the Nuclear Free Zone, by any State, whether or not a Party to
this Treaty or its Protocols.
ARTICLE 2
PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR TRANSIT
Each Party undertakes:
(a) to accept and abide by the principle here stated that the transit
or passage through any waters or airspace of any ship or aircraft whose
propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power:
(i) is prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal
State;
(ii) by virtue of its presence, is a threat against the sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and political independence of a coastal state or a State
bordering a strait; and
(iii) is a direct and immediate threat to, and cannot comport and
accord with, protection and preservation of the marine environment.
(b) to prevent and prohibit visits by foreign warships and military
aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft,
and navigation by foreign warships in its territorial sea, archipelagic wa-
ters, straits and other seas claimed by it, inside or outside the Nuclear
Free Zone, when such ships or aircraft carry nuclear explosive devices of
any kind, whether activated or not;
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(c) to require that, prior to granting transit or visitation privileges to
its ports, airfields, airspace or sea territory, to a foreign warship or mili-
tary aircraft, the foreign State of whose forces such warship or aircraft are
a part must request permission to transit or visit the Party's ports, air-
fields, airspace or sea territory with adequate advance notice of such
transit or visitation as to assure orderly processing of the request:
(i) failure to provide adequate notice to allowing orderly processing
of such a request shall result in automatic denial of the transit or visita-
tion rights requested;
(ii) each Party to this treaty shall develop a procedure for processing
such requests, and that procedure shall be communicated to all other
Parties to this Treaty, to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
and to the Governments of all nations known to have nuclear capabilities;
and
(iii) all such foreign warships and military aircraft transitting or vis-
iting a Party's claimed seas, ports and airfield shall be open to inspection
for the purposes of verifying the non-presence of nuclear explosive de-
vices upon request of the Party or any other Party to this Treaty when
any such party has reason to believe such foreign warship or military air-
craft is in violation of this Treaty.
ARTICLE 3
PREVENTION OF DUMPING AND USE OF RADIOACTIVE SUB-
STANCES AND FISSION PRODUCTS
Each Party undertakes:
(a) to prevent the storage, dumping or disposal of any radioactive
wastes and any other radioactive substances by anyone in its sea terri-
tory, or on or in any other body of water, any alluvial lands, any riparian
lands, any lands adjacent to a watershed or subterranean stream, river or
lake, any lands possibly subject to flooding, or any land where, if exposed,
radioactive substances could leach into the surrounding or nearby soil,
strata or water;
(b) to prevent the storage or disposal of radioactive waste materials
except in monitored retrievable and secure radioactive waste management
facilities on or in the land or in structures built thereon or therein, and
when stored in a manner which can be shown to the satisfaction of com-
petent national bodies of all states party to afford the maximum in:
(i) containment of radioactive materials from the environment;
(ii) safety of workers and the public;
(iii) security from terrorism and theft;
(iv) accessibility to permit expert inspection and supervision;
(v) monitoribility to ensure the early detection of any failure to meet
the above criteria; and
(vi) retrievability in the event of the detection of any such failure.
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The onus of proof in demonstrating that these criteria be fulfilled for
the duration of the design life of the facility shall lie with the prospective
operators of the proposed facility.
(c) not to take any action to assist, encourage or support the dump-
ing or disposal by anyone of radioactive wastes and any other radioactive
substances, except as expressly permitted by this Treaty, anywhere
within the Nuclear Free Zone or in any other place;
(d) to call upon the United Nations and the International Atomic
Energy Agency to abandon, as one of its purposes, the promotion of the
expansion of the nuclear industry and the development of standards af-
fording maximal safeguards and protections as would be consistent with
Article 3.
ARTICLE 4
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
1.(a) The Parties undertake to prohibit the planning, construction
and use of all nuclear reactors, whether on land or in ships, other than
nuclear reactors required for medical or non-military scientific purposes,
except those already in full service and used for the generation of electri-
cal power at the date of the conclusion of this Treaty.
(b) Reactors required for medical or non-military scientific purposes,
as permitted in Paragraph (a) of this Article 4, shall not be utilized for
any other purpose.
(c) Each Party shall shut down and begin dismantling all other nu-
clear reactors within one year of that Party's ratification of this Treaty.
Constructed but not yet fully operational nuclear reactors, other than
those medical and non-scientific reactors permitted in Paragraph (a) of
this Article 4, will not be placed into operation.
2. Except as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article and Protocol A of
this Treaty, the Parties agree that there shall be no use of nuclear or
radioactive substances within their territory or anywhere within the Nu-
clear Free Zone.
ARTICLE 5
NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
Each Party undertakes:
(a) to support and encourage the complete nuclear disarmament of
this planet;
(b) to support the continued and enhanced effectiveness of the inter-
national non-proliferation and anti-nuclearization systems based on the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the several Nuclear-Free and Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties;
(c) to support and encourage the formation of other nuclear free zone
treaties, particular those proposed for regions contiguous to the Nuclear
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Free Zone created and encompassed by this Treaty;
(d) to prevent the testing of any delivery vehicle or other device
designed or intended to carry or deploy nuclear explosive devices through
or over its territory;
(e) to discourage the testing of any delivery vehicle or device
designed or intended to carry, guide or deploy nuclear explosive devices
through or over any territory or seas anywhere within the Nuclear Free
Zone;
(f) to prevent and prohibit the development, manufacture or produc-
tion of any delivery vehicle or other device, in whole or in any part
thereof, designed or intended to carry, guide or deploy nuclear explosive
devices, by anyone within its territory;
(g) not to participate in any way in the testing, use, design, manufac-
ture, production, possession or control of any nuclear explosive device by
anyone or any State, directly or indirectly;
(h) to prohibit the use by any State of facilities carrying out com-
mand, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, navigation, re-
search or other functions, located anywhere on its territory, when em-
ployed for aiding the performance, operation, targeting, testing, or
efficiency of nuclear explosive devices; and
(i) not to participate or enter into any military or defense alliance
under which nuclear weapons would be used in defense of or with the
cooperation of any Party.
ARTICLE 6
DEFINITIONS AND TERMS
For purposes of this Treaty:
1. "Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other de-
vice capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for
which it could be or is intended to be used, and includes any such device
in any stage of assembly or disassembly.
2. "Nuclear Free Zone" means zone of application of this treaty as
defined in Annex 1 and Articles 7 and 20 of this Treaty.
3. "Territory" means the land territory, bodies of water thereon, ter-
ritorial sea, exclusive economic zone, and any other land or sea territory
claimed by a Party to this Treaty, as well as the airspace and subterra-
nean and sub-ocean surface area demarcated by that territory. "Sea terri-
tory" means any part of a Party's territory other than land.
4. "Stationing" means emplacement, home porting, deployment,
stockpiling, transportation on land, in the air or at sea, emplantation,
storage, installation or other physical presence.
5. "Radioactive substance" means any fissionable material, fission
products, fission by-products, spent radioactive or nuclear material, the
waste products from any fission reaction or any radioactive substances,
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raw and source materials which can be processed into such substances,
items contaminated by such substances, and materials or products whose
value is due either wholly or in part to their radioactivity or their inclu-
sion of radioactive material.
6. "Nuclear reactor" is any device or structure capable of containing
a controlled nuclear fission chain reaction.
7. "Party" means any State which has deposited its instrument of
ratification to this Treaty with the Depository of this Treaty. "Associate
Party" means any State which has deposited its instrument of ratification
to any of the Protocols to this Treaty with the Depository.
ARTICLE 7
ZONE OF APPLICATION
1. This Treaty and its protocols shall apply to the whole of the terri-
tory within the Nuclear Free Zone as defined in Annex 1.
2. The zone of application of this Treaty may be extended to other
contiguous areas by amendment of this Treaty, including but not limited
to:
(a) Parties outside the Nuclear Free Zone as defined in Annex 1
which accede to this Treaty after its conclusion and signing, as provided
in Article 20(1); and
(b) the consolidation of adjoining nuclear free zone and nuclear
weapon free zone treaties with this Treaty, as provided in Article 20(2).
ARTICLE 8
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
1. There is hereby established a Consultative Committee. The Con-
sultative Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of
the Parties. The Consultative Committee shall be chaired by the repre-
sentative to the Consultative Committee of the Party which last hosted
the annual meeting of the Consultative Committee as prescribed in Arti-
cle 10 of this Treaty. Each representative to the Consultative Committee,
at the Committee's annual meeting and other meetings as may be called,
may be accompanied by advisors.
2. A quorum shall be constituted by representatives of one half the
Parties. Except as otherwise provided by this Treaty, decisions of the
Consultative Committee shall be taken by consensus or, if failing consen-
sus, by a two-thirds majority vote of those present and voting. The Con-
sultative Committee shall adopt such other rules of procedure as it sees
fit.
3. All meetings of the Consultative Committee shall be open to each
Party to the Treaty.
4. Without prejudice to the conduct of consultations among Parties
by other means, at the written request of one-third of the Parties to this
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Treaty requesting a meeting of the Consultative Committee for the same
purpose, the Director of the Organization shall convene a meeting of the
Consultative Committee as soon as possible.
ARTICLE 9
ORGANIZATION
1. The Parties hereby establish an organization to oversee and facil-
itate compliance with this Treaty. The organization shall be known as the
Nuclear Free Zone Organization, hereinafter referred to as the
"Organization."
2. The Organization shall consist of a Director and necessary staff to
conduct its affairs. The Director shall be elected for a term of five years
by a vote of the Consultative Committee.
3. The Organization shall maintain offices at the city where this
Treaty was signed.
4. The Organization shall be responsible for:
(a) scheduling and holding annual meetings as provided under Arti-
cle 10;
(b) coordinating consultations among Parties and investigations as
provided for under Article 11;
(c) disseminating all communications, including reports and ex-
changes of information, between Parties, as provided under Articles 12
and 13, as well as to other international organizations and the world pub-
lic at large, as provided elsewhere in this treaty.
ARTICLE 10
ANNUAL MEETING
1. An annual meeting of the Consultative Committee shall be held for
the purpose of reviewing operations of the past and upcoming year, in-
cluding budgeting and activities of the Director and of the Organization.
The annual meeting shall be chaired by the representative to the Organi-
zation of each Party in rotation in successive years. The meeting shall
take place at a location within the territory of, and at the choosing of,
that Party.
2. The Director shall report to the annual meeting on the status of
this Treaty and all matters arising under or in relation to it, including all
matters and communications made under Articles 11 through 15.
ARTICLE 11
REPORTS, EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION, AND FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION
1. Each Party and Associate Party shall submit to the Director an-
nual reports stating that no activity prohibited under this Treaty or the
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Protocols it has signed has occurred in their respective territories (in the
case of Associate Parties, with respect to territory with the Nuclear Free
Zone). The Director shall circulate such reports to all Parties and Associ-
ate Parties.
2. Each Party and Associate Party shall report to the Director as
soon as possible, and prior to, an event occurring within its jurisdiction
which may affect the implementation or efficacy of this Treaty. The Di-
rector shall circulate such reports to all Parties and Associate Parties as
quickly as possible.
3. The Parties shall undertake to keep each other informed on mat-
ters arising under or in relation to this Treaty. They may exchange infor-
mation by communicating it to the Director, who shall circulate it to all
Parties.
4. The Parties shall report to the Director all suspected incidents of
violations of the Nuclear Free Zone by ships and aircraft powered by or
containing nuclear reactors, or which are capable of carrying nuclear ex-
plosive devices of any kind which have not provided unequivocal declara-
tions that the they do not carry nuclear explosive devices, as provided in
Article 2.
5. All reports prepared by the Director, the Consultative Committee,
Parties, Associate Parties, other non-Parties, the IAEA, and by Special
Investigation Teams, relating to any matter arising under or in relation to
this Treaty or violations of its provisions, shall be made freely and
promptly available to any citizen of any Party, as well as to the United
Nations Secretary-General. The only exceptions shall be individual re-
ports which the Consultative Committee votes explicitly not to make
public. The Consultative Committee may vote on an annual basis to keep
a given report from the public. Otherwise, such reports shall be made
public after one year from the date of the last vote not to make the report
public.
ARTICLE 12
COMPLAINTS AND SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
1. The Consultative Committee shall have the power to carry out spe-
cial investigations anywhere within the Nuclear Free Zone when re-
quested by any Party which reasonably suspects that:
(a) another Party has taken action or is about to take action inconsis-
tent with this Treaty,
(b) an Associate Party has taken or is about to take action inconsis-
tent with the Protocols to this Treaty to which it is a party, or
(c) a non-Party is engaging in some activity inconsistent with this
Treaty while within the Nuclear Free Zone.
2. Any such complaint shall first be brought to the attention of the
Director who shall then convene a meeting of the Consultative Committee
as soon as practicable. Upon consideration of the claim and having al-
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lowed the Party (or Associate Party) charged with a breach or potential
brach of its obligation an opportunity to respond to the claim, the Con-
sultative Committee may decide, by consensus or simple majority vote of
all Parties present excluding the complained of Party, to commence an
investigation of the claim. The Consultative Committee shall determine
the scope of the investigation.
3. Such investigation shall commence forthwith and shall be con-
ducted by a special investigation team of three to five suitably qualified
special investigators appointed by the Consultative Committee in consul-
tation with the complained of (if a Party to this treaty) and complaining
Parties and the Director, provided that no national of either Party shall
serve on the special investigation team. If so requested by the complained
of Party, the investigation team may be accompanied by representatives
of that Party. Neither the right of consultation on the appointment of
special investigators, nor the right to accompany special investigators,
shall delay or impede the expedient work of the special investigation
team.
4. Each Party shall give to all special investigators full and free ac-
cess to all places, persons, and information which it may deem relevant or
necessary to enable it to conduct its investigation. Special investigators
shall be the sole determiners of which places, persons, and information
are relevant or necessary to their investigation, as well as all reasonable
and humane methods, respectful of basic human rights to be employed in
conducting their investigation.
5. The Party complained of shall take appropriate steps to facilitate
the special investigation, and shall grant to special investigators, privi-
leges and immunities necessary for the performance of their functions,
including inviolability for all papers and documents, and immunity from
arrest, detention and legal process for words spoken and written, and
places visited, in connection with the special investigation.
6. The special investigation team shall report in writing as quickly as
possible to the Consultative Committee, outlining its activities, setting
out relevant facts and information, with supporting evidence and docu-
mentation as appropriate, and stating their conclusions and recommenda-
tions. The report shall be communicated to all Parties and Associate Par-
ties to this Treaty, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
as provided under Article 11.
7. If a complainant declares to the Director that the complaint con-
stitutes an emergency and provides sufficient grounds for that belief, the
Director may appoint and dispatch a special investigation team, as other-
wise provided in paragraph 3 above, within 24 hours of receipt of the
complaint. A meeting of the Consultative Committee will be called and
convened as soon as possible, at which time the Consultative Committee
may review the scope of the special investigation team appointed by the
Director and provide further delineation of the scope of the investigation.
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ARTICLE 13
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1. Upon presentation of the investigation team's report, the Consult-
ative Committee shall take whatever reasonable corrective action it
deems necessary to bring the situation, if inconsistent with this Treaty,
into compliance with the Treaty, or to prevent an action which would be
inconsistent with this Treaty. The Consultative Committee may also take
whatever reasonable action it deems necessary in order to insure peace,
security and protection of the environment. If the complained of State is
a non-Party or Associate Party to this Treaty, its compliance to the above
procedures shall be sought.
2. If a Party determined to have acted in a way inconsistent with this
Treaty by the Consultative Committee fails to adhere to the Consultative
Committee's corrective actions or other recommendations regarding that
violation, the Dispute Settlement Procedures, as provided for in Article
13, shall be called into force unless otherwise determined.
3. If any non-Party or Associate Party fails to comply with the Con-
sultative Committee's corrective actions as provided for under Paragraph
1 of this Article, or if any Party to this Treaty fails to comply with any
directives or correction actions provided for under Paragraph 2 of this
Article, then all Parties to this Treaty will undertake to compel such com-
pliance by such peaceful means as may be deemed necessary and appro-
priate, including but not limited to suspension of all economic privileges
granted that State and products of national origin of that State, until
that party complies with the above procedures, the complaint is found to
be without grounds, or remedial or disciplinary action recommended by
the Consultative Committee has been effectively carried out. Nothing in
this paragraph shall be construed so as to directly violate provisions of
any valid and binding multilateral treaty, the sole or primary subject of
which is international trade.
ARTICLE 14
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
1. In the case of a Party to this Treaty determined to have acted in a
way inconsistent with this Treaty by the Consultative Committee which
fails to adhere to the Consultative Committee's corrective actions or other
recommendations regarding that violation, the Parties involved shall un-
dertake to submit the decision to arbitration. An arbitration panel shall
be selected as follows: The aggrieving Party and the Consultative Com-
mittee shall each appoint an arbitrator of their choosing, who shall then
select a third arbitrator to complete the panel, which shall arbitrate the
dispute.
2. If in the above situation an agreeable arbitration panel cannot be
found and unless the Parties concerned agree on another mode of peace-
ful settlement, the Parties and the Consultative Committee shall submit
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the matter to the adjudication of the International Court of Justice.
ARTICLE 15
AMENDMENT
The Consultative Committee shall consider proposals for amendment to
this Treaty proposed by any Party as communicated to the Director. The
Director shall circulate the proposed amendment to all Parties not less
than three months prior to the convening of the Consultative Committee
for this purpose. Any proposal agreed upon by a two-thirds vote of the
present members of the Consultative Committee shall be communicated
to the Director, who shall circulate it for acceptance to all Parties.
Amendments adopted shall enter into force thirty days after receipt by
the Depositary of acceptances from two-thirds of the Parties.
ARTICLE 16
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND DEPOSIT
1. This Treaty shall be open indefinitely for signature by all States
situated within the area defined by Annex 1 and Articles 7 and 20.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States.
3. The state archivist of the state in which this treaty is concluded
and signed is hereby designated Depositary of this Treaty and its Proto-
cols, and respective Instruments of Ratification until such time as the
Treaty is entered into force as provided in Article 19 and the first Direc-
tor of the Organization is appointed, at which time the Director will
thereby be designated Depositary of this Treaty and its Protocols, and
respective Instruments of Ratification.
4. The Depositary shall transmit certified copies of this Treaty and
its Protocols to the Governments of all signatory States and all States
eligible to become Parties to the Protocols to the Treaty, and shall notify
them of signatures and ratifications of the Treaty and its Protocols.
ARTICLE 17
RESERVATIONS
This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 18
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
This Treaty shall be of permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
ARTICLE 19
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the
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instrument of ratification amounting to two-thirds of the signatories to
the Treaty.
2. For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date this Treaty
comes into force, the Treaty shall enter into force on the date of deposit
of its instrument of ratification.
ARTICLE 20
EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
1. If a state whose territory is contiguous with the zone of application
of this Treaty seeks to become a Party to this Treaty, that state shall
make written application to the Director. The Director shall circulate the
application to all Parties not less than three months prior to the conven-
ing of the Consultative Committee for this purpose. Upon a decision of
the Consultative Committee to accept the application, that State shall be
invited to become a Party to and sign the Treaty. Upon deposit of its
instrument of ratification, the state shall become a Party to the Treaty as
provided in Article 19(2).
2. Upon the two-thirds vote of the Consultative Committee and a
similar vote by the appropriate decision-making body of a contiguous nu-
clear free zone or nuclear weapon free zone treaty organization, a broader
nuclear free zone shall be declared by the Parties to those Treaties. The
Consultative Committee will undertake consideration of such, if and only
if the result of a positive vote and the joint effort:
(a) would serve the purposes of both treaties;
(b) that the rights and obligations prescribed by this Treaty will not
in any way be diluted or their effectiveness in any way compromised, and
that they, at minimum will apply to all Parties of both treaties anyplace
within the zone of application of this Treaty or the other treaty;
(c) that the broader nuclear free zone will not obviate this Treaty;
and
(d) that the Parties and organs of both treaties will work together to
enforce the strongest nuclear prohibitory provisions of both treaties
within the broader nuclear free zone.
ARTICLE 21
AUTHENTIC TEXT
This Treaty, of which the [insert appropriate languages] texts are equally
authentic, shall be registered by the Depositary in accordance with Arti-
cle 102 of the United Nations Charter. The Depositary shall notify the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the signatures, ratifications
and amendments relating to this Treaty.
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ANNEX 1
NUCLEAR FREE ZONE
The Nuclear Free Zone contains all of the land and water territories with
the area bounded by a line -
[insert geographic bounds of zone of application].
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE MODEL NUCLEAR FREE
ZONE TREATY
PROTOCOL A
The Parties to this Protocol,
Being Parties to the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes to prohibit the entry, development, manufacture,
use, storage, sale and distribution within the Territory of each Party as
that term is defined in Article 6 of the Treaty except those radioactive
substances or items containing or made of, in whole or in part, of any
radioactive substance,
(a) required for medical and non-military and scientific purposes;
and
(b) other items of great value to society for which there are no suita-
ble non-radioactive substitutes as determined by Article 4.
Article 2
The Consultative Committee shall be the sole organ capable of determin-
ing which items are of great value to society and for which there are no
suitable non-radioactive substitutes. Such determination shall be made
by a two-thirds majority vote of the Consultative Committee.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature to all signatories to the Treaty.
Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol shall remain in force until it is denounced by one-half of
the signatories to this Protocol.
Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the instru-
ment of ratification amounting to two-thirds of the signatories of the
Treaty. For a signatory which ratifies this Protocol after the date this
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Treaty comes into force, the Protocol shall enter into force on the date of
deposit of its instrument of ratification.
PROTOCOL 1
The Parties to the this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it
is internationally responsible and which are situated within the Nuclear
Free Zone, the prohibitions contained in Articles 1 through 5, and the
reporting, complaint and settlement procedures specified in Articles
11(1), 11(2), 11(5), (12), 13(1) and 13(3).
Article 2
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature by [all States which are, de jure
or de facto, internationally responsible for territories within the Nuclear
Free Zone].
Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its de-
posit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification.
PROTOCOL 2
The Parties to this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use any nuclear explosive
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device against:
a) Parties to the Treaty, or
b) any territory within the Nuclear Free Zone for which a State that
has become a Party to Protocol 1 is internationally responsible.
Article 2
Each Party undertakes not to contribute to any act of a Party to the
Treaty which constitutes a violation of the Treaty, or to any act of an-
other Party to a Protocol which constitutes a violation of a Protocol.
Article 3
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty or by the
extension of the Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 4
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
Article 5
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 6
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
Article 7
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its de-
posit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification.
PROTOCOL 3
The Parties to this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear explosive device anywhere
within the Nuclear Free Zone.
Article 2
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
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acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty or by the
extension of the Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its de-
posit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification.
PROTOCOL 4
The Parties to this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes not to. transit territory or airspace, or visit ports
or airfields within the Nuclear Free Zone, with warships or military air-
craft which are nuclear-powered or carry nuclear explosive devices of any
kind.
Article 2
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty or by the
extension of the Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
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Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of the de-
posit with the Depositary of the instrument of ratification of the last
State eligible to sign this Protocol.
PROTOCOL 5
The Parties to this Protocol,
Noting the Model Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty),
Have Agreed as follows:
Article 1
Each Party undertakes not to test any delivery vehicle or other device
designed or intended for the carrying, guiding or deploying nuclear explo-
sive devices through or over the Nuclear Free Zone.
Article 2
Each Party may, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its
acceptance from the date of such notification of any alteration to its obli-
gation under this Protocol brought about by the entry into force of an
amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 15 of the Treaty or by the
extension of the Nuclear Free Zone pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.
Article 3
This Protocol shall be open for signature by the French Republic, the
People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United
States of America.
Article 4
This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.
Article 5
This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force
indefinitely.
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Article 6
This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of the de-
posit with the Depositary of the instrument of ratification of the last
State eligible to sign this Protocol.
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS SECTION
Buyer Beware: The United States No
Longer Wants Foreign Capital to Fund
Corporate Acquisitions*
JOSEPH E. REECE**
INTRODUCTION
Instead of being viewed as a rival, [foreign investment] ought to be
considered as a most valuable auxiliary, conducing to put into motion
a greater quantity of productive labor, and a greater portion of useful
enterprise than could exist without it.'
Alexander Hamilton
The boundary lines of the world's primary financial markets are be-
coming ever blurred. No longer can we concern ourselves with the activi-
ties in corporate America alone. Today, it is rare when a major corpora-
tion does not do business in all of the major financial centers throughout
the world.
A good example of this increasing internationalization can be seen in
the world-wide debt market. Today it is common to find IBM commercial
paper2 being traded and held in Tokyo, Exxon Eurodollar notes3 being
* The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims
responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission or of the author's colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
** Special Counsel, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 994 (1791).
2. Stigum, Money Market Instruments, in THE HANDBOOK OF FIXED INCOME SECURITIES
217, 232 (1983). This essay contains the following discussion on commercial paper:
Commercial paper, whoever the issuer and whatever the precise form it takes,
is an unsecured promissory note with a fixed maturity. In plain English, the
issuer of commercial paper (the borrower) promises to pay the buyer (the
lender) some fixed amount on some future date. But issuers pledge no assets -
only liquidity and established earning power - to guarantee that they will
make good on their promises to pay. Traditionally, commercial paper resem-
bled in form a Treasury bill; it was a negotiable, non-interest-bearing note is-
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sold in London 4 and sovereign debt being placed with large money center
banks in New York.
The international bond market has undergone an explosive increase
in size.' For example, in 1980, the total amount of bonds issued interna-
tionally was $38.3 billion.' By 1986 this figure had increased to $225.4
billion.7 It appears that the world financial markets are in an era of un-
precedented internationalization and growth.
sued at a discount from face value and redeemed at maturity for full face
value. Today, however, a lot of paper is interest bearing. For the investor the
major difference between bills and paper is that paper carries some small risk
of default because the issuer is a private firm, whereas the risk of default on
bills is zero for all intents and purposes.
Firms selling commercial paper frequently expect to roll over their paper
as it matures; that is, they plan to get money to pay off maturing paper by
issuing new paper. Since there is always the danger that an adverse turn in the
paper market might make doing so difficult or inordinately expensive, most
paper issuers back their outstanding paper with bank lines of credit; they get a
promise from a bank or banks to lend them at any time an amount equal to
their outstanding paper. Issuers normally pay for this service in one of several
ways: by holding at their line banks compensating deposit balances equal to
some percentage of their total credit lines; by paying an annual fee equal to
some small percentage of their outstanding lines; or through some mix of bal-
ances and fees.
3. See, STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS G-3
(hereinafter "INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY"). A generally accepted definition of a Eurodollar
Security is a debt security issued multinationally through an international syndicate of
banks or securities firms in a currency other than that of the country in which the bond is
issued. According to the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the all inclusive
term Eurobond has several derivatives and variations such as Eurodollar bond, Euroyen
bond, Euro-DM bond, etc. These names serve to indicate the currency in which the offering
is denominated. Compare this to a foreign bond which is a debt security issued in a country
other than that of the issuer and sold through a syndicate of banks or securities firms with
the instrument being denominated in the currency of the country in which such bond is
being sold.
4. The Eurodollar market was originally established by London banks in the early
1960's. This market was developed primarily because major multinational corporations
needed to match cash needs with the currency inflows and expenditures caused by overseas
expansion. Major corporations could offer a higher rate of return in London than in the
United States and still have a lower total debt cost because London had no requirements for
central bank insurance or participation. This market is primarily a debt market. The trans-
actions involved were generally paper swaps between issuing corporations and large London
banks. This market was a bombshell to the health of United States financial markets. As a
result of the growth of this market, the Kennedy administration created the Fowler Task
Force to examine what actions the United States could undertake to counteract the outflow
of United States dollars to foreign investments.
5. See INTERNATIONALIZATION STUDY, supra note 3, at G-5. The staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission has defined an international bond as a debt security originally
issued outside the country of the borrower. These securities generally take the form of
Eurobonds or Foreign bonds.
6. Id. at II-1.
7. Id. at 11-2.
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Nowhere is this trend more evident than in the area of international
mergers and acquisitions. As in other areas of internationalization of the
financial markets, the United States is at the forefront of this activity.
For example, in 1980, United States companies were involved in 116 deals
where foreign companies were acquired with a total dollar value of over
$1 billion.' By 1987 these numbers had increased to 190 deals valued at
approximately $7.1 billion.' Although this represents an increase of over
seven-fold, these numbers pale in comparison with the recent activity of
foreign entities acquiring United States corporations. Many of our coun-
try's major multinational corporations have recently been the target of
acquisitions by foreign entities and individuals.'" In 1980, foreign ac-
quirers participated in 167 deals valued at $6.7 billion." By 1988 these
numbers had risen to 447 deals valued at over $60.8 billion.", As the sta-
tistics illustrate, foreign investment in the United States has achieved a
significant presence in corporate America.'
3
As a result of this activity, political pressure mounted resulting in the
passage of an obscure amendment, section 5021, to the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988,' commonly referred to as the Exon-
Florio Amendment ("Exon-Florio"). This trade act is an amendment to
the Defense Production Act of 1950, and in essence, gives the President
the power to suspend, prohibit or dismantle mergers, acquisitions and
takeovers of United States companies by foreign investment which
threaten "national security." 5 On its face, this law does not appear to be
problematic for corporate acquisitions that do not involve national secur-
ity. However, given the broad discretionary power that has been granted,
it is possible that this law will have far reaching and potentially onerous
effects on the United States capital markets.
This article will explore the ramifications for and application to for-
eign acquirers of Exon-Florio. First, a historical framework will provide
8. 1988 Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May/Jun. 1989, at 60 (hereinafter "M & A").
This represents an increase of over 488%.
9. Id.
10. For a list of the twenty-five largest acquisitions made by foreign entities in the
United States in 1988, see M & A, supra note 8. Companies such as Firestone Tire & Rub-
ber Co., Federated Department Stores, CBS Records Group, Tropicana Products Inc.,
Brooks Brothers Inc., and Kidde Inc., were all acquired by foreign entities in 1988. As the
names illustrate, many of the companies involved are ones that the American consumers
deal with on a daily basis. As such, the recent flurry of international acquisitions affect all of
us. Given the high profile of these companies, the stage was set for United States legislative
action.
11. See M & A, supra note 8, at 60.
12. Id.
13. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
14. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107.
15. See supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text. This term has not been defined.
Therein lies what may be the largest potential problem for foreign acquirers of United
States companies.
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an overview of the factors that led to the passage of Exon-Florio.' This is
followed by a discussion of the coverage, scope and application of Exon-
Florio.' 7 Finally, the article will discuss the problems inherent in Exon-
Florio, the proposed regulations and the burdens that may be placed on
foreign acquirers.' 8
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
Historically, the United States has encouraged foreign investment in
this country.19 In its earliest years, the United States not only encouraged
direct foreign investment, our fledgling nation was extremely dependent
upon such funds.2 0 Indeed, as Alexander Hamilton noted in 1791, foreign
investment was a valuable addition to our capital hungry nation."' Thus,
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, foreign capital was a ma-
jor factor in the economic development of this country. For example, it
was a loan from England, France and the Netherlands that permitted the
United States to con~plete the Louisiana Purchase in 1803.22 Throughout
the early part of the nineteenth century, European investment was the
driving force behind the creation of our nation's infrastructure.2" Between
1820 and 1840, investment in United States factories rose from $50 mil-
lion to $250 million."' As with our nation's infrastructure, the bulk of
these funds were provided by foreign investors. During the 1880's, it is
estimated that nearly two-thirds of all new investment in railroads was
16. See supra notes 19-71 and accompanying text.
17. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
18. See supra notes 82-114 and accompanying text.
19. See Berger, Applying Uniform Margin Requirements to Foreign Entities Attempt-
ing to Acquire U.S. Corporations, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 543 (1984).
20. For a complete discussion of the historical development of Trade law and tariffs see
Note, The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States Foreign Trade
Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1418 (1971). Early American investment policy focused on international
trade and primarily consisted of high tariffs to protect our nation's youthful industry. In the
middle to late 1700's, this paternalistic approach was necessary because foreign products
were frequently better made at a cheaper price. See also F. ROOT, R. KRAMER & M. D'ARLIN,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE (1966).
21. See ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 1. Although Hamilton was a forceful advocate
favoring direct foreign investment, he may have been promoting more than just national
pride. In recent years, Hamilton's zealous support for foreign investment has been chal-
lenged as motivated by the potential for personal pecuniary gain as opposed to promoting
the long term fiscal health of our nation. See K. CROWE, AMERICA FOR SALE 248 (1978).
22. See Boorstin, Foreign Investments in America, 2 EDITORIAL RES. REP. 571 (1974)
(hereinafter "Boorstin"). An $11.25 million loan from England, France and the Netherlands
provided Thomas Jefferson with the funds needed to complete the land purchase that was a
dramatic step in the emergence of our young nation as a potential world power.
23. Id. at 572. Railroads, canals, bridges and roads were all financed primarily with
European capital. For example, the Erie Canal was made possible by a sale of state bonds
sold on the London Market. This was significant given that the Erie was the first American
canal to be a commercial success. By proving a commercial success, the Erie was an excel-
lent selling point for other infrastructure promoters.
24. Id.
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being made by Europeans."
This financing of America by the Europeans continued unabashedly
until the beginning of World War I. The war was the primary cause of a
dramatic change in capital flows into the United States. To pay for war-
time needs, many of Europe's creditor countries liquidated a large portion
of American investments that had been amassed in the prior century.
Foreign investment in the United States went from $7.2 billion in 1914 to
$4 billion at the end of 1919.26
Although America's growth for over two centuries had been made
possible with the utilization of foreign investment, the infusion of this
foreign capital was not always viewed as a welcome event. As early as
1791, legislation aimed at curbing foreign investment was enacted. In cre-
ating the first Bank of the United States, laws were enacted that prohib-
ited the election of aliens as directors and also barred the giving of prox-
ies by nonresidents of the United States.2 7
Again during the 1850's, attention was focused upon the large influx
of foreign investment."8 By 1887, public concern had again culminated in
25. D. ADLER, BRITISH INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN RAILWAYS, 1834-1898 (1970); Boorstin,
supra note 22, at 572. In discussing the importance of foreign investment to the develop-
ment of our nation, Daniel Boorstin, librarian for the Library of Congress, noted:
By 1854, foreign investors held approximately one-half of the federal and state
and one-quarter of the municipal debts. Their interest in private enterprise
was much smaller. The discovery of gold in California, however, sparked activ-
ity in trade, manufacturing, and railroad building which started a new flow of
European capital to America. The regularity of such investment was sometimes
interrupted by panics and the disclosures of the folly of American promoters;
in 1869, for example, representatives of the Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific
Railroad sold some $5 million worth of bonds on the Paris Bourse, having
widely advertised their great transcontinental line which turned out to be just
three miles long.
After that fiasco French investments in American railroads were negligible,
but the English and Dutch remained enthusiastic and for a long time held con-
trolling interests in the Illinois Central, the New York and Erie, the Philadel-
phia and Reading, and others. For more than three-quarters of a century Brit-
ish investors were the principal buyers of American railway securities. By 1914,
when securities and direct investments by Europeans in America totalled $7
billion, well over half of it was in railroads ....
See also North, International Capital Flows and the Development of the American West,
16 J. ECON. HIST. 493 (1956).
26. Boorstin, supra note 22, at 573.
27. Act of Feb. 25, 1791, Ch. X, §§ 7 (I), (III), 1 Stat. 193. This fear of foreign control
was still present in 1816. In creating the second Bank of the United States, prohibitions
similar to the ones attached to the first Bank were also included in the enacting legislation
of the second Bank. Act of Apr. 10, 1816, Ch. XLIV, §§ 11(1), (16), 3 Stat. 271, 274. But cf.
National Bank Act, Ch. CVI, §§ 9, 10, 13 Stat. 102 (1864). These prohibitions were not
entirely successful. By 1841, 56% of the Bank of the United States was owned by foreign
investors. For a better discussion of the foreign investment in the Bank of the United States
during the 1800's see LEWIS, AMERICA'S STAKE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 14-15 (1938).
28. See Boorstin, supra note 22. The major investments in the railroads were the pri-
mary area of concern during this era. In response to this purchase of America by foreign
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the passage of legislation that regulated foreign investment. The Alien
Land Law of 1887 prohibited the purchase of land in federal territories
by foreign investors.2 9 Regulation of foreign investment was essentially
ignored from the early 1900's through World War II. Legislation was en-
acted mainly in those industries the federal government considered im-
portant to national security."0 After World War II, the United States
again actively encouraged foreign investment. The United States policy
during this era can best be understood by a review of the following ex-
cerpt from the Mutual Security Act of 1954:
[This Act authorizes the President to] . . . accelerate a program of
negotiating treaties for commerce and trade . .. which shall include
provisions to encourage and facilitate the flow of private investment
and its equitable treatment in nations participating in programs
under this Act .... 31
As a result of this encouragement, United States investors began
making significant offshore investments. Although the United States was
encouraging the inflow of foreign investment capital, we were experienc-
ing a significant balance of payments deficit. Given this turn of events,
additional legislation was promulgated to encourage investment in the
United States by foreigners and by United States citizens and to limit the
outflow of capital. The principal legislation at this time was the Interest
Equalization Tax of 1964.32 This tax imposed a penalty on the purchase
investors, the Know-Nothing Party was supporting discriminatory taxation of foreign in-
vestment in the United States. Although unsuccessful in its efforts, the Know-Nothing
Party nevertheless raised the general awareness of foreign investment in the United States.
See generally ADLER, BRITISH INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN RAILWAYS: 1834-1898, 10-11 (1970).
29. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, Ch. 340, § 1, 24 Stat. 476. Other legislation during this period
includes: Homestead Act of 1862, Ch. LXXV, § 1, 12 Stat. 392; Desert Land Act of 1877, Act
of Mar. 3, 1877, Ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377, amended by 43 U.S.C. § 321 et seq. (1970); and
Natural Resources Act of 1887, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, Ch. 340, § 1, 24 Stat. 476. Briefly, the
Homestead Act allowed only citizens of the United States to enter public lands for the pur-
pose of homesteading. The Desert Land Act was similar to the Homestead Act in that it
authorized only United States citizens the right to reclaim public desert land. Finally, the
Natural Resources Act was also directed to the prohibition of public land ownership and
usage by non-citizens of the United States.
30. Industries where foreign investment was regulated, restricted or prohibited include:
Atomic Energy, 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1982); Air Transportation, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(13),
1302(13), 1378(a)(4), (f), 1401(b), 1508(b) (1982); Coastal Shipping and Trade Activities, 46
U.S.C. §§ 11, 252, 289, 8654, 883, 888 (1982); Ship Building, 49 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835 (1982);
Leases on Federal Mineral Lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 24, 72, 181, 352 (1982); Radio and Televi-
sion Industries, 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1982); and Military Aircraft Production, 10 U.S.C. § 2272(f)
(1982). For a complete discussion of industries where foreign investment is regulated see
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 333-729 (Marans, Williams and Mirabito, eds.
1977). See also Andrews, An Evaluation of the Need for Further Statutory Controls on
Direct Foreign Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 147 (1974).
31. Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. 665-937, 68 Stat. 832.
32. Act of Sept. 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-563, 78 Stat. 809, amended by Pub. L. No. 90-
59, 81 Stat. 145 (1967) (formerly codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4811 et seq., repealed by Act of
Oct. 4, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1814, Title XIX, § 1904(a)(21)(A)).
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of foreign securities by United States citizens. Additionally, a Presidential
Task Force was created to discuss and propose methods to increase for-
eign investment in the United States."3
In the early 1970's the amount of foreign investment in the United
States increased tremendously. This increase was due to two key factors.
First, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
emerged during this period as a cohesive and dominant economic and po-
litical force. This event coupled with the implementation of a sustained
oil embargo caused petroleum prices to soar. As a result, a significant pool
of dollars became available for investment by the OPEC nations.3 Sec-
ond, the dollar suffered a significant devaluation compared to the curren-
cies of our major trading partners.3 Also, corporate securities prices were
depressed in the early 1970's.1s
Other factors making the United States an inviting target for foreign
investment included attractive rates of return for foreign investors, a sta-
ble political climate and fair laws under which returns could be favorably
achieved.3 7 Overall, during the last twenty-five years, the United States
has been a very inviting investment choice for well capitalized foreign
investors."'
These international financial developments did not go unnoticed. By
1974, Congress began a major inquiry into the degree of foreign invest-
ment in the United States.3 ' As a result of this attention, several pieces of
33. See H.R. Doc. No. 141, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963) (Message from the President
of the United States transmitting a special message on Balance of Payments).
34. See Arab Banks Grow, Bus. WK., Oct. 6, 1980, at 70, 72. This trend continued un-
abated through the late 1970's. For example, in 1978 the estimated dollar surpluses held by
Arab oil exporters equaled $5.3 billion. However, by 1980, estimates for the surpluses had
ballooned to $120 billion. As a result of this surplus, the Arab oil nations became a potent
force in the international financial markets. By 1980, Arabic members of OPEC had in-
vested $340 billion worldwide. This amount was three times greater than their cumulative
worldwide investment in 1975.
35. See E. FRY, FINANCIAL INVASION OF THE U.S.A.: A THREAT TO AMERICAN SOCIETY 36
(1980). From 1971 to 1978, the dollar declined 81% against the German mark and 63%
against the Japanese yen.
36. For a complete discussion of the economic factors that led to an increase of foreign
investment in the early 1970's, see ZAGARIS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 8-10
(1980).
37. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text. Many of these same factors are pre-
sent today in the United States. Currency valuations are presently in favor of the United
States trading partners, we are presently suffering a huge trade and balance of payment
deficit and many investors still view the United States markets as the deepest and most
liquid. As such, we are again seeing a large influx of foreign funds into our financial markets.
38. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1963). In 1963, the Securities and
Exchange Commission noted in a study that foreign funds were an important source of capi-
tal for large, unregulated borrowers.
39. See generally Foreign Investment in the United States: Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). Other major hearings and legislative proposals include: Hearings on
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legislation were debated before Congress in 1974. Although not enacted,
perhaps the most significant in terms of potential effect was the Foreign
Investors Limitation Act of 1974.40 This proposed Act would have been
an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.41 Briefly, this
proposal would have prohibited foreign investors from acquiring more
than five percent of any voting securities, or thirty-five percent of non-
voting securities of any company whose securities were registered under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.42 Although it restricted the foreign
acquisition of United States companies, the bill was silent on the ability
of a foreign entity to create a wholly owned subsidiary in the United
States. Thus, it appears as if the Foreign Investors Limitation Act of 1974
wanted to maintain the historical encouragement of foreign investment
while at the same time protect established United States industries. In
fact, the stated purpose of this bill was to encourage diversification of
foreign investments in domestic industries and avoid the pitfalls that
would occur with the foreign control of United States industries. 3
The legislation that was enacted has subsequently had a profound
effect. Not in immediate results, but in laying the groundwork for the
application of the Exon-Florio Amendment. Given the lack of any useful
information concerning foreign investment in the United States, Congress
directed the Commerce Department to study such investment and pre-
pare a complete report. The enacting legislation for this survey was the
Foreign Investment in the United States Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic
Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)(the "Culver
Subcommittee"); Hearings on S. 2840 Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)(the "Inouye
Subcommittee"); Hearings on S. 3955 Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)(the "Metzen-
baum Subcommittee"); Hearings on S. 425 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975)(the "Williams Subcommittee"); Hearings on S. 425, S. 953, S. 995 and S. 1303
Before the Subcommittee on Int'l Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)(the "Stevenson Subcommittee"); Hearings
on S. 329, S. 995, S. 1303 and Amendment No. 393 Before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975)(the "Inouye Subcommittee"). A review of the Congressional hearings will illustrate
the frequently vocalized concern over the lack of any usable data concerning the extent and
effects of direct foreign investment in the United States.
40. H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. H21,425 (1973). The other major
legislation proposed was the Energy and Defense Industry Production Act, H.R. 12040, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REC. H42655 (1973)(hereinafter Production Act). This bill was
less restrictive than the Foreign Investors Limitation Act. The focus of the Production Act
was to regulate foreign investment in the energy or defense industries. The Production Act
stated that it would be illegal for a non-citizen of the United States or a foreign controlled
entity to control a United States company (the Production Act defines control as ownership
of 10% or greater of a company's voting securities).
41. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1989)).
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
43. Id.
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Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 ("1974 Act").4" As a result of this
directive, the Commerce Department compiled a nine volume treatise on
direct foreign investment that was released in 1976."1 As a direct result of
the information contained in the 1976 study, Congress enacted the Inter-
national Investment Survey Act of 1976 ("1976 Act"). 6 This law author-
ized the ongoing collection of comprehensive data concerning foreign di-
rect investment in the United States. Specifically, this act vested the
authority in the President to, "conduct a regular data collection program
to secure current information on international capital flows and other in-
formation related to international investment .. .
In an Executive Order, the President subsequently delegated his au-
thority to the Department of Commerce for the promulgation and imple-
mentation of regulations concerning such information gathering tasks.'
In addition to the legislative activity surrounding the 1974 and 1976 Acts
was the 1975 Presidential creation of the Committee on Foreign Invest-
ment in the United States (CFIUS).' 9 CFIUS was formed principally to
be an advisory and information gathering entity. ° With the passage of
44. Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, §§ 1-11, 88 Stat. 1450-60
(1974). The principal purpose of this act was to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to
prepare a report for Congress that would focus on direct foreign investment in the United
States. However, as a review of the subsequent law and its application shows, the Foreign
Investment Study Act of 1974 was to be the first in a long chain of far reaching laws con-
cerning foreign investment in the United States.
45. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. (1976) (report
of the Secretary of Commerce to the Congress in Compliance with Foreign Investment
Study Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450).
46. Internal Investment Survey Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472, § 2, 90 Stat. 2059-64
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1979 & Supp. 1983)). The principal pur-
pose of the Survey Act was to require benchmark surveys of direct and portfolio foreign
investment in the United States and of United States direct investments abroad. These
surveys were to be completed at least once every five years and provide for the collection of
data on an on-going basis. See 22 U.S.C. § 3103 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
47. 22 U.S.C. § 3103(a)(1) (1979 & Supp. 1983). The stated purpose of this legislation
was to provide,
clear and unambiguous authority for the President to collect information on
international investment and to provide analyses of such information to the
Congress, the executive agencies, and the general public.
22 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (1979 & Supp. 1983).
The language in this Act expressly stated that its purpose was not to, "restrain or deter
foreign investment in the United States or United States investment abroad." 22 U.S.C. §
3101(c) (1979 & Supp. 1983).
48. Exec. Order No. 11,961, 3 C.F.R. 86 (1978), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,013, 3
C.F.R. 147 (1978).
49. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975), amended by Exec. Order No.
12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
50. Id. As originally created, CFIUS consisted of a representative, whose status shall
not be below an Assistant Secretary, designated by the Secretaries of State, Treasury, De-
fense, Commerce, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs and the Executive
Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. In 1980, the Assistant to the
President for Economic Affairs and the Executive Director of the Council on International
Economic Policy were replaced by the United States Trade Representative and the
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the 1976 Act, Congress insured that there would be a steady flow of direct
investment data to CFIUS. Thus, through the actions of Congress and
President Ford, a permanent mechanism was created to monitor foreign
investment in the United States.51
Although the events in the world oil and financial markets created a
general increase in the concern about foreign investment in the United
States, the historic support for foreign investment in the United States
was left relatively unscathed. The Carter Administration in the late
1970's continued to espouse the international financial benefits of foreign
investment. An indication of our country's policy during this era can be
seen in the Declaration issued at the conclusion of the Bonn Economic
Summit and signed by the President on July 17, 1978. The Declaration
stated:
We underline our willingness to increase our co-operation in the field
of foreign private investment flows among industrialized countries and
between them and developing countries. We will intensify work for
further agreements in the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development] and elsewhere.52
By 1980, the concern of the 1970's and the active governmental quest
for more information about direct foreign investment in the United
States had virtually evaporated.
With the onset of the Reagan era, corporate America had begun to
reassert itself. In 1982, American financial markets began what was to be
the longest bull market in history. With prosperous times, less of a threat
was seen coming from foreign investment in the United States. In Sep-
tember of 1983, President Reagan released what he described as a "major
statement on international investment." 3 This statement, developed by
the Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy,
contained a direct welcome to foreign investment in the United States. In
that statement, the following policy was set forth concerning foreign in-
vestment in this country:
The United States has consistently welcomed foreign direct invest-
Chairperson of the Council of Economic Advisers. See Exec. Order No. 12,188, § 1-105.
Prior Executive Orders and Determination, §§ (f)(1) and (2) at 992.
51. Another law promulgated during this era was the Agricultural Foreign Investment
Disclosure Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-460, 92 Stat. 1263 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 3501-3508
(1988)). See 124 CONG. REc. 31,673-682 (1979) (hereinafter "AFIDA"). This legislation was
enacted in response to the concerns voiced by rural constituencies that an increase of the
foreign investment in United States agricultural land was causing a dramatic escalation in
land prices. Like the International Investment Survey Act of 1976, AFIDA was promulgated
for the purpose of establishing a nationwide monitoring program. This program was to pro-
vide statistical data covering the extent and impact of foreign investment in United States
agricultural land. See also 44 Fed. Reg. 29,029 (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 47,526 (1979); 45 Fed.
Reg. 61,15 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 77,79 (1980); 49 Fed. Reg. 35,073 (1984).
52. 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1314 (July 24, 1978). In addition to President Carter,
this Declaration was also signed by the leaders of England, France and West Germany.
53. 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1214 (Sept. 9, 1983).
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ment in this country. Such investment provides substantial benefits to
the United States. Therefore, the United States fosters a domestic ec-
onomic climate which is conducive to investment. We provide foreign
investors fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory treatment under our
laws and regulations. We maintain exceptions to such treatment only
as are necessary to protect our security and related interests and
which are consistent with our international legal obligations."
Thus, during the Reagan years, foreign investment was vigorously en-
couraged. As the merger and acquisition figures for 1980-1988 illustrate,
foreign investment flowed into the United States at unprecedented
rates.5 This growing foreign presence in American industry again served
to fuel the fires of alarm.
During this era, increased attention was again focused upon the mag-
nitude of foreign investment in the United States. 6 Although the Reagan
administration hailed foreign investment as a welcome tool in our quest
for expansion, other economic pundits warned that the United States was
becoming addicted to foreign capital." There were fears that
overdependence on foreign investment would actually weaken our coun-
try's fiscal health. Further, there were suggestions that such dependence
could also cause the United States to be the subject of undue foreign po-
litical pressure which could undermine our political independence. 8 Cou-
pled with these concerns were the questions about national security.
Recently, two proposed transactions arose that sparked extensive de-
bate about the desirability of direct foreign investment in the United
States. First was the proposed acquisition of eighty percent of Fairchild
Semiconductor Corp. ("Fairchild") by Fujitsu, Ltd. ("Fujitsu") of Japan.
This acquisition was potentially very problematic because if consum-
mated, the deal would have provided the Japanese with advanced tech-
nology in an area previously dominated by the United States. There was
concern that the Japanese would use this information in an attempt to
dominate an industrial market. On October 24, 1986, Fujitsu and
Fairchild announced the proposed transaction. 9 There was an immediate
increase in the number of commentaries on the effect of foreign invest-
54. Id. at 1216.
55. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
56. MARTIN & SUSAN TOLCHIN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How FOREIGN MONEY IS CHANG-
ING THE FACE OF OUR NATION 6 (1988) (hereinafter "Tolchin").
57. Id.
58. Id. An example of this potential problem was illustrated in April, 1987, when Paul
Volcker disclosed that the Federal Reserve Board had decided to raise short-term interest
rates. The rationale for this action was so the depreciation of the United States dollar would
be slowed which would then make United States investments more attractive to foreign
investors. In response to this action, Norman Robertson, Chief Economist at the Mellon
Bank, stated: "Federal policy is increasingly influenced and even dictated by the needs of
our foreign creditors." See Blustein, Dollar Looms Bigger in Fed's Decision at Risk of Re-
cession, Wall St. J., May 19, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
59. Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1986, at C1, col. 3.
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ment in the United States. Most of the vocalized concerns were focused
upon the potential effect the acquisition would have on our nation's na-
tional security."0 Opponents of the Fujitsu purchase also noted that the
proposed transaction would make Fujitsu the world leader in the produc-
tion of semiconductors."' Finally, the fact that Fairchild's defense elec-
tronics subsidiary provided more than $100 million of high-speed cir-
cuitry annually to defense contractors spawned a wave of anti-foreign
investment sentiment.
6 2
Because Fairchild was in an industry where America held a perceived
edge in technology over Japan, the proposed acquisition generated exten-
sive debate and political attention. On November 8, 1986, the CFIUS
Task Force announced that it would review the proposed merger.6 Al-
though many of the above-referenced factors were considered, the areas
that were ultimately the primary focus of concern in the proposed Fujitsu
transaction were trade and national policy. As attention was focused on
the Fujitsu transaction, many commentators noted that America's tradi-
tional open door policy on foreign investment was seldom reciprocated.6
As a result of the negative publicity and political inquiry, Fujitsu ul-
timately decided to terminate negotiations and abort the acquisition of
Fairchild.6 5 Although this retreat by Fujitsu stemmed the flow of anti-
Japanese investment sentiment, the problem was still on the front line of
political agendas.
The second transaction was the proposed acquisition of the Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Company by the British financier, Sir James Goldsmith.
Goodyear is a well known industrial company headquartered in Akron,
Ohio. Given Akron's and the entire midwest's quest for economic resur-
gence in the early to mid-1980's, 6' this proposed transaction was aggres-
60. See, e.g., Pollack, Fujitsu Chip Deal Draws More Flak, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1987, at
D1, col. 3.
61. Tolchin, supra note 57, at 10. At the time of the proposed acquisition, Fujitsu
owned half of Amdahl, an American computer company.
62. Id. This concern is very interesting given that at the time of Fujitsu's proposed
purchase, Fairchild was owned by the United States affiliate of Schlumberger, Ltd. (a large
French oil services company.) Thus, it would appear as if foreign ownership of sensitive
technology was not per se objectionable. Instead, the concerns were focused upon Japanese
acquisition of sensitive technology. There were fears that if Fujitsu gained access to
Fairchild's technological expertise, it would use such knowledge to eliminate United States
competition in a key area of technology.
63. N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1986, at 39, col. 1.
64. Tolchin, supra note 57, at 12. Auerbach, Cabinet to Weigh Sale of Chip Firm,
Wash. Post, March 12, 1987, at El, col. 3. In announcing that the Department of Commerce
would investigate the Fujitsu transaction and the public policy concerning America's open-
door to foreign investment, Commerce Secretary Baldridge stated that Fujitsu's ownership
of Fairchild would increase Japan's "ability to compete for United States supercomputer
sales while blocking United States makers from a large share of Japan's market."
65. Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 67 (April 10, 1987).
66. The entire midwest was hit extremely hard by the recession of the early 1980's.
Detroit was suffering due to its reliance on the automobile industry. Cleveland, Akron,
VOL. 18:2
FOREIGN CAPITAL
sively opposed by the residents of Akron, of Ohio, and by the federal
government.6 7
In responding to this outpouring of public support for Goodyear, the
House Subcommittee on Monopolies convened special public hearings to
review the Goldsmith bid.6" These meetings provided a public forum for
the debate concerning the merits of an open door policy to direct foreign
investment in the United States. Although the hearings were inconclu-
sive, the proceedings were widely publicized and served to heighten
America's awareness of the level of direct foreign investment and to fuel
the fires of fear that foreigners were buying up America."'
Ultimately, Goldsmith withdrew his bid for Goodyear and sold his
shares back to the company for a substantial profit. Thus, while Gold-
smith was able to avoid public wrath and congressional action by selling
out his Goodyear holdings, the public hearings spawned by his actions
brought America's direct foreign investment policy to the forefront of leg-
islative agendas.
The Fujitsu and Goodyear debates were important in several re-
spects. First, it was the first time in recent memory that a major contro-
versy erupted after a proposed foreign investment.7" Second, before
Fujitsu, foreign investment in the United States was essentially viewed as
a welcome addition to our own sources of capital. Finally, the proposed
Fujitsu and Goodyear transactions may have been the final events that
led Congress to take action to assess and control the extent of direct for-
eign investment in the United States. In assessing what Congress faced in
tackling this economic puzzle, one scholar noted:
The challenge for American policy makers is to continue to reap the
benefits of foreign investment while minimizing its risks. If they fail to
meet this challenge, the threat of losing a measure of political and
Pittsburgh, Youngstown, and other major cities in the great lakes region were also victim-
ized due to their ancillary reliance on the automobile industry. Since the early 1980's, com-
panies and cities located in this region have diversified themselves in order to lessen the
short and long term effects of swings in the economic cycle. Goodyear was an example of
this strategy. In addition to automobile tires, industry participation was extended to com-
puter manufacturing, increased defense related production, natural gas exploration and pro-
duction, and a myriad of other high technology areas where known technology could be
utilized. All of this diversification was subsequently scrapped as a result of Goldsmith's bid.
In order to finance the forced restructuring, Goodyear was required to sell off its non-tire
subdivisions and concentrate on the rubber industry.
67. See, e.g., L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
68. See Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at 2, col. 3. Getting its fight to Capitol Hill appeared
to be a last ditch effort on the part of Goodyear. Goodyear chairman Robert Mercer urged
lawmakers to curtail the activities of corporate raiders and conceded that there is "very
little we can do to stop [the British financier's threatened tender offer.] I haven't been opti-
mistic since this started, I'm not sure where we go from here." See, e.g., Wall St. J., Nov. 21,
1986, at 4, col. 1; L.A. Times, Nov. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. Tolchin, supra note 57, at 12.
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economic sovereignty becomes a real possibility."
In responding to this challenge, Congress passed the Exon-Florio
Amendment.
ExON-FLORIo AMENDMENT
Essentially, Exon-Florio gives the President or his designee the abil-
ity to investigate any proposed merger, acquisition or takeover of a
United States Company by foreign persons or entities that may have ad-
verse effects on national security.7 2 As allowed by Exon-Florio, the Presi-
71. Id. at 13.
72. 50 U.S.C. App. 2 158(a), et seq. Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950,
reads as follows:
(a) Investigations. The President or the President's designee may make an in-
vestigation to determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisi-
tions, and takeovers proposed or pending on or after the date of enactment of
this section by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of
persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States. If it is deter-
mined that an investigation should be undertaken, it shall commence no later
than 30 days after receipt by the President or the President's designee of writ-
ten notification of the proposed or pending merger, acquisition, or takeover as
prescribed by regulations promulgated pursuant to this section. Such investiga-
tion shall be completed no later than 45 days after such determination.
(b) Confidentiality of information. Any information or documentary material
filed with the President or the President's designee pursuant to this section
shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States
Code, and no such information or documentary material may be made public,
except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceed-
ing. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent disclosure to ei-
ther House of Congress or to any duly authorized committee or subcommittee
of the Congress.
(c) Action by the President. Subject to subsection (d), the President may take
such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or
prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States proposed or pending on or after the date of
enactment of this section by or with foreign persons so that such control will
not threaten to impair the national security. The President shall announce the
decision to take action pursuant to this subsection not later than 15 days after
the investigation described in subsection (a) is completed. The President may
direct the Attorney General to seek appropriate relief, including divestment
relief, in the district courts of the United States in order to implement and
enforce this section.
(d) Findings of the President. The President may exercise the authority con-
ferred by subsection (c) only if the President finds that-
(1) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the
foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair
the national security, and
(2) provisions of law, other than this section and the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), do not in the President's
judgment provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to pro-
tect the national security in the matter before the President.
The Provisions of subsection (d) of this section shall not be subject to
judicial review.
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dent has delegated his authority to administer the law to the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (the "Committee" or
"CFIUS"). 73 This Committee consists of the Secretaries of the Treasury
(the Chairperson of the Committee), Commerce, Defense and State, as
well as the Attorney General, the chairperson of the Council of Economic
Advisers, the director of the Office of Management and Budget and the
United States Trade Representative.
On July 14, 1989, the Department of the Treasury's office of interna-
tional investment released proposed regulations to implement Exon-
Florio.7 ' Pursuant to such regulations, any party involved in a transaction
subject to Exon-Florio may submit a "voluntary notice" to the Commit-
tee to initiate an investigation to determine whether Presidential action
should be taken.75 Also, any committee member who has reason to believe
a transaction may fall within the purview of Exon-Florio may submit an
"agency notice" to review a proposed transaction s.7  However, although
voluntary in nature, if an acquirer does not submit to the application of
Exon-Florio, the acquirer could face a divestment action or other relief
that the President deems necessary to enforce Exon-Florio.77 Given the
potentially onerous post-acquisition consequences of a Presidential rul-
ing, it is doubtful that merger and acquisition professionals will view this
(e) Factors to be considered. For the purposes of this section, the President or
the President's designee may, taking into account the requirements of national
security, consider among other factors-
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national de-
fense requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services, and
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign
citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United States to meet
the requirements of national security.
(f) Report to the Congress. If the President determines to take action under
subsection (c), the President shall immediately transmit to the Secretary of the
Senate and the Clerk of the House of Representatives a written report of the
action which the President intends to take, including a detailed explanation of
the findings made under subsection (d).
(g) Regulations. The President shall direct the issuance of regulations to carry
out this section. Such regulations shall, to the extent possible, minimize
paperwork burdens and shall to the extent possible coordinate reporting re-
quirements under this section with reporting requirements under any other
provision of Federal law.
(h) Effect on other law. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or
affect any existing power, process, regulation, investigation, enforcement mea-
sure, or review provided by any other provision of law.
73. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988).
74. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 800.103-800.702, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744 (1989) (proposed July 14,
1989).
75. Id. at 29,753.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 29,755.
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provision as voluntary.
Assuming notice is provided, any investigation subsequently under-
taken must be commenced within thirty days of the notice 7 and must be
completed within forty-five days.7 9 Once the investigation is completed,
the President has fifteen days to determine whether the transaction
should be blocked. 0 Should the President decide to take action to enjoin
the proposed transaction, he must submit a detailed written report of his
findings to Congress.8 ' It is interesting to note that the investigation and
subsequent action by the President are not subject to judicial review.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
In addition to the "involuntary" nature in which Exon-Florio is ap-
plied, 2 one of the greatest potential problems in the application of the
Exon-Florio Amendment is the determination of when a proposed trans-
action threatens national security. 3 A review of the statute illustrates
that Presidential action will be predicated on a finding that a transaction
will threaten national security.84 The problem lies in the fact that the
statute does not define national security. Moreover, Stephen J. Canner,
the Staff Chairman of CFIUS, has stated: "[B]ecause each transaction is
different, there can be no pre-determined comprehensive list of national
security criteria."85
Therefore, it can be assumed that any final regulations promulgated
to aid in the implementation of Exon-Florio will also be silent as to a
definition of national security. However, a list of factors that should be
78. Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(a), amended
by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, §5021, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988).
79. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(a).
80. Id. at § (c).
81. Id. at § (f).
82. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
83. The language in the statute that places the emphasis upon national security reads
as follows:
(a) Investigations. The President or the President's designee may make an in-
vestigation to determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisi-
tions, and takeovers proposed or pending on or after the date of enactment of
this section by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of
persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States. [emphasis
added].
Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (a), § 721.
84. Id. The following excerpt from the statute highlights when Presidential action
would be appropriate:
(c) Action by the President. Subject to subsection (d), the President may take
such action for such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or
prohibit any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States proposed or pending on or after the date of
enactment of this section by or with foreign persons so that such control will
not threaten to impair the national security.
85. Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 67 (April 10, 1989).
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considered in determining whether a proposed acquisition could impact
national security was provided. These factors are:
1. Domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements;
2. the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national
defense requirements, including the availability of human resources,
products, technology, material, and other supplies and services; and
3. the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by for-
eign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United
States to meet the requirements of national security."0
Although helpful, the list will still allow the President or his designee
unbridled discretion in applying Exon-Florio. Therein lies the potential
for a major problem. Through February 1, 1990, CFIUS had received 243
written notices of transactions. Of these notices, the committee sent only
six to the President for a determination as to whether an investigation
should be commenced. Of this number, only four transactions were subse-
quently subjected to a review.
On February 7, 1989, Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary, announced that the President had decided against
intervening in the proposed acquisition of Monsanto Electronic Material
Company (MEMC) by Huels AG of West Germany.87 The decision by the
President not to intervene in this transaction was significant because the
MEMC-Huels investigation was the first formal investigation by CFIUS
under Exon-Florio.8s MEMC is the largest United States producer of
86. Defense Production Act, §§ 2170(e)(1-3).
87. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 7, 1989.
88. Id. Although the Huels-MEMC transaction was the first to generate a formal inves-
tigation by CFIUS, Exon-Florio was first sought to be applied in the fall of 1988. Consoli-
dated Gold Fields PLC was the target of a hostile takeover attempt by Minorco S.A. Gold
Fields is a U.K. company and Minorco is headquartered in Luxembourg. Gold Fields owned
a forty-nine percent interest in Newmont Mining Corp. Newmont, a Delaware corporation,
owned a controlling interest in Peabody Coal and held other significant minority stakes in
several United States mining and natural resource companies.
Gold Fields asserted that Minorco's takeover attempt was a threat to United States
national security for three reasons:
1) Newmont and its affiliates were involved in the mining and production of
minerals that were vital to national security.
2) Gold Field's other subsidiaries were involved in mining and processing min-
erals outside the United States that were of equal importance to national
security.
3) Gold Fields was a major refiner of gold. The claimed importance of this was
two-fold. First, gold was used in critical defense related electronic components.
Second, maintaining stability in the international gold market was a primary
consideration in maintaining the underlying value of western currencies, in-
cluding the United States dollar.
Gold Fields alleged that Minorco was controlled by South African Harry Oppenheimer.
Given the political tensions between South Africa and the United States, national security
would be compromised if South African interests could gain influence over western curren-
cies and trading relationships. The argument was made that if Oppenheimer gained this
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silicon wafers. In December 1988, the Department of Defense, the De-
partment of Commerce and the General Accounting Office all notified
CFIUS that the proposed transaction should be investigated as the con-
summation of such transaction could impact the integrity of United
States national security.89 In addition, on February 2, 1989, twenty-nine
members of Congress wrote to President Bush and urged him to prevent
the proposed MEMC acquisition."
Although the MEMC-Huels transaction was the subject of extensive
public, administrative and legislative scrutiny, the President refused to
block the transaction. In making the announcement that the President
would not take any action, Mr. Fitzwater provided the following two cri-
teria that must be met before the President would suspend or prohibit a
transaction:
1. Credible evidence to believe that the foreign investor might take
actions that threaten to impair the national security, and
2. that existing laws, other than the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act and the Exon-Florio provision, are inadequate and
inappropriate to deal with the national security threat.9 1
In making this pronouncement, Mr. Fitzwater disclosed that the
President based his decision on the "reliability of supply, technology
transfer, and the relationship of the transaction to the semiconductor in-
dustry research consortium SEMATECH." '92
The second transaction that was the subject of a review was the ac-
quisition of Westinghouse Electric Corporation's interest in a joint ven-
control, the strength of the United States economy would be affected.
Ultimately, CFIUS determined that a full scale investigation was not warranted. On
March 23, 1989, CFIUS announced that the proposed Gold Fields acquisition by Minorco
posed no threat to United States national security. In a rare public statement, CFIUS stated
that even in a worst case scenario, the Gold Fields acquisition by Minorco would pose no
threat to mineral supplies to the United States.
As a general rule, CFIUS activity is confidential. As such, the basis for any CFIUS
ruling under Exon-Florio is not made public and is in fact exempt from Freedom of Infor-
mation Act requests. The release of a public statement by CFIUS was unexpected and is not
likely to be frequently repeated.
89. Tolchin, Monsanto Unit Sale Faces Inquiry, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1988, at D3, col.
1 (citing Defense News, Dec. 20, 1988). See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1989, at D5, col. 4.
90. Congressmen Ask Bush to Block Sale of Wafer Maker to West German Firm, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) DER No. 23 (Feb. 6, 1989). Concern was focused on the manu-
facture of silicon wafers. The assertion was made that if the proposed transaction were con-
summated, the United States share of the silicon wafer world-wide chip market would fall
from fourteen percent to two percent. The congressmen stated this was unacceptable and
noted that" . . . the United States is lagging severely behind its competitors in its ability to
produce computer chips, the virtual sell-off of the wafer industry will help seal the fate of
our weakening high-technology infrastructure ......
91. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Feb. 7, 1989.
92. Id. See also Farnsworth, Bush Won't Block Chip Unit's Sale, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8,
1989, at Dl, col. 4. SEMATECH is an industry-government consortium that was formed to
jump-start the United States semiconductor industry.
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ture by its joint venture partner ASEA Brown Boveri Ltd. (ABB). 3 The
ABB-Westinghouse joint venture was involved in the manufacture, distri-
bution, sale and servicing of electrical transmission and distribution
equipment in the United States. In an effort to decrease CFIUS concerns
about the future of the United States' electrical transmission capabilities,
ABB notified CFIUS that it intended to "continue the manufacture, ser-
vicing, repair, research and design in the United States of these high volt-
age transformers."9 ' In asserting the same criteria for Presidential action
as was outlined in the MEMC-Huels investigation, President Bush again
refused to take action.
The third investigation was concluded on August 18, 1989. The trans-
action in question involved the acquisition of three Fairchild Industries
divisions by Matra S.A., a French firm. The three Fairchild divisions
were: Fairchild Communications & Electronics Company, Fairchild Con-
trol Systems Company, and Fairchild Space Company. All three of the
Fairchild divisions and Matra were engaged in the manufacture of hard-
ware and software for aerospace systems and spacecraft. This transaction
did not involve an investigation as much as a negotiation. During the
course of its "investigation," CFIUS sought concessions from Matra to
prevent the export of sensitive computer technologies. Working in concert
with the Department of Commerce, Matra developed and pledged to in-
stitute a comprehensive export control management system that was
viewed as sufficient.9 5 The President, in making his determination that
intervention was unnecessary, determined that the safeguards developed
by Matra and the Department of Commerce were sufficient to protect
sensitive technologies from unauthorized transfer outside the United
States."9
A quick review of the three above referenced transactions, and Presi-
dential inaction, would seem to indicate that Exon-Florio is little more
than a paper tiger.9 7 However, this perception changed with the CFIUS
investigation of the proposed acquisition of General Ceramics, Inc. by
Tokuyama Soda Co. Ltd. of Japan. General Ceramics receives seven per-
cent of its total sales from the sale of beryllium ceramics for military
equipment. Although the proposed transaction was never referred to the
President for official action, CFIUS intervention ultimately caused the
93. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, May 17, 1989.
94. Id.
95. Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, August 18, 1989.
96. Id. The President weighed the proposed safeguards against that criteria first out-
lined in the MEMC transaction and reiterated in the Westinghouse sale.
97. Tolchin, supra note 56. In assessing the impact of CFIUS on international capital
flows into the United States:
CFIUS is known around government circles as a "paper tiger": It rarely meets
and has never to anyone's knowledge, blocked a foreign investment. Consider-
ing that CFIUS is the only foreign-investment review mechanism in the execu-
tive branch, its inactivity speaks volumes about government complacency to-
ward foreign investment.
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parties to shelve the deal." CFIUS unofficially notified Tokuyama that it
intended to recommend that President Bush block the proposed acquisi-
tion. As a result of this "unofficial" notice, Tokuyama withdrew its
CFIUS notification and agreed to restructure the deal to exclude the Gen-
eral Ceramics division that produces military equipment."
The CFIUS action with respect to the Tokuyama acquisition elicited
praise from Congressmen Exon and Florio. In lauding the aggressive pos-
ture taken by CFIUS, Rep. Florio stated: "[Exon-Florio] is working al-
most exactly as we envisioned it would." 110 If Rep. Florio is accurately
portraying the intent of Congress in passing Exon-Florio, the intended
scope of government intervention is extreme. Such "unofficial" govern-
ment intervention could become a sanctioned form of economic black-
mail. Critics of the CFIUS action have noted that in reviewing proposed
transactions, CFIUS has acted without regard for the potential effect on
national security. In outlining the CFIUS posture on making investigation
recommendations, one opponent noted: "In most cases, it comes down to
a popularity contest . . . . The focus should be on the technology and
whether we want to see it in foreign hands."' 0'1 Thus, it appears as if the
threat of intrusive action by CFIUS has already been realized.
The final investigation undertaken by CFIUS fully illustrates the
scope of presidential power conferred by Exon-Florio. The parties in-
volved in this investigation were MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc.
("MAMCO") and the China National Aero-Technology Import and Ex-
port Corporation ("CATIC"). MAMCO is a company incorporated in the
State of Washington whose principal business is machining and
fabricating metal parts for civilian aircraft. A large proportion of
MAMCO's production is sold to a single manufacturer. Although
MAMCO has no contracts with the U.S. government involving classified
information, some of the machinery it uses during production is subject
to U.S. export controls. CATIC is an export-import company operating
under the direct control of the Ministry of Aerospace Industry of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (the "Ministry"). The Ministry engages in re-
search and development, design, and manufacture of military and com-
mercial aircraft, missiles, and aircraft engines. CATIC has sectors,
including commercial aircraft.
In accordance with the "voluntary" nature of CFIUS notification,
MAMCO notified CFIUS of CATIC's intention to acquire MAMCO. On
November 30, 1989, CATIC completed its purchase of all outstanding
voting stock of MAMCO. CATIC completed this acquisition before
98. Pine, Security Factors Delay Sale of Ceramics Firm, L.A. Times, April 19, 1989, at
§ 4, at 5, col. 1.
99. Id. The General Ceramics unit in question was involved in the manufacture of parts
for nuclear weapons as part of a classified contract with the Department of Energy.
100. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1989, at D6, col. 5.
101. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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CFIUS had completed its review. 102 On December 4, 1989, CFIUS deter-
mined to undertake a formal investigation to determine MAMCO's pre-
sent and potential production capabilities and technology. Specifically,
the investigation focused upon the'national security implications of
CATIC's purchase. To gather information relevant to the CFIUS request,
officials from the Departments of Commerce and Defense, representing
CFIUS, visited MAMCO to conduct an on site investigation. In accor-
dance with the statutory requirements imposed by Exon-Florio, the
CFIUS representatives focused on the presence of any credible evidence
that CATIC might take action which could impair national security. In
addition, CFIUS also focused on the adequacy of any other laws that
were appropriate to deal with the threat presented by CATIC's acquisi-
tion of MAMCO.
After a review of the CFIUS investigation and a consideration of its
recommendations, President Bush ultimately chose to order CATIC to
divest its acquisition of MAMCO. In ordering divestment, the President
ordered and authorized three specific actions:
1. CATIC will have three months in which to divest itself of MAMCO.
2. During the pendency of CATIC's divestment, CFIUS will monitor
the divestment process. The President also authorized CFIUS to take'
measures necessary to ensure protection of the national security.
3. This decision by the President will not have any impact on
CATIC's other business arrangements in the United States.'03
102. Although completion of a proposed acquisition potentially subject to an Exon-
Florio review is not politically astute, nothing in the statute prohibits such action. Further,
nothing in the statute requires the participants in a transaction to notify CFIUS before
consummating any deal. However, given the highly politicized nature of deal making with
respect to CFIUS investigations, it appears that the prudent course would be complete dis-
closure of the change in status of any deal being reviewed by CFIUS.
103. Order Pursuant to § 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950. Released by the
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, February 2, 1990. The exact text of the order
reads as follows:
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and stat-
utes of the United States of America, including § 721 of the Defense Produc-
tion Act of 1950 ("§ 721"), 50 U.S.C. App. 1270,
Section 1. Findings. I hereby make the following findings:
(1) There is credible evidence that leads me to believe that in exercising
its control of MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc. ("MAMCO"), a corporation incor-
porated under the laws of the State of Washington, the China National Aero-
Technology Import and Export Corporation ("CATIC") might take action that
threatens to impair the national security of the United States of America; and
(2) provisions of law, other than § 721 and the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), do not in my judgment provide
adequate and appropriate authority for me to protect the national security in
this matter.
Section 2. Actions Ordered and Authorized. On the basis of the findings
set forth in § 1 of this Order, I hereby order that:
(1) CATIC's acquisition of control of MAMCO and its assets, whether di-
rectly or through subsidiaries or affiliates, is prohibited.
(2) CATIC and its subsidiaries and affiliates shall divest all of their inter-
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Although the impact of Exon-Florio on CATIC was very burdensome
and economically draconic, the President was effusive in distinguishing
the CATIC acquisition from other direct foreign investment. In espousing
the benefit to the United States of an open policy toward foreign invest-
ment, President Bush set forth the following position:
The United States welcomes foreign direct investment in this country;
it provides foreign investors fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory
treatment. This Administration is committed to maintaining that pol-
icy. There are circumstances in which the United States maintains
limited exception to such treatment. Generally these exceptions are
necessary to protect national security. Of those foreign mergers, acqui-
sitions, and takeovers which have been reviewed under the Exon-
Florio provision to determine effects on national security, this is the
first time I have invoked § 721 authority. My action in this case is in
response to circumstances of this particular transaction. It does not
change our open investment policy and is not a precedent for the fu-
ture with regard to direct investment in the United States from the
People's Republic of China or any other country.0 4
est in MAMCO and its assets by May 1, 1990, 3 months from the date of this
Order, unless such date is extended for a period not to exceed 3 months, on
such written conditions as the committee of Foreign Investment in the United
States ("CFIUS") may require. Immediately upon divestment, CATIC shall
certify in writing to CFIUS that such divestment has been effected in accor-
dance with this Order.
(3) Without limitation on the exercise of authority by any agency under
other provisions of law, and until such time as the divestment is completed,
CFIUS is authorized to implement measures it deems necessary and appropri-
ate to verify that operations of MAMCO are carried out in such manner as to
ensure protection of the national security interests of the United States. Such
measures may include but are not limited to the following: On reasonable no-
tice to MAMCO, CATIC, or CATIC's subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively "the
Parties"), employees of the United States Government, as designated by
CFIUS, shall be permitted access to all facilities of the Parties located in the
United States -
(a) to inspect and copy any books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence,
memoranda, and other records and documents in the possession or under the
control of the Parties that concern any matter relating to this Order;
(b) to inspect any equipment, containers, packages, and technical data (in-
cluding software) in the possession or under the control of the Parties; and
(c) to interview officers, employees, or agents of the Parties concerning any
matter relating to this Order.
(4) The Attorney General is authorized to take any steps he deems neces-
sary to enforce this Order.
Section 3. Reservations. I hereby reserve my authority, until such time as
the divestment required by this Order has been completed, to issue further
orders with respect to the Parties as shall in my judgment be necessary to
protect the national security.
Section 4. Publication. This Order shall be published in the Federal
Register.
[signed and dated: George Bush, February 1, 1990]
104. Release to the Congress of the United States, The White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, February 2, 1990. Although this was the first "official" action taken under
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Summarizing the 243 transactions referred to CFIUS through Febru-
ary 2, 1990, only three, Tokuyama, MATRA and CATIC were required to
restructure proposed transactions. As such, it would appear as if CFIUS
has acted with restraint in determining the transactions that pose a
threat to "national security."
Unfortunately, there are no assurances that future administrations
will act with similar restraint. Because much of CFIUS activity is con-
ducted under a shroud of secrecy, the potential for abuse appears bound-
less. As such, CFIUS could use its authority to insist that a proposed deal
be restructured or face cancellation.10 5 Further, concessions could be de-
manded from foreign investors that in the long run would hamper the
economic viability of an entity. This is troublesome given the latitude in
defining national security. A future administration may decide that na-
tional security is synonymous with economic security or that promotion
of a national industrial policy is a tenant of national security. Given the
breadth of the statute, the silence of the regulations, and the latitude
given CFIUS in fashioning "unofficial" solution, such a scenario is well
within the realm of possibilities. Further, after the recent action taken to
thwart the CATIC acquisition of MAMCO, CFIUS has put foreign ac-
quirers on notice that no one can ignore the potential impact of Exon-
Florio when planning the acquisition of a United States company.
Another area of potential abuse is in the area of confidential and sen-
sitive business information and trade secrets. Presently, under Exon-
Florio, Congress and members of their staff have access to the confiden-
tial information filed in connection with a Presidential request.'0 6 Al-
though the statute asserts that any information provided in connection
with a request will remain confidential, the potential for disclosure is
great. Congress must by its very nature serve its constituents. Frequently,
members of Congress will be asked by their constituents to address and
intervene in local corporate affairs.10 7 As such, this situation presents a
member of Congress with a dilemma. Should information given to the
President or CFIUS remain confidential, or should we provide a target
company that happens to be a "constituent" with the foreign company's
the guise of Exon-Florio, as a review of previous cases reveals, CFIUS has been able to get
concessions from foreign investors before consummating a transaction. See supra notes 99-
102 and accompanying text. It is this unofficial inquiry and action which presents foreign
acquirers with the greatest potential hurdle in consummating the acquisition of a United
States company when members of CFIUS determine that such an acquisition may impact
national security.
105. A review of the Tokuyama and MATRA proposals confirm this assertion. Given
the pressure exerted by CFIUS in getting the two acquirers to restructure the proposed
deals, it is probable that if concessions were not agreed upon, that CFIUS would have rec-
ommended to the President that the transactions be blocked.
106. See Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, supra note 79 at § 2170(c).
107. An excellent example of this scenario was exhibited in the Goodyear offer by Gold-
smith. As the text implies, Goldsmith may have abandoned his bid to avoid the specter of
legislative intervention.
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takeover plans for the target. It would seem beneficial for members of
Congress to provide their constituents with such information.
Another problem is that any material provided in connection with an
Exon-Florio request may be made available to parties in any "administra-
tive or judicial action or proceeding. 08 Given this availability, any time a
company is threatened with a takeover from a foreign investor, the target
could file suit under a myriad of claims, send a notice to CFIUS, and
subsequently make a request to have all information provided to CFIUS
made public for purposes of trial preparation. Thus, it would seem that
the veil of confidentiality is one that is extremely transparent. In practice,
there is no guarantee whatsoever of confidentiality. This factor alone may
be enough to drive well intentioned foreign investment out of the United
States.
Confidentiality aside, disclosure of the information to Congress car-
ries the threat that the entire review process will be politicized. In form,
CFIUS should be a non-partisan review process that only addresses the
merits of a transaction as they affect "national security." However, by
giving Congress broad latitude in access to CFIUS data, Congress may be
tempted to use such information as ammunition in attempts to derail a
CFIUS decision. Certainly a member of Congress would have much to
gain by publicly second-guessing an unpopular decision by CFIUS.
Exon-Florio may also be misused as an anti-takeover device."0 9 Given
the minimal scrutiny required for a member of CFIUS to call for an in-
vestigation, Exon-Florio could very possibly be used as a deal buster. 1
Should a United States company find itself facing a hostile tender offer, it
will surely seek to invoke Exon-Florio. If defensive management is suc-
cessful in getting CFIUS to initiate an investigation, they could buy
themselves up to ninety days to plot their defensive strategy."' Given the
speed and exactitude under which the majority of hostile tender offers
108. Title VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950, supra note 79, at § (c).
109. Exon-Florio may also come into play in friendly transactions. It is clear that third
parties cannot file notices under Exon-Florio. However, there is nothing in the law that
prevents interested third parties from communicating with the members of CFIUS about
any transaction involving a foreign investor. Further, these interested parties could also
bring their political might to bear on the backs of their members of Congress who could
ultimately influence CFIUS to commence an investigation. The potential list of "interested"
third parties is virtually boundless. Shareholders, institutional investors, employees, major
competitors, labor unions, state and local governments and many other individuals and in-
terest groups possess significant political power. It is very easy to envision the situation
where powerful local constituents of a member of Congress pressures that member to influ-
ence CFIUS to take action. As in the case of disclosing confidential information, it is certain
that at some time, CFIUS and the application of Exon-Florio will become politicized.
110. It only requires the affirmative vote of one member of CFIUS to initiate the review
process. As such, the potential for abuse is staggering. Target management will certainly
seek to maintain close contact with a member of CFIUS during times of siege. By doing so,
the target could provide the CFIUS member with sufficient ammunition to invoke Exon-
Florio and indirectly derail a foreign hostile takeover bid.
111. See generally supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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commence, ninety days in plotting your takeover defense is tantamount
to years of corporate strategy. Thus, it is almost assured that a target,
given ninety days to formulate a defense, could easily find a white knight
or big brother,"' undertake a restructuring defense,1 ' or complete some
other action that would eliminate the threat of a hostile takeover." 4
CONCLUSION
Direct foreign investment in the United States provides significant
economic benefits. Frequently, foreign investment will serve as a stimu-
lant to a depressed area or a company in financial hardship. A recent
example of this impact is Bridgestone's purchase of Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company. Prior to Bridgestone's acquisition, Firestone had con-
112. See Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.
1984); but see, Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985). In a
typical white knight/big brother situation, a target's management has made the determina-
tion that the only way they can remain independent is to sell a large block of their stock to
a friendly suitor. Frequently, to entice a friendly suitor, target management may enter into
a "standstill" agreement that limits the white knight's ability to vote its shares and giving
the knight the right to acquire additional shares. Although these agreements may not be in
the best interests of shareholders, the target management can assert the business judgement
rule and claim the takeover bid is not in the best interest of shareholders. Generally, if the
standstill agreement does not consolidate voting power in the hands of management, courts
will allow this defensive measure.
113. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1986); but see AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d (Del.
Ch. Ct. 1986); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Edward P. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. Ct.
1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. Super. Ct. 1989). Re-
structuring defenses have in the past been very effective in deflecting junk bond and two-
tier takeovers. In theory, a target company that undertakes a corporate restructuring should
be able to provide its shareholders with a better value than is being offered by the suitor.
Arguably, a suitor or raider is proposing the deal to enrich themselves where a restructuring
should inure to the benefit of current shareholders. Further, in a restructuring, it is possible
for current shareholders to maintain an ownership position in the company. As such, this is
frequently viewed as a more palatable alternative than being cashed by a raider. However,
as a practical matter, a restructuring defense may also be used by incumbent management
to enrich themselves.
Another advantage to a restructuring is that a company does not necessarily open itself
up to outside offers when implementing its plan. In this respect, a restructuring is superior
to a white knight strategy. Should it be determined that the directors have offered to sell
the company, and they receive (legitimate) unsolicited offers, the company may subse-
quently be thrust into an auction.
Restructuring defenses may include self tenders, crown jewel sales or sales of attractive
assets, corporate divestitures, and recapitalizations.
114. A complete review of all the defensive measures and tactics available is beyond the
scope of this article. This is an area of the law that undergoes daily permutations. Attempt-
ing to summarize such an area is virtually impossible. However, it is important to know that
problems exist within the structure of Exon-Florio that may enhance the position of target
management in hostile battles for corporate control.
Given this disclaimer, for a complete discussion of the law and strategies that impact
corporate control battles see HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1989 (P.L.I. Nos.
632, 633) (prepared for distribution at the Hostile Battles for Corporate Control Program,
Co-Chairmen Dennis J. Block and Harvey L. Pitt, Feb. 23-24, 1989).
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sidered closing its truck radial tire plant located in La Vergne, Tennessee.
Fortunately for the 1400 workers employed in this location, Bridgestone
was able to keep the plant open. Additionally, the region was spared al-
most certain financial devastation.'1 5 Granted, foreign investment is not
without its drawbacks. 11 However, Exon-Florio is not the proper mecha-
nism in its present form to deal with the concerns being generated over
foreign investment. As written, the law suffers from a severe case of over-
breadth. The potential for abuse is great. The lack of clarity provides
CFIUS with excessive discretion. Finally, there are too many questions
that have been left unanswered by the proposed regulations.
To cure these problems, several solutions have been proposed. One
such proposal was to provide a streamlined no-action procedure that
would allow counsel for the interested parties to seek the equivalent of a
Securities and Exchange Commission no-action position to the effect that
the President would take no enforcement action under Exon-Florio."'
Another workable proposal called for the inclusion of explicit regulatory
exemptions for transactions involving specified types of industries."' The
argument for this proposal is that the damage Exon-Florio could wreak
on the economy would be minimized without compromising the integrity
of national security." 9 Thus, it is clear there are solutions to the problems
posed by Exon-Florio. Additionally, if action is not taken to eliminate the
potential draconian impact of Exon-Florio, United States companies may
see the international demand for their securities drastically reduced. Not
only would this affect the long term market value of a company's securi-
ties, American shareholders would also suffer adverse economic conse-
quences. As such, we should all think twice before jumping on the band-
wagon in support of Exon-Florio.
115. For a complete discussion of Bridgestone's efforts, see Tolchin, supra note 56, at
63, 81-93, 269.
116. Id. at 16-32, 259-274. See also Note, An Evaluation of the Need for Further Stat-
utory Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 147, 182-187; Little, The Impact of Acquisition by Foreigners on the Financial Health of
the U.S., NEw ENG. ECON. REV., Jul./Aug. 1982, at 40; Roberts, A Minefield of Myths, Bus.
WK., Jan. 28, 1985, at 18; Reich & Mankin, Joint Ventures with Japan Give Away our
Future, 64 HARV. Bus. REV., Mar./Apr. 1986, at 78.
117. See Wall St. J., August 30, 1989, at A10, col. 3. This suggestion was put forth by
Susan W. Liebeler, former chairperson of the United States International Trade Commis-
sion, 1986-88.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Human Rights and Foreign Policy
REVIEWED BY DR. R.K.L. PANJABI*
HILL, DILYS M. (ED.), HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE.** MacMillan Press, London (1989),
ISBN 0333436547, 208 pp.
This book consists of a series of very interesting articles in the field
of human rights. Most of the contributors are lawyers and political scien-
tists working in England, Wales and Thailand. Their work will undoubt-
edly be a significant addition to an ongoing debate which has generated
international interest and concern. This book will be useful both for in-
ternational lawyers and for students who wish to acquire a variety of per-
spectives on the issue of human rights.
The significant international concern over the violations of human
rights around the world has generated a spate of academic and legal writ-
ing on this issue in recent years. The attempt to promote the cause of
human rights awareness has already yielded results, if events in Eastern
Europe are any indication. Any book, article or pamphlet on this subject
serves a useful purpose either in exposing violations or in analyzing the
nature and scope of human rights and the serious implementational
problems involved.
James Crawford in his book, The Rights of People,' explored the
compatibility of the so-called third generation of human rights (including
the right to development, right to peace and right to a healthy environ-
ment) with the first two generations which comprise civil and political
rights and economic, social and cultural rights.
Dilys Hill and her contributors concentrate on another facet of this
fundamental issue, the interconnections between human rights and for-
eign policy. They explore the link existing between a government's need
* Associate Professor, Memorial University, Canada.
** This book forms part of the series of Southampton Studies in International Policy.
The University of Southampton hosted a Workshop Conference on Human Rights and For-
eign Policy in 1986. Funding was provided by the Nuffield Foundation. The articles in the
compilation were part of the proceedings of the Conference.
1. CRAWFORD, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE (1988).
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to ensure the success of its foreign policy goals regardless of human rights
considerations and growing world public opinion which demands that for-
eign policy makers recognize the significance of avowed commitments to
human rights issues. The book emphasizes the international refugee crisis
as a case study of the reluctance of governments in the developed world
to come to terms with human rights issues within the context of long
range planning. The existing system of largely ad hoc "bandaid" mea-
sures has failed to eradicate the fundamental causes of refugee flows and
thousands of displaced persons have fallen victims to the restrictiveness
of entry procedures into Europe and North America. These problems are
inevitable when largely political solutions are proposed for a human di-
lemma, where the claims are also moral in nature.
In her introduction, Dilys Hill, drawing on the views of the partici-
pants in the Workshop Conference, examines the moral issues involved in
human rights and explores the divide between universalism and particu-
larism; between the idea of rights shared by all and the more precise con-
centration on specific matters relative to rights.
In a system based on nation states with sovereign authority, any im-
plementation and action on human rights is largely in the hands of gov-
ernments which have frequently shown considerable resistance to, and re-
sentment of, external agencies and foreign states which seek to persuade
or pressure them in the direction of improving their human rights record.
Contributor lain Elliot highlights this problem with reference to the
U.S.S.R.'s record on human rights. While his article has a strong moral
tone and is largely negative about the Soviet record, Elliot is careful to
prove his conclusions with an analysis of the significance of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.) and the Final Act
(1975). While the Government of U.S.S.R. averred its commitment to the
Helsinki Final Act, Elliot points out that the same government has im-
prisoned sixty of the eighty Soviet citizens who joined unofficial human
rights monitoring groups. Fifteen of the eighty were exiled, four died in
prison and one was killed in a street accident.'
Examining the first years of Gorbachev's term in power, Elliot sees
some improvement but feels that the human rights issue is not of primary
concern in the minds of those who determine policy in the Soviet Union.'
It would appear that attempts by the world's leading democracies to per-
suade the Soviet Union to improve its human rights record have had
mixed results. Events in Europe since the writing of Elliot's article might
encourage him. The loosening of Moscow's hold on Eastern Europe; the
largely nonviolent democratic revolutions in Germany, Poland and Czech-
oslovakia, the tumultuous demands within U.S.S.R. for self-determina-
tion (specifically in Lithuania and Azerbaijan) all demonstrate a climate
of greater freedom, even if it is accompanied by more political turmoil.
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Time will tell how far the Soviet political system will bend in implement-
ing the human rights demands of its ethnic minorities.
To turn to the democratic states, Alex Cunliffe, in a lucid, very well-
written article, discusses economic aid as an instrument for the promotion
of human rights. Democracies like the United Kingdom and the United
States have drawn criticism for neglecting the obvious connection be-
tween human rights and the grant or withdrawal of foreign aid. In the
United States, the President most committed to human rights issues,
Jimmy Carter, reduced aid to only three countries (Argentina, Uruguay
and Ethiopia) out of fifty-seven serious violators of human rights." Rea-
sons of State obviously take precedence over human rights issues where
American foreign policy is concerned. Cunliffe also believes that the Brit-
ish government's record is similar.
To encourage greater commitment by dpmocratic governments to
promoting human rights and increased receptivity by nations which are
aid recipients to persuasion in this matter, Cunliffe supports the creation
of reciprocal arrangements "whereby the donor's own political system
may be subject to similar scrutiny."' The donor and recipient would then
assess each other's human rights record on the basis of an equal footing.
This might avoid the inevitable diplomatic crises generated by criticisms
of a foreign government's domestic policies and actions by the donor
country. Cunliffe also proposes that foreign aid be used to reward states
with good human rights records, thereby lending encouragement to the
continuation of such policies in the recipient state.6
The double standard whereby Western states do not practice as they
preach is most evident in the international refugee crisis which is rapidly
becoming a source of alarm for governments around the world. Estimates
of refugee numbers vary. The United Nations believes that there are over
thirteen million refugees. 7 These people have fled their homes because of
political repression, economic deprivation and violations of their human
rights. Most tragic are the cases of individuals kept indefinitely in "or-
bit, ' shuttled from country to country unable to find a home anywhere.
The plight of the millions of international homeless has been seriously
considered in this book and some extremely useful proposals have been
suggested.
Recognizing the fact that states do not deal adequately with the
causes of refugee flows and that the United Nations lacks the capacity to
address this issue in any effective manner, the contributing authors have
proposed that humanitarian institutions intervene before the commence-
ment of refugee flows in order to avert a crisis.' Gil Loescher emphasizes
4. Id. at 121.
5. Id. at 124.
6. Id. at 125.
7. Id. at 140.
8. Id. at 174.
9. Id. at 132.
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the problems generated by the politicization of the refugee problem, an
approach which might destabilize an enemy state but which can also re-
verberate on the receiving states which have to house, feed and clothe
thousands of displaced persons. While the Western European and North
American states were eager to accommodate European refugees from
communist states, the reception given to Third World refugees has been
quite different. Asian nations like Thailand have borne a heavy burden of
refugee inflows and have grounds for feeling that there is indeed a double
standard operating in this regard as far as Western states are concerned.
Recently, the National Film Board of Canada produced a film, "Who
Gets In?," which explored the highly controversial nature of the Cana-
dian Government's immigration and refugee policies. The film revealed
that entry into Canada for those with wealth would be relatively simple
on the basis of these policies. On the other hand, thousands of deserving
candidates, many genuine refugees, were being denied entry. The film
concluded by suggesting ironically that on the basis of such restrictive
entry criteria, few of those who now enjoy Canadian citizenship would
even qualify for entry into their country.
In his contribution to the book being reviewed, Johan Cels has ex-
plained the refugee policies of West European governments and he points
out that "compassion-fatigue" has led to severe restrictions on acceptance
of refugees and violation of the non-refoulement principles. 0 In Ger-
many, courts have affirmed that fear of torture is not a sufficient ground
for conferring refugee status unless the torture is "politically
motivated.""
The proposals suggested by contributor Julia Hiusermann (Director,
Rights and Humanity) are practical and worthy of serious consideration.
She suggests the strengthening of the "activities of the U.N. with respect
to the underlying causes of flight"; a greater effort by states to implement
humanitarian law, especially in wartime and thereby reduce the necessity
for civilians to flee; consideration of problems of "potential displace-
ment"; the further development of regional institutions to deal with the
root causes of refugee flows and "the provision of relief assistance within
the border of the victim's own country."' 2 Hiusermann also supports the
recommendation by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan (in his report on Human
Rights and Massive Exodus prepared for the United Nations) for the cre-
ation of a "Corps of Humanitarian Observers" to monitor volatile situa-
tions. Prince Sadruddin also proposed the appointment of a Special Rep-
resentative for Humanitarian Questions whose task would be to
anticipate refugee flows and alert the international community. 3
Vitit Muntarbhorn, a law professor in Thailand, adds to the concrete
10. Id. at 168.
11. Id. at 173.
12. Id. at 142-57.
13. Id. at 159-60.
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suggestions in this book and considers the problem of self-determination
and the State's claim to disallow secession. His recognition of the phe-
nomenon of "internal colonialism"1 leads him to propose that if the level
of oppression of a minority approaches a point that resembles colonial-
ism, then a right of self-determination arises which justifies secession. 8
Just how this point is to be gauged in unclear. Contributor Sally Morphet
asserts that Third World countries have a variety of approaches to the
idea of internal self-determination 6 and states that while a right of seces-
sion is not likely to become an implicit part of self-determination, the
future might generate interest in a "cosmopolitan conception of interna-
tional community in which state boundaries have a merely derivative sig-
nificance . ".1.."7
Finally, a review of this length can at best only distill the essence of a
remarkable collection of essays, a number of them incisive in analysis and
useful in the practicality of their suggestions for concrete action. From
Moorhead Wright's plea for codification and implementation of human
rights as having a moral claim in international society,1 8 to R.J. Vincent's
eloquent proposal that:
A rational approach to human rights in foreign policy would recognize
the reality of plural idealogies of the world of states, and seek a neu-
tral language in which to express principles that ought to apply re-
gardless of location in East or West, North or South."
This. book presents the reader not merely with a series of problems but
also, with interesting solutions. As such, it forms a valuable contribution
to the growing literature on this subject and one can only hope that those
who formulate the policies of governments will read it.
14. Id. at 190.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 83.
17. Id. at 86.
18. Id. at 52.
19. Id. at 63.
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